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ABSTRACT
The sixteen words in the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment have their
roots in England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688–89. This Article traces the historical
events that initially gave rise to the prohibitions against excessive bail, excessive
fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. Those three proscriptions can be found
in the English Declaration of Rights and in its statutory counterpart, the English Bill
of Rights. In particular, the Article describes the legal cases and draconian punish-
ments during the Stuart dynasty that led English and Scottish parliamentarians to
insist on protections against cruelty and excessive governmental actions. In describ-
ing the grotesque punishments of Titus Oates and others during the reign of King
James II, the Article sheds light on the origins of the language of Section 10 of the
English Bill of Rights. That language became a model for similarly worded provi-
sions in early American constitutions and declarations of rights, including the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, that were linguistic forerunners of the Eighth Amendment.
The U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment, ratified in 1791, became the law of the
land more than 100 years after the Glorious Revolution, though that provision of the
U.S. Bill of Rights was shaped by the Enlightenment as well as by early American
understandings of English law and custom. The Article describes the seventeenth-
century origins of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions and the Enlightenment’s
impact on eighteenth-century thinkers, while highlighting how existing American
prohibitions against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punish-
ments are now understood to bar acts inconsistent with “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” The Article concludes by
outlining the implications of the Eighth Amendment’s history for modern American
jurisprudence. In doing so, it provides a critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent
Eighth Amendment decision in Bucklew v. Precythe.
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; Adjunct Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center; Of Counsel, Berens & Miller, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota. The author extends his appreciation and thanks to Raquel Flynn and Shannon
Hayden, two University of Baltimore law students who provided outstanding research as-
sistance during this Article’s preparation.
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INTRODUCTION
The meaning of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment has long been treated
as an enigma.1 Since its ratification in 1791, the significance of the Eighth Amend-
ment’s sixteen words2 has been fiercely debated—and hotly contested—by innumer-
able scholars and law professors,3 countless judges,4 practicing lawyers,5 and members
of the American public more broadly.6 It is a debate with important, sometimes life-
or-death, consequences,7 and it is one that has played out in countless law review
1 See Joseph L. Hoffmann, “The ‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment’ Clause,” in THE BILL
OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 173 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., rev. &
expanded ed. 2000) (“The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment
today remains a constitutional enigma.”).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
3 Compare RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT’S OBSTACLE
COURSE 1–6 (1982) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972), which declared the death penalty to be a “cruel and unusual” punish-
ment, was wrongly decided), with HUGO ADAM BEDAU, KILLING AS PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS
ON THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 91 (2004) (arguing that “an appropriate moral reading
of the Eighth Amendment yields the conclusion that the death penalty is, indeed, unconstitu-
tional”). A number of prominent scholars have written about the Eighth Amendment. See,
e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Execution and the Forgotten Eighth Amendment, in AMERICA’S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FU-
TURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 547–77 (James Acker, Robert Bohm & Charles
Lanier eds., 1998); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (2009); Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the Eighth Amendment:
Slaves, Prisoners, and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 94 N.C. L. REV. 817 (2016); Meghan
J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That
Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567 (2010).
4 Compare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (“It is apparent from the text of
the Constitution itself that the existence of capital punishment was accepted by the Framers.
At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, capital punishment was a common sanction
in every State. Indeed, the First Congress of the United States enacted legislation providing
death as the penalty for specified crimes.”), with Kevin M. Barry, The Law of Abolition, 107
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 523 (2017) (“[F]or over a half-century, at least thirty-five
federal and state judges have concluded that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se.”).
5 See, e.g., COLIN DAYAN, THE STORY OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (2007).
6 See, e.g., Bob Herbert, In America; Cruel and Unusual, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2001), https://
nyti.ms/2IByrwG; Carl Hiaasen, Cruel and Unusual Ways of Execution, MIAMI HERALD
(May 3, 2014), https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/carl-hiaasen/arti
cle1963811.html [http://perma.cc/9H2L-UGT3].
7 See generally JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY
AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT (2012) [hereinafter BESSLER, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL]; MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (2011) (discussing the history and development of the Eighth Amendment).
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articles,8 in state and federal courts,9 and before the highest court in the land, the
Supreme Court of the United States.10
Although the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions originally applied only against the
federal government,11 the U.S. Supreme Court—using its selective incorporation
doctrine12—made the ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” applicable against the
8 See, e.g., William W. Berry III, Evolved Standards, Evolving Justices? The Case for
a Broader Application of the Eighth Amendment, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 105 (2018); Laurence
Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119 (2004);
Aliza Plener Cover, The Eighth Amendment’s Lost Jurors: Death Qualification and Evolving
Standards of Decency, 92 IND. L.J. 113 (2016); Phyllis Goldfarb, Arriving Where We’ve Been:
Death’s Indignity and the Eighth Amendment, 102 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 386 (2018); Scott W.
Howe, The Implications of Incorporating the Eighth Amendment Prohibition on Excessive
Bail, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1039 (2015); Robert Johnson, Solitary Confinement Until Death
by State-Sponsored Homicide: An Eighth Amendment Assessment of the Modern Execution
Process, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1213 (2016); Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously:
Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2129.
9 See, e.g., Larry C. Berkson, The Eighth Amendment: A New Frontier of Creative Con-
stitutional Law, in CIVIL LIBERTIES: POLICY AND POLICY MAKING 107 (Stephen L. Wasby
ed., 1976):
[T]he concept of cruel and unusual punishment has, until very recently,
remained an obscure, if important, part of the Bill of Rights. For example,
after an exhaustive search of opinions reported prior to 1870, only 20
cases were found that dealt with the prohibition. Beginning with that
date, however, larger number of cases raising the issue did begin appear-
ing before state and federal courts. The total by 1916 was slightly over
200 cases. The number of cases reported during each subsequent ten-
year period rose in rather even increments until the 1955–66 era. At
that time, litigation of the inhibition nearly doubled (253 cases).
10 See generally CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SU-
PREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2016) (focusing on the Eighth Amendment as
interpreted historically by the Supreme Court).
11 See Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866); Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); see also GEORGE F. COLE, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & CHRISTINA
DEJONG, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 169 (15th ed. 2017) (“For most of
U.S. history, the Bill of Rights did not apply to most criminal cases, because it was designed
to protect people from abusive actions by the federal government.”).
12 See KÄREN MATISON HESS & CHRISTINE HESS ORTHMANN, INTRODUCTION TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55 (10th ed. 2012) (“The selective incorporation
doctrine holds that only those provisions of the Bill of Rights fundamental to the American
legal process are made applicable to the states through the due process clause.”); Jerold H.
Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 1319, 1327 (1977) (noting that, under the selective incorporation doctrine, “once it
is decided that a particular guarantee is fundamental, that guarantee is incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment ‘whole and intact’ and is enforced against the states by the same
standards applied to the federal government”); see also David Sloss, Incorporation, Federal-
ism, and International Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL JUDGMENTS: THE
AMERICAN STORY 84–85 (Austin Sarat ed., 2017) (discussing the Supreme Court’s selective
incorporation doctrine).
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states in 196213 in Robinson v. California.14 In 1971, consistent with the history
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment’s post–Civil War ratification,15 the U.S.
13 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 493 (1977) (noting that “[t]he eighth amendment’s prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment was applied to state action in 1962 . . . .” (citing Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962))).
14 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See also NANCY D. CAMPBELL, DISCOVERING ADDICTION: THE
SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH 135 (2007) (“The U.S. Supreme
Court interpreted addiction as a condition akin to illness in Robinson v. California (1962),
opining that ‘even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the “crime”
of having a common cold.’”).
15 John D. Bessler, The Inequality of America’s Death Penalty: A Crossroads for Capital
Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 73 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. ONLINE 487, 541 (2016) [hereinafter Bessler, The Inequality of America’s Death Pen-
alty]. See also Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitu-
tions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted
in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 83 (2008) (“Thirty-four states—or an
Article V, three-quarters consensus—in 1868 had clauses in their state constitutions that banned
cruel and unusual punishments.”); id. (“Ninety-one percent of all Americans in 1868—again
a huge supermajority—lived in states with bans on cruel and unusual punishments.”). Even
before the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, the prohibition against “cruel and unusual
punishments” was being interpreted in northern locales to bar the torturous execution of slaves.
Negro Roasting, PORTLAND ADVERTISER & GAZETTE OF ME., July 13, 1830, at 2:
The abominable punishment of burning alive is inflicted in S. Carolina,
and some other of the Southern States, upon their slaves, convicted of
certain aggravated crimes. Edgefield District is a place famed for these
exhibitions of human torture. The victim is chained to a stake, and a pile
of light combustible wood built up around him, in the form of a cob-
house. The pile is set on fire, and the wretch left to his agonies until re-
lieved by suffocation. Such a punishment is unquestionably a violation
of the Constitution, which says, “cruel and unusual punishments shall
not be inflicted . . . .”;
NAT’L GAZETTE, Aug. 10, 1830, at 2 (referring to “the recent burning of a negro in South
Carolina, as a public punishment,” concluding that “the form of punishment is unworthy of a
civilized age and enlightened country[,]” and editorializing: “[i]t is prescribed in the 8th
Amendment to the Constitution, that ‘cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.’
Burning is unquestionably included in that description. The spirit and design of that clause
should be respected, even if the Constitution does not reach the case of a slave.”).
And that was so even as the “cruel and unusual punishments” language was being read in
southern states to legitimize the torturous whipping of slaves because whipping, in the South,
was then employed as a common, or usual, punishment against slaves. BESSLER, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 314. But cf. RALEIGH REG. & N.C. ST. GAZETTE, Mar. 26, 1824,
at 1:
A person of the name of Tinsley was convicted at Richmond, on Monday
last, of exhibiting a Faro Table, which offence is, by the laws of Virginia,
punishable by imprisonment and stripes, at the discretion of the Judge.
The verdict of the Jury was—“We of the jury find the prisoner guilty: but,
inasmuch as we consider the punishment by stripes at the whipping-post
“cruel and unusual,” we recommend him to the mercy of the Court.”
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Supreme Court also assumed that the bar on “excessive bail” is a fundamental legal
protection that is applicable against the states.16 How the Eighth Amendment is
interpreted, of course, has profound implications for America’s criminal justice sys-
tem, and for how individual criminal suspects and offenders are treated within it.17
Because the stakes are so high, a reexamination of the Eighth Amendment’s history,
and the modern-day implications of the Eighth Amendment’s origins, is in order.18
The debate over the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment has divided jurists
and legal scholars into two competing camps: originalists and living constitutional-
ists, the latter group sometimes referred to derisively as non-originalists.19 Even
16 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (noting that bail is “basic to our system of
law” and that the “Eighth Amendment’s proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to
have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment”). In Timbs v. Indiana, the
U.S. Supreme Court also held that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause applies
against the states. No. 17-1091 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2019). See also id. at 4–5 (discussing the history
of the text of the Excessive Fines Clause); id. at 4–8 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the
history of the text of the Excessive Fines Clause). In 1909, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he
fixing of punishment for crime or penalties for unlawful acts against its laws is within the police
power of the state” and that the Court “can only interfere with such legislation and judicial
action of the States enforcing it if the fines imposed are so grossly excessive as to amount
to a deprivation of property without due process of law.” Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212
U.S. 86, 111 (1909) (citing Coffey v. Harlan Cty., 204 U.S. 659 (1907)). In Coffey, the Supreme
Court emphasized that “[o]ne of the limitations upon the power of the State, imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, is that the State shall not deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law.” 204 U.S. at 663.
17 See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH
PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2017); see also KENNETH BRESLER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS AND STUDENTS: A PLAIN LANGUAGE
EXPLANATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 369–90 (2014).
18 The Eighth Amendment’s English origins were explored in considerable detail by one
scholar, Anthony Granucci, back in 1969. See Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969). The digitization
of historical sources allows further, more detailed exploration of the Eighth Amendment’s
seventeenth-century origins. A lot of scholarly attention has recently been focused on the Eighth
Amendment’s history. For example, one legal scholar, John Stinneford, has examined the roots
of the “cruel” and “unusual” terminology used in the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishments prohibition. See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The
Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008) [hereinafter
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”]; John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning
of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441 (2017).
19 ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DE-
BATE (2016); Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary
Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 41 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). Compare RONALD
DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVID-
UAL FREEDOM 127 (1994) (“The Eighth Amendment forbids ‘cruel and unusual punishment,’
but it does not indicate whether any particular methods of executing criminals—hanging or
electrocution, for example—are cruel or, indeed, whether the death penalty is itself cruel no
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within those two broad categories, however, there is—not surprisingly—considerable
variation.20 The Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, all of whom have differing
views of the Constitution and the import of its words, have themselves decided many
Eighth Amendment cases by 5–4 votes.21 Those closely divided opinions have come
in cases dealing with challenges to everything from conditions of confinement22 to
terms of imprisonment23 to the death penalty.24 For instance, while a majority of the
Justices have upheld the death penalty’s constitutionality since the mid-1970s in
multiple cases,25 both Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, while on
matter what method of execution is used.”), with Antonin Scalia, “Response,” in ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 145 (2018) (“[I]t
is entirely clear that capital punishment, which was widely in use in 1791, does not violate
the abstract moral principle of the Eighth Amendment.”), and ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA
SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH, AND LIFE WELL LIVED 192 (Christopher J. Scalia &
Edward Whelan eds., 2017) (“[P]erhaps the area of our jurisprudence that most clearly reflects
the ‘living Constitution’ philosophy is that which pertains to the Eighth Amendment, the
provision of our Bill of Rights that proscribes ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”).
20 ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 8 (2018) (“There is no single definition of origi-
nalism just as there is no overarching agreement among non-originalists as to the best way
for judges to interpret the Constitution.”); Randy J. Kozel, Constitutional Method and the
Path of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 175 (Christopher
J. Peters ed., 2013) (“Like originalists, living constitutionalists subscribe to varying belief sets.”).
In a book titled Living Originalism, scholar Jack Balkin observes that “[t]he Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibitions on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ ban punishments that are cruel and un-
usual as judged by contemporary application of these concepts and principles, not by how people
living in 1791 would have applied them.” JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6 (2011).
21 See, e.g., CHARLIE EASTAUGH, UNCONSTITUTIONAL SOLITUDE: SOLITARY CONFINE-
MENT AND THE US CONSTITUTION’S EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY 80 (2017) (“In 2003,
the Court handed down two landmark Eighth Amendment decisions on the same day: Lockyer
v Andrade and Ewing v California. Both concerned petitioners from California, and the same
Justices split 5–4 in each case.”); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
789 (Kara E. Stooksbury, John M. Scheb II & Otis H. Stephens Jr. eds., 2017) (“[I]n Roper
v. Simmons (2005), the Court split 5–4 in striking down the death penalty for offenders who were
juveniles at the time of their crimes.”). See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005);
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
22 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
23 E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN
LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 134 (2009) (“Since 1980 the Supreme
Court has decided six cases in which the duration of a prison sentence was attacked on
Eighth Amendment grounds. All six cases were 5–4 decisions in form or substance . . . .”).
24 For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726
(2015), which upheld the State of Oklahoma’s lethal-injection protocol, was decided by a
5–4 vote. See STEPHEN BREYER, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY (John D. Bessler ed., 2016)
(reprinting Justice Breyer’s dissent in Glossip and contextualizing and annotating that dissent);
see also Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-8151 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2019) (upholding lethal injection as
a method of execution for a Missouri inmate).
25 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2726; Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976).
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the nation’s highest court, continually wrote that capital punishment should be
declared a per se violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.26 The duel
over the Eighth Amendment’s meaning and proper interpretation27 can itself be seen
as framing the debate about how to read the U.S. Constitution as a whole.28
26 MICHAEL MELLO, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: THE RELENTLESS DISSENTS OF
JUSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL (1996). Justice William Brennan—a long-time opponent
of capital punishment—once offered: “With respect to the death penalty, I believe that a
majority of the Supreme Court will one day accept that when the state punishes with death, it
denies the humanity and dignity of the victim and transgresses the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.” William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death
Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 331 (1986). I have articulated my own
views on the Eighth Amendment and its relationship with the death penalty in a series of
recent law review articles. See John D. Bessler, The Abolitionist Movement Comes of Age:
From Capital Punishment as a Lawful Sanction to a Peremptory, International Law Norm
Barring Executions, 79 MONT. L. REV. 7 (2018); Bessler, The Inequality of America’s Death
Penalty, supra note 15; John D. Bessler, The Law’s Evolution: From Medieval Executions to
a Peremptory, International Law Norm Against Capital Punishment, 3 BECCARIA. REVUE
D’HISTOIRE DU DROIT DE PUNIR 255 (2017); John D. Bessler, The Long March Toward Abo-
lition: From the Enlightenment to the United Nations and the Death Penalty’s Slow Demise,
U. FLA. J.L. PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2019); John D. Bessler, What I Think About When I Think
About the Death Penalty, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 781 (2018).
27 In a prior book, I detailed the history of the U.S. Constitution’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7. This Article delves even
deeper into the English roots of the Eighth Amendment and contains historical information
on all three of its clauses.
28 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
6 (1991) (“In the Constitution of the United States, men like Madison bequeathed to subsequent
generations a framework for balancing liberty against power. However, it is only a framework;
it is not a blueprint. Its Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of ‘cruel and unusual punish-
ment,’ but gives no examples of permissible or impermissible punishments.”). The contentious
debate over the Eighth Amendment’s interpretation may even have implications beyond
America’s borders. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER 179 (2006) (noting that, when the United States ratified the U.N. Convention Against
Torture, the Senate was encouraged to ratify the treaty, which prohibits torture and “cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” subject to a reservation that the treaty’s lan-
guage would be interpreted to mean the same thing as the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and
unusual punishments prohibition); JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A
REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 170 (2014) (noting
that “when the United States became one of the original signing nations” of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, which prohibits “torture” and “cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment,” “legal experts on both sides of the Atlantic assumed that
these words meant largely the same thing as the Eighth Amendment’s ban on ‘cruel and unu-
sual punishment’”). But see STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN
LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 238 (2016) (“One could argue that the death penalty
cases present no general ‘foreign law’ issue, for the relevant constitutional provision, the Eighth
Amendment, refers to ‘unusual punishments’ without specifying whether ‘unusual’ matters
only in relation to the United States, to countries that follow the common law, to European
nations, or to some other subset of the world’s nations.”).
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This Article traces the Eighth Amendment’s English and common-law roots,29
a history closely associated with England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688–89,30 which
took place a century before the U.S. Constitution’s ratification.31 The Glorious Revo-
lution, in which King James II—a Catholic monarch of the Stuart dynasty—was
forced to abdicate the throne, led to the ascendency of the Protestant co-regents,
William and Mary,32 while provoking its own effects in colonial America, too.33 The
Glorious Revolution impacted societies around the globe,34 and produced the legal
29 The English Bill of Rights, which set forth, among others, the rights now set forth in
the Eighth Amendment, was rooted in “ancient” privileges. 1 MARK A. GRABER & HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE COMPLETE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTRODUCTION AND THE COLO-
NIAL ERA 55 (2015) (“The American revolutionaries who demanded their rights engaged in
practices that were both centuries old and novel. From at least 1215, the year the Magna Carta
was promulgated and signed, Englishmen had demanded that their King respect their rights.
Over the years these rights became embodied in such parliamentary enactments as the English
Bill of Rights (1689) . . . .”); THE TIMES (London), Mar. 3, 1786 (“Charles the I. lost his head,
and James the II. to preserve his life, pusillanimously abdicated the throne. This happy event
produced the glorious Revolution, when the Bill of Rights was enacted declaratory of the
ancient and indubitable privileges of the people of England.”).
30 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS 52–55 (Jack A. Goldstone ed., 1998)
(discussing the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688–89).
31 PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788
(2010).
32 A “Glorious Revolution” also took place in America. See, e.g., DAVID S. LOVEJOY,
THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, at xi (1987) (“Once Englishmen turned their backs
on James II, a number of colonists rebelled against his governors in America. They claimed
their acts were part of a revolution they shared with their cousins at home against arbitrary
government and the threat of Catholicism.”).
33 THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: DOCUMENTS ON THE COLONIAL CRISIS OF
1689, at 3 (Michael G. Hall, Lawrence H. Leder & Michael Kammen eds., 1964) (“The
Glorious Revolution of 1688, which forced James II from the English throne and established the
reign of William and Mary, created a major crisis among the English colonies in America. Fol-
lowing news of England’s revolution, a series of rebellions and insurrections erupted in colonial
America from Massachusetts to Carolina.”).
34 See generally THE ANGLO-DUTCH MOMENT: ESSAYS ON THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION
AND ITS WORLD IMPACT (Jonathan I. Israel ed., 1991) (containing chapters on the Dutch role
in the Glorious Revolution, as well as the impact of the Glorious Revolution in England,
Scotland, Ireland, and in the American colonies). See also id. at 89 (noting that the English
Declaration of Rights “looked at those actions of James II (and, to a much lesser extent, those
of Charles II in the years 1681–85) which were in breach of existing law, and confirmed the
illegality of those royal acts”); id. at 89 n.50 (“Most prominently in the clauses against abuses
in treason trials (which looked back to the trials of the Rye House plotters) and the levying
of excessive fines (principally referring to the 1682 fine of Sir Thomas Pilkington and the
1684 fine on Sir Samuel Barnardiston).”); MATTHEW JENKINSON, CULTURE AND POLITICS AT
THE COURT OF CHARLES II, 1660–1685, at 187 (2010) (noting that the “Rye House Plot of
March/April 1683” was “a conspiracy, allegedly conceived at a manor house in Hoddesdon,
Hertfordshire, for a hundred armed men to ambush the king and his brother as they returned
to London from Newmarket”); id. (“The plotters were arrested; some were sent to the Tower
during June and July. Those who were executed suffered their fate the coming winter.”);
2019] A CENTURY IN THE MAKING 997
landscape-changing English Declaration of Rights.35 That Declaration, in turn, led
to the passage, in 1689, of its statutory counterpart, the English Bill of Rights.36 Those
English legal instruments served as a model for the Virginia Declaration of Rights37
drafted by George Mason,38 with the English Declaration also serving as a template
for the American Declaration of Independence39 drafted principally by Thomas
Jefferson.40 All three clauses of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment—the
Excessive Bail Clause, the Excessive Fines Clause, and the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause—are derived from the English Bill of Rights.41
accord THE HUTCHINSON ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BRITISH HISTORY (Simon Hall
ed., 2017) (noting that the “Rye House Plot conspiracy of 1683 [was led] by English Whig ex-
tremists against Charles II because of his Roman Catholic leanings”; that the plotters “intended
to murder Charles and his brother James, Duke of York, at Rye House, Hoddesdon, Hertford-
shire,” as they returned to London from the Newmarket races “but the plot was betrayed”;
and that “[t]he Duke of Monmouth was involved, and alleged conspirators, including Lord
William Russell and Algernon Sidney (1622–1683), were executed for complicity”).
35 The English Declaration of Rights was the Eighth Amendment’s linguistic forerunner.
See BAYARD MARIN, INSIDE JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRACTICES AND PRO-
CEDURES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF OFFENSES AGAINST DISCIPLINE IN PRISONS OF BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES 246 (1983) (“The English Declaration of Rights 1688 contains
language so similar that its role as precedent is obvious.”); but see id. (“However, it is not so
clear that the founders of the American Constitution, in copying the words, copied the English
meaning; that is, as a limitation upon barbarous tortures, such as disemboweling and quartering,
practiced under the Stuart kings.”).
36 Gerard N. Magliocca, The Bill of Rights as a Term of Art, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
231, 241 n.55 (2016) (“The English Declaration of Rights was issued by an irregular Parlia-
ment sitting without a king, and after William III was crowned the Declaration was reenacted
as the Bill of Rights.”). See also 2 THE STATUTES: WILLIAM & MARY TO 10 GEORGE III. A.D.
1688–1770, at 9–10 (1871).
37 VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (June 12, 1776).
38 JEFF BROADWATER, GEORGE MASON: FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS 80–81, 87–88 (2006)
(noting Mason’s role in drafting the Virginia Declaration of Rights and how he drew on a variety
of sources, including the English Bill of Rights, in drafting that document).
39 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). See also 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 53 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2009) (“The influence of the English Bill of Rights is evident
in the Declaration of Independence; it set a precedent for the American colonists by declaring to
their king that they had rights, the king had violated those rights, and they would not tolerate any
such violations in the future.”); cf. id. (“The American founders did not simply copy the ideas
found in the English Bill of Rights; they modified and expanded upon those ideas in a way that
reflects the political and philosophical environment of eighteenth-century colonial America.”).
40 GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(1978).
41 See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910):
Patrick Henry said that there was danger in the adoption of the Con-
stitution without a bill of rights. Mr. Wilson considered that it was un-
necessary, and had been purposely omitted from the Constitution. Both,
indeed, referred to the tyranny of the Stuarts. Henry said that the people
of England in the bill of rights prescribed to William, Prince of Orange,
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The seventeenth-century Glorious Revolution had reverberations in colonial
America, with eighteenth-century American revolutionaries looking to the guarantees
of English law in forging American law. Part I of this Article traces the English history
that produced the prohibitions in the English Bill of Rights on excessive bail, exces-
sive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. The story of early American constitu-
tions and the Eighth Amendment, which contain those same prohibitions,42 thus does
not begin with the first revolutionary constitutions in 1776, the Eighth Amendment’s
1789 adoption by the United States Congress, or the Eighth Amendment’s 1791
ratification by the states.43 Instead, the heritage of the Eighth Amendment—or, more
accurately, that of the Eighth Amendment’s textual provisions—begins in England,
America’s mother country, from whence its language originates.44 In recalling the
Eighth Amendment’s seventeenth-century origins, Part II of this Article discusses
the American Revolution, early American constitutions echoing the three prohibi-
tions first set forth in Section 10 of the English Bill of Rights,45 and the writings of
early legal commentators on the Eighth Amendment.
upon what terms he should reign. Wilson said that ‘[t]he doctrine and
practice of a declaration of rights have been borrowed from the conduct
of the people of England on some remarkable occasions; but the princi-
ples and maxims on which their government is constituted are widely
different from those of ours.’ It appears, therefore, that Wilson, and
those who thought like Wilson, felt sure that the spirit of liberty could
be trusted, and that its ideals would be represented, not debased, by
legislation. Henry and those who believed as he did would take no
chances. Their predominant political impulse was distrust of power,
and they insisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse. But
surely they intended more than to register a fear of the forms of abuse
that went out of practice with the Stuarts.
42 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
43 The first ten amendments of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Bill of Rights, were
passed by Congress on September 25, 1789, and ratified on December 15, 1791. See
CHRISTINE BARBOUR & GERALD C. WRIGHT, KEEPING THE REPUBLIC: POWER AND CITI-
ZENSHIP IN AMERICAN POLITICS 139 (6th ed. 2014); see also Amanda L. Tyler et al., A Dia-
logue with Federal Judges on the Role of History in Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1889, 1916 (2012) (according to Judge Diane P. Wood: “[T]he meaning of the words, ‘cruel
and unusual,’ against the backdrop of 1688 had already changed a bit by the time we get to
1791, at the time the Eighth Amendment is adopted, and that the people who used that term
knew that.”).
44 Cf. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 162–63.
45 English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2; WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND TORTURE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CHALLENGED IN THE
WORLD’S COURTS 18 (1996) (“Section 10 of the English Bill of Rights is the direct ancestor
of constitutional provisions in other countries that remain applicable to this day. The Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States borrows the phrase virtually word for
word, and it is included in many of the state constitutions as well.”).
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The Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions were not adopted in a vacuum, but were,
because of their English heritage, more than a century in the making. Part II of the
Article specifically highlights how the Enlightenment—in particular, the principles
laid down by writers such as the French political theorist, Montesquieu, and the
Italian philosopher, Cesare Beccaria—materially changed the lens through which
colonial and early Americans viewed capital and corporal punishments and the
criminal-law concepts of excessiveness, proportionality, and “cruel and unusual
punishments.”46 Both Montesquieu and Beccaria were concerned about despotism
and abuses of power, and both concluded, in what can be seen as an Enlightenment
legal maxim, that any punishment not derived from “necessity” (or “absolute neces-
sity,” as Beccaria put it47) is “tyrannical.”48 Such views—the ones laid down in the
mid-1700s by Montesquieu, the French baron, and Beccaria, the Italian marquis—
materially shaped Anglo-American views in the decades to come.49 The Article
concludes by discussing the implications of the Eighth Amendment’s history—one
grounded in both the Enlightenment and English law—for modern Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.50
46 English Bill of Rights, supra note 45. See, e.g., JOHN D. BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMER-
ICAN LAW: AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2014) [hereinafter
BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW] (documenting the influence of Cesare Beccaria’s
ideas in America); COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE SPIRIT OF REPUBLICAN
SELF-GOVERNMENT 58 (2009) (“Montesquieu’s influence on Madison and the American
Founders, particularly evident in the theory of separation of powers that informs the United
States Constitution, is well noted by scholars.”); The Marquis Beccaria: An Italian Penal
Reformer’s Meteoric Rise in the British Isles in the Transatlantic Republic of Letters
(forthcoming in 2019 in Diciottesimo secolo) (discussing the early embrace of Cesare
Beccaria’s ideas).
47 JOHN HOSTETTLER, CESARE BECCARIA: THE GENIUS OF ‘ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS’
72 (2011) (noting that Beccaria adopted Montesquieu’s view that unnecessary punishments
are tyrannical).
48 KEEGAN CALLANAN, MONTESQUIEU’S LIBERALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL
POLITICS 250 (2018) (noting Montesquieu’s view, as expressed in The Spirit of the Laws:
“Every penalty that does not derive from necessity is tyrannical. The law is not a pure act of
power . . . .”); HOSTETTLER, supra note 47, at 72.
49 See generally JOHN D. BESSLER, THE BARON AND THE MARQUIS: LIBERTY, TYRANNY,
AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT MAXIM THAT CAN REMAKE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2019)
(discussing the Eighth Amendment’s history in the context of the Enlightenment and the
popular eighteenth-century maxim created by Montesquieu—and publicized by Cesare
Beccaria—that any punishment that goes beyond necessity is tyrannical). Indeed, the Eighth
Amendment cannot be properly understood without studying the Enlightenment and eighteenth-
century penal reform efforts. See, e.g., Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth Amendment’s Milieu: Penal
Reform in the Late Eighteenth Century, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405 (2016).
50 See BESSLER, supra note 49; see also Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, The
Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the
Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 783 (1975).
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I. THE ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS
A. The Glorious Revolution of 1688–89
In England, the Glorious Revolution51 led to the overthrow of King James II
(James VII of Scotland),52 and to a Declaration of Rights, and then to its statutory
counterpart, the English Bill of Rights,53 that proclaimed in these hortatory words:
51 The Glorious Revolution was a seminal event in England, and it was still being commemo-
rated and celebrated long after the fact. See Commemoration of the Glorious Revolution,
1688, THE TIMES, Nov. 3, 1788, at 1; see also IPSWICH J., Dec. 29, 1792, at 4 (referring to “the
glorious Revolution in 1688” that “is equally dear to us” and saying that “we hold ourselves
equally bound to maintain it”); Dulwich in the County of Surrey, THE TIMES, Dec. 26, 1792,
at 4; BATH CHRON., Dec. 27, 1792, at 1 (“We solemnly pledge ourselves individually to each
other, and collectively with all our fellow-subjects, that we will to the utmost of our power, and
at the expence of every thing dear to us, maintain and support the principles of the BRITISH
CONSTITUTION, as established at the Glorious Revolution . . . .”); Mr. Curran’s Speech,
N. STAR, Jan. 30, 1794, at 2–3 (“He here adverted to the circumstances which tended to bring
about the glorious Revolution of Great Britain in the year 1688, by which British freedom
was placed on its present basis. Had the tyrant of that day listened to the complaints of his
people, and abstained from arbitrary and unconstitutional stretches of power, he might have
remained a King respected by all his subjects, and neither he nor his family and posterity would
be reduced to the wretched condition of foreign exiles. He had his corrupt judges, and venal
tools to execute submissively his orders.”); PENN. GAZETTE, Aug. 28, 1766, at 2 (referring
to “the late glorious Revolution” as “the grand æra of British liberty”); DERBY MERCURY,
Nov. 16, 1764, at 3 (“By Opposition, also, England effected the glorious Revolution, obtained
our present happy Constitution . . . .”); JACKSON’S OXFORD J., Oct. 3, 1772, at 1 (“Your
ancestors gained unfading laurels by saving their country in times of extreme national danger,
when a glorious Revolution set us free.”). The Glorious Revolution was also well-remembered
in the United States long after it had occurred. See The Petition and Remonstrance of the Com-
mittee of the City and Liberties of Philadelphia, DUNLAP’S PENN. PACKET, Nov. 13, 1775,
at 1 (noting that “the glorious revolution” had “placed the present Royal Family upon the
British throne”); PENN. GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 1775, at 2 (referring to “the glorious revolution,
under which the said Society of Quakers, as well as others, enjoy their present religious and
civil rights”). The American colonists themselves referred to their own revolution as “a glorious
revolution.” Instructions to the Representatives of the Town of Boston, CALEDONIAN
MERCURY, July 9, 1776, at 3 (“At a time when, in all probability, the whole united colonies are
upon the verge of a glorious revolution . . . .”); Philadelphiensis, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Dec. 19,
1787, at 3 (referencing “our glorious revolution”).
52 STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION 480 (2009) (“The revolutionaries
of 1688–89 were motivated to overthrow James II and create a new kind of English government
because they were concerned not only about their religion but also about England’s foreign
policy and England’s political economy.”).
53 English Bill of Rights, supra note 45. See also NICK O’NEILL, SIMON RICE & ROGER
DOUGLAS, RETREAT FROM INJUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AUSTRALIA 7 n.40 (2d ed. 2004):
The Bill of Rights is sometimes given the date 1688 because the Decla-
ration of Rights was passed on 13 February 1689 and at that time and
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“That excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor
cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.”54 The full text of the Declaration of Rights,
drafted by the Convention Parliament,55 was presented to Prince William of Orange
and his wife, Mary, in a ceremony in London on February 13, 1689.56 It was read
by a clerk at Whitehall Palace’s ornate Banqueting House in William and Mary’s
presence, with the lords on the right and the commons on the left.57 Less than two
months later, on April 11, 1689, William and Mary, robed in crimson velvet attire,
would be crowned as England’s king and queen at Westminster Abbey.58
The story of the Glorious Revolution is a fascinating one, full of royal intrigue
and a desire of the English people to have a greater say in their own governance.59
The largely Protestant subjects of England’s Catholic monarch, King James II, had
until the Calendar (New Style) Act 1750, the new Calendar year began
on 25 March rather than 1 January. However, the Declaration was not
enacted in statutory form, as the Bill of Rights, until 25 October 1689.
54 English Bill of Rights, supra note 45; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991).
55 GEORGE L. CHERRY, THE CONVENTION PARLIAMENT 1689: A BIOGRAPHICAL STUDY
OF ITS MEMBERS (1966) (providing biographies of members of the Convention Parliament).
56 ABEL BOYER, THE HISTORY OF KING WILLIAM THE THIRD 354–56 (1702); Lois G.
Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 27, 31
(2000); Michael S. Woodruff, The Excessive Bail Clause: Achieving Pretrial Justice Reform
Through Incorporation, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 241, 288 (2013).
57 ROBERT BUCHOLZ & NEWTON KEY, EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 1485–1714: A NAR-
RATIVE HISTORY 309 (2d ed. 2009); JOHN LINGARD, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 591–92 (1873); ENGLAND’S RISE TO GREATNESS, 1660–1763, at 130–32 (Stephen
B. Baxter ed., 1983); 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: DURING THE REIGNS OF KING WILLIAM,
QUEEN ANNE, AND KING GEORGE THE FIRST 53–55 (1746) (“By a LOVER of TRUTH and
LIBERTY.”). See also CHARLES K. ROWLEY & BIN WU, BRITANNIA 1066–1884: FROM
MEDIEVAL ABSOLUTISM TO THE BIRTH OF FREEDOM UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY,
LIMITED SUFFRAGE, AND THE RULE OF LAW 102 (2014):
The Heads of Grievances, the first draft of the Declaration of Rights,
contained 28 articles reported out by a committee of the House of Com-
mons on February 2, 1689. Due to pressures from abroad and at home,
a prompt resolution of the issues was given top priority. On February 8,
the House of Commons instructed the committee to delete the articles
that required new laws and retained 11 clauses from the original Heads
of Grievances. The Declaration of Rights restated the ancient rights and
liberties of England. The final version of 13 articles indicted James II for
his subversion of laws and imposed restrictions on monarchical power.
Article 10 of the final version provided “[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be required nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Calvin R. Massey,
The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 1233, 1249–50 (1987).
58 Lois G. Schwoerer, The Coronation of William and Mary, April 11, 1689, in THE REVO-
LUTION OF 1688–1689: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES 107 (Lois G. Schwoerer ed., 1992).
59 STEVEN C. A. PINCUS, ENGLAND’S GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 1688–1689: A BRIEF HIS-
TORY WITH DOCUMENTS (2006).
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accumulated a long list of grievances against him, with James II having assumed the
throne in 1685 after the death of his brother, Charles II.60 In the Glorious Revolution,
James II was forced from the throne, to be replaced by the new co-regents, William
III and Mary II, after the Convention Parliament had drafted the Declaration of
Rights to guarantee the rights and liberties of British subjects.61 While William’s
mother was the daughter of King Charles I, the English king who had been publicly
beheaded with an executioner’s axe in 1649,62 William’s wife, Mary, was King
James II’s own daughter.63 The Convention Parliament had first met at Westminster
on January 22, 1689, after the unpopular James II had fled England, going into exile
following his son-in-law William’s invasion of England in November 1688.64
The Glorious Revolution was about more than a prince’s quest to accumulate
greater power.65 William, a Dutch stadtholder and the Prince of Orange before as-
suming the British throne, had been invited in June 1688 by seven Protestant nobles,
known as the “Immortal Seven,” to restore “the Lawes and Liberties of England.”66
Henry Sydney (also spelled Sidney) wrote the invitation, which recited that “the
people are so generally dissatisfied with the present conduct of the government, in
relation to their religion, liberties and properties (all of which have been greatly
invaded).”67 That invitation, sent by men who had been deeply affected by the reign
of the Stuarts, had been carried to Holland by an admiral disguised as a common
sailor.68 Henry Sydney, who, as an envoy to Holland, had befriended the Prince of
Orange in 1680, was the brother of the late Algernon Sydney and a man destined to
be named, in 1694, as the 1st Earl of Romney.69 The English politician Algernon
Sydney, later revered by American revolutionaries for his devotion to the cause of
liberty and republicanism, had been executed in 1683 for treason during Charles II’s
60 Charles R. Eskridge III, Modern Lessons from Original Steps Towards the American
Bill of Rights, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 25, 37–38 (2014); Woodruff, supra note 56, at 287–88.
61 Peter Lanston Fitzgerald, An English Bill of Rights? Some Observations from Her
Majesty’s Former Colonies in America, 70 GEO. L.J., 1229, 1234 (1982); Richard S. Kay,
William III and the Legalist Revolution, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1645, 1646 (2000).
62 See generally CHARLES SPENCER, KILLERS OF THE KING: THE MEN WHO DARED TO
EXECUTE CHARLES I (2015) (discussing the death of Charles I).
63 Id. at 294; JOHN VAN DER KISTE, WILLIAM AND MARY: HEROES OF THE GLORIOUS
REVOLUTION (2011), preface; Kay, supra note 61.
64 BUCHOLZ & KEY, supra note 57, at 308; PINCUS, supra note 52, at 227.
65 PINCUS, supra note 52.
66 STEPHEN BAINES, CAPTAIN COOK’S MERCHANT SHIPS: FREELOVE, THREE BROTHERS,
MARY, FRIENDSHIP, ENDEAVOUR, ADVENTURE, RESOLUTION AND DISCOVERY, ch. 2 (2015);
Woodruff, supra note 56, at 287–88.
67 See BAINES, supra note 66, at ch. 2; NEVILLE WILLIAMS, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
CONSTITUTION 1688–1815: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 8 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1970).
68 5 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 242 (A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero & Stanley
Leathes eds., 1908); BAINES, supra note 66, at ch. 2.
69 SIDNEY J. LOW & F. S. PULLING, THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH HISTORY 945–46 (1910).
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reign.70 His most famous work, Discourses Concerning Government, was published
posthumously in 1698 after he had become, as one source puts it, a “victim of Stuart
despotism.”71
Henry Sydney’s invitation to William was joined by Henry Compton, the Church
of England’s suspended Bishop of London; William Cavendish, the Earl of Devonshire,
and Charles Talbot, the Earl of Shrewsbury, who were both Whigs; Thomas
Osborne, the Earl of Danby, and Richard Lumley, a baron and colonel in the British
army, who were both Tories; and Edward Russell, an officer in the Royal Navy and
the 1st Earl of Orford.72 Because the seven men sought a military invasion, the in-
vitation was treasonable, with its seven subscribers signing it using ciphers (i.e., code
numbers) instead of their actual names.73 Despite the peril it put them in, the invita-
tion served its intended purpose. On October 10, 1688, the Prince of Orange issued
a declaration—the opening volley of the Glorious Revolution—setting forth “the
reasons inducing him to appear in arms in the Kingdom of England, and for preserv-
ing the Protestant religion, and for restoring the laws and liberties of England,
70 ALAN CRAIG HOUSTON, ALGERNON SIDNEY AND THE REPUBLICAN HERITAGE IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 4, 223–24 (1991). Algernon Sidney, who was executed during the reign
of Charles II, was an important figure in English history:
Algernon Sidney was beheaded in 1683 by British authorities for treason
and conspiracy to assassinate the king. His unfinished insurrectionist
tract, the Discourses Concerning Government, was seized upon his ar-
rest and used as evidence against him. One historian has referred to the
Discourses, published in 1698, as a “textbook of revolution.” Indeed,
as a martyr to the “Old Cause” of liberty, Sidney inspired generations
of leaders and intellectuals, particularly in America. Thomas Jefferson
listed him alongside John Locke as a major influence on the Declaration
of Independence.
SCOTT A. NELSON, THE DISCOURSES OF ALGERNON SIDNEY (1993) (inside cover material).
71 2 A HOUSE DIVIDING AGAINST ITSELF, 1836–1840: THE LETTERS OF WILLIAM LLOYD
GARRISON 222 n.2 (Louis Ruchames ed., 1971); HOUSTON, supra note 70, at 235.
72 ANDREW D. M. BEAUMONT, COLONIAL AMERICA AND THE EARL OF HALIFAX 1748–1761,
at 15 (2015); GERARD CASEY, FREEDOM’S PROGRESS? A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
ch. 22 n.10 (2008); AMANDA FOREMAN, THE DUCHESS 15 (2008); EDWARD GREGG, QUEEN
ANNE 134 (2001); RICHARD LODGE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE RESTORATION
TO THE DEATH OF WILLIAM III, at 278–79 (1910); LOW & PULLING, supra note 69; 2 THOMAS
BABINGTON MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES THE
SECOND 399 (1901); ANTTI MATIKKALA, THE ORDERS OF KNIGHTHOOD AND THE FORMATION
OF THE BRITISH HONOURS SYSTEM 1660–1760, at 130 (2008); ANDREW RAWSON, TREACHERY
AND RETRIBUTION: ENGLAND’S DUKES, MARQUESSES AND EARLS 1066–1707, at 171 (2017);
BENJAMIN TERRY, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE DEATH OF
QUEEN VICTORIA 794 (1902); WILLIAMS, supra note 67, at 8–20; 34 DICTIONARY OF NA-
TIONAL BIOGRAPHY 275 (Sidney Lee ed., 1893).
73 2 GERALD BRENAN & EDWARD PHILLIPS STATHAM, THE HOUSE OF HOWARD 604 n.1
(1907); MAUREEN WALLER, UNGRATEFUL DAUGHTERS: THE STUART PRINCESSES WHO STOLE
THEIR FATHER’S CROWN 158 (2002).
1004 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:989
Scotland, and Ireland.”74 “It is both certain and evident to all men, that the public
peace and happiness of any state or kingdom cannot be preserved where the Law,
Liberties, and Customs, established by the lawful authority in it, are openly trans-
gressed and annulled,” William’s declaration audaciously proclaimed.75 The declaration
emphasized that “we cannot any longer forbear to declare that, to our great regret,”
King James II’s “evil counsellors” had acted in violation of the Magna Carta76 and had
“subjected” the subjects of the realm to “despotic power” and “arbitrary government.”77
In Britain, there had been for years a rampant fear of Catholic tyranny or
“popery,” then identified with the powerful, long-reigning French king, Louis XIV,78
an ally of Charles II and Charles’ younger brother, the Duke of York.79 In 1683, an
English Whig conspiracy to assassinate Charles II and his brother James, then the
Duke of York, had been foiled,80 with a number of men put to their deaths for their
participation in the so-called “Rye House Plot.”81 Because Charles II did not father
an heir in wedlock before his death in 1685, the fears of politicians in the British
Isles were realized when, just two years after the Rye House Plot had been exposed,
a known Catholic—James II—rose to the throne.82 The imprisonment in 1688 of
74 “Declaration of the Prince of Orange, October 10, 1688,” http://www.jacobite.ca/docu
ments/16881010.htm [http://perma.cc/L9JJ-54ZZ].
75 WILLIAMS, supra note 67, at 10.
76 See generally DANNY DANZIGER & JOHN GILLINGHAM, 1215: THE YEAR OF MAGNA
CARTA (2004).
77 ROBERT BEDDARD, A KINGDOM WITHOUT A KING: THE JOURNAL OF THE PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE REVOLUTION OF 1688, at 124–28, 145–49 (1988); THE WORLD OF
WILLIAM AND MARY: ANGLO-DUTCH PERSPECTIVES ON THE REVOLUTION OF 1688–89, at
105 (Dale Hoak & Mordechai Feingold eds., 1996); “Declaration of the Prince of Orange,
October 10, 1688,” supra note 74.
78 The Roman Catholic “Roi Soleil” (Sun King) Louis XIV lived from 1638–1715. He
reigned as King of France from 1643 until his death. After reaching the age of majority in 1651,
he ruled personally from 1661 following the death of Cardinal Jules Mazarin, an Italian-born
diplomat and politician who served Louis XIV. See JOHN S.C. ABBOTT, LOUIS XIV (1903);
ALAN JAMES, THE ORIGINS OF FRENCH ABSOLUTISM 1598–1661, at 91 (2013). 
79 See Fiona Keating, Revolution 17th-Century Style: How a Fear of Catholics Led to the
Last Successful Invasion of England, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015, 8:00 PM), https://www.ib
times.co.uk/revolution-17th-century-style-how-fear-catholics-led-last-successful-invasion-en
gland-1527188 [http://perma.cc/XSY4-WH6U]. The relationship between Charles II and Louis
XIV involved French monetary subsidies, and on his deathbed, Charles II converted to Catholi-
cism. WILLIAM YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND WARFARE IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV
AND PETER THE GREAT: A GUIDE TO THE HISTORICAL LITERATURE 203 (2004); see also DAVID
HICKMAN, THE SUN KING: LOUIS XIV, FRANCE AND EUROPE, 1643–1715, at 75–76 (2016).
80 CLARE JACKSON, RESTORATION SCOTLAND, 1660–1690: ROYALIST POLITICS, RELIGION
AND IDEAS 36 (2003).
81 6 ISRAEL SMITH CLARE & MOSES COIT TYLER, THE WORLD’S HISTORY ILLUMINATED:
ENGLISH REFORMATION TO FALL OF POLAND 2233–34 (1897) (noting the execution of con-
spirators associated with the Rye House Plot).
82 Edward Vallance, The Glorious Revolution, BBC (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk
/history/british/civil_war_revolution/glorious_revolution_01.shtml [http://perma.cc/WF9S-P794].
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seven Anglican bishops in the Tower of London—clergymen, including the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury, who had defied an order that the bishops read the Declaration
of Indulgence83—brought the long-simmering Catholic-versus-Protestant feud to a
head.84 The bishops were put on trial at the Court of King’s Bench for seditious libel
on June 29, 1688 after signing a petition to the king, but just a day later, on June 30,
the jury found them not guilty, handing James II a major and humiliating defeat.85
The trial of the seven bishops in mid-1688 solidified opposition to James II and
proved to be a prelude to the Glorious Revolution.86
B. The English Declaration of Rights, the English Bill of Rights, and the Scottish
Claim of Right
On January 28, 1689, less than a week after the Convention Parliament had first
convened, its House of Commons fearlessly resolved:
[T]hat King James the Second, having endeavoured to subvert
the constitution of this kingdom, by breaking the original con-
tract between king and people, and by the advice of Jesuits and
other wicked persons, having violated the fundamental laws, and
having withdrawn himself out of the kingdom, has abdicated the
government and that the throne is thereby vacant.87
The English Declaration of Rights, as one source notes, “reaffirmed the principle of
the 1628 Petition of Right, denying the divine right of kings and setting forth
thirteen basic rights that Parliament regarded as the ‘true, ancient, and indubitable
rights and liberties of the people’ of the English kingdom.”88 The English Bill of
83 SOURCES AND DEBATES IN ENGLISH HISTORY 1485–1714, at 234–35, 255 (Newton Key
& Robert Bucholz eds., 2009) (noting and reprinting James II’s Declaration of Indulgence
of April 4, 1687 and reissued April 27, 1688).
84 RICHARD DAVEY, THE TOWER OF LONDON 313 (1910).
85 WILLIAM GIBSON, JAMES II AND THE TRIAL OF THE SEVEN BISHOPS 123–24, 132, 140
(2009). For more information on the foundations of the Glorious Revolution, see JOHN MILLER,
THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1997).
86 GIBSON, supra note 85, at ix (2009) (“[W]hat happened in England in 1688–89 is that
men and women chose Protestantism over monarchy . . . . Even James II (and VII of Scotland),
after the Revolution, ascribed his loss of the throne to the ‘groundless’ fears the Church had
about Catholicism.”).
87 John Miller, The Glorious Revolution: ‘Contract’ and ‘Abdication’ Reconsidered, 25
HIST. J. 541, 541 (1982).
88 AKHIL REED AMAR & LES ADAMS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS PRIMER: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE-
BOOK TO THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 12 (2013). See also id. at 9–10:
Several hundred years of English history were to pass after the signing
of Magna Carta before England was presented with the next seminal
document in its constitutional history, The Petition of Right, drafted by
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Rights itself took note of how James II and his “evil counsellors” had subverted “the
Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of this kingdom” by, among other things,
“committing and prosecuting . . . worthy prelates for humbly petitioning” the king.89
Along with England, both Ireland and Scotland were also part of James II’s
realm, though James II—because of Scottish history—went by James VII in his
Scottish kingdom.90 In Edinburgh, on April 11, 1689, the same day William and
Mary were crowned as England’s new king and queen, the Declaration of the Estates
of the Kingdom of Scotland, containing the Claim of Right, and the Offer of the
Crown to their Majesties King William and Queen Mary, was issued.91 Like the
English Bill of Rights, it similarly declared that “King James the Seventh, being a
professed Papist,” had failed to take “the Oath required by Law . . . to maintain the
Protestant Religion”; did, through “the Advice of Wicked and Evil Counsellers,
Invade the Fundamental Constitution of this Kingdom, and Altered it from a Legal
Limited Monarchy, to an Arbitrary Despotic Power”; and had, thereby, “Forfeited
the Right to the Crown, and the Throne is become Vacant.”92 That Scottish Declara-
tion further asserted that James had subverted “the Protestant Religion,” had violated
“the Laws and Liberties of the Kingdom,”93 and also contained the following recital,
among many others, about how his reign had violated Scottish liberty: “By imposing
Exorbitant Fines, to the Value of the Parties Estates, exacting extravagant Bail; and
disposing Fines and Forfeitures before any Process or Conviction.”94 The Scottish
declaration further pronounced “[t]hat the imposing of extraordinary Fines, the ex-
acting of exorbitant Bail, and the disposing of Fines and Forfeitures, before Sen-
tence, are contrary to Law.”95
the English Parliament and presented to King Charles I in 1628. The
petition reflected the gradual development of individual liberties that
had been implied long before in the provisions of Magna Carta, and fore-
told the codification of those liberties, which would occur sixty-one
years later with the passage of the English Bill of Rights.
89 English Bill of Rights, supra note 45. See also AGNES STRICKLAND, THE LIVES OF THE
SEVEN BISHOPS COMMITTED TO THE TOWER IN 1688, at 1 (1866):
The revolution which drove the male line of the Royal House of Stuart
from the throne of Great Britain was precipitated by the courageous
resistance of seven intrepid prelates to the unconstitutional exercise of
the royal prerogative attempted by James II.—a fact no one who dis-
passionately studies the events of that period can doubt.
90 THE REIGNS OF CHARLES II AND JAMES VII AND II, at 51 (Lionel K. J. Glassey ed., 1997).
91 The Declaration of the Estates of the Kingdom of the Scotland, containing the Claim
of Right, and the Offer of the Crown to their Majesties King William and Queen Mary,
Apr. 11, 1689, reprinted in THE ACTS OF THE PARLIAMENTS OF SCOTLAND 206–11 (1908).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. See also The Declaration of the Estates of the Kingdom of Scotland containing the
Claim of Right and the offer of the Croune to the King & Queen of England, in WILLIAM
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The late seventeenth-century transition in monarchical power that occurred in
England and Scotland was tied up squarely with issues relating to religion (i.e., a fear
of Catholicism). More broadly, it was also about checking royal power and restoring
the rights and civil liberties of English and Scottish subjects.96 On January 22, 1689,
in each house of England’s Convention Parliament, a letter from Prince William had
been read to the peers and to the assembled members of the Commons at its outset.97
“My Lords and Gentlemen,” the letter began, with William asserting, “I have
endeavoured to the utmost of my power, to perform what was desired from me,” so
as to achieve “the public peace and safety,” since “the administration of affairs was
put into my hands.”98 “It now lieth upon you,” it declared, “to lay the foundations of a
firm security for your religion, your laws, and your liberties.”99 “I do not doubt,” his
letter continued, “but that by such a full and free representative of the nation, as is
now met,” the British people might arrive at a “happy and lasting settlement.”100 “[I]t
hath pleased God hitherto to bless my good intentions with so great success,” William
proclaimed, adding: “I trust in him, that he will complete his own work, by sending
a spirit of peace and union to influence your counsels.”101 It was the Convention
Parliament, which offered the crown to William and Mary under the parliamentary
conditions it crafted, that produced the historic English Declaration of Rights.102
The Convention Parliament identified specific grievances that it wanted ad-
dressed, seeking to limit the kinds of abuses of power that had taken place during
the reign of the Stuarts, including after King James II had taken the reins of royal
prerogative.103 Indeed, the House of Commons of England’s Convention Parliament
produced twenty-three “Heads of Grievance” that targeted the abuses of James II and
those of the House of Stuart.104 Those were produced by a committee of thirty-nine
members chaired by a lawyer, Sir George Treby, with that committee having been
tasked with drafting the “heads of things that were absolutely essential to secure the
ALEXANDER, AN ABRIDGEMENT OF THE ACTS OF THE PARLIAMENTS OF SCOTLAND, FROM THE
REIGN OF JAMES THE FIRST IN 1424 TO THE UNION WITH ENGLAND IN 1707, at 336 (1841) (“By
imposeing exorbitant fines to the value of the pairties Estates exacting extravagant Baile and
disposeing fines and forefaultors befor any proces or Conviction. . . . ALL which are utterly
and directly contrairy to the knoune lawes, statutes and freedomes of this realme.”); id. at
337 (“That the Imposeing of extraordinary fynes, The exacting of exorbitant Baile and the
disposeing of fynes and forefaultors befor sentence are Contrary to law.”).
96 JACKSON, supra note 80, at 121–25.
97 2 RAPIN DE THOYRAS, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIODS 322
(Nicolas Tindal trans., 1820).
98 Id. at 322–23.
99 Id. at 323.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF STUART ENGLAND, 1603–1689, at 151 (Ronald H. Fritze
& William B. Robison eds., 1996).
103 WILLIAMS, supra note 67, at 2.
104 HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF STUART ENGLAND, supra note 102, at 126.
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nation’s religion, laws and liberties.”105 In the parliamentary debate, Sir Richard
Temple—one of the Convention Parliament’s most frequent speakers—had pre-
sented “three heads essentially necessary” for reform, with the first two focused on
Parliament and the third centered on judicial abuses.106 “Extravagant bail,” one
member of Parliament raised as a particular concern.107 With the committee’s report
given to the House of Commons on February 2, 1689, and with five more grievances
added by the House of Commons itself, the nineteenth grievance read: “The requir-
ing excessive bail of persons committed in criminal cases, and imposing excessive
fines and illegal punishments to be prevented.”108 Before being finalized, those
grievances were later whittled down to thirteen. Another committee, chaired by John
Somers, a radical Whig lawyer educated at Oxford and at the Middle Temple, formed
on February 7 to amend the motion that would, less than a week later, declare William
and Mary the King and Queen of England.109
The final version of the Declaration of Rights—the one presented to Prince William
and Princess Mary on February 13—listed, among those thirteen grievances, that “ex-
cessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the
benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects”; “excessive fines have been
imposed”; and “illegal and cruel punishments inflicted.”110 To rectify the articulated
wrongs, the English Declaration of Rights then declared in its tenth article: “[t]hat
excessive Bail ought not to be required, nor excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and
unusual Punishments inflicted.”111 That Declaration of Rights thus laid out the
multiple abuses of James II, his ministers, and his judges, as well as the fundamental
rights and liberties of British subjects.112 “Over the next ten months,” one scholar,
105 Id. (entry for “Declaration of Rights (1689)”).
106 Woodruff, supra note 56, at 288.
107 Id.; Godfrey Davies, The Political Career of Sir Richard Temple (1634–1697) and
Buckingham Politics, 4 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 47, 78–79 (1940). See also 9 THE PARLIA-
MENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 1233
(1811) (referring to 1736 debate in the House of Lords over a “Bill to prevent Smuggling” to “the
security of the subject against unjust imprisonments, and the demanding of extravagant bail”).
108 4 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE
GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TILL THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE IV,
at 102 (2d Am. ed. 1851). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 655 (1977); 10 HC
Jour. 17 (1688); Massey, supra note 57, at 1249–50; Woodruff, supra note 56, at 288.
109 Massey, supra note 57, at 1249–50.
110 English Bill of Rights, supra note 45. See also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890);
Mitchell v. State, 34 A. 246, 247 (Md. 1896).
111 Laurence Claus, Methodology, Proportionality, Equality: Which Moral Question Does
the Eighth Amendment Pose?, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 36 (2008). See also LORD
NUGENT, SOME MEMORIALS OF JOHN HAMPDEN, HIS PARTY AND HIS TIMES 80 (3d ed., rev.
1854) (“Families were impoverished, some ruined, by excessive fines to the Courts of Wards for
compounding wardships.”); LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 1689 (1981)
(reprinting “Heads of Grievances”).
112 Pauline Miller, Introduction to THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 2 (2008).
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Michael Woodruff, observes of the period that followed the Declaration’s presenta-
tion in mid-February 1689, “the Convention Parliament worked on giving statutory
force to the rights and liberties asserted in the Declaration of Rights.”113 The English
Bill of Rights received royal assent on December 16, 1689, and thus was enacted within
the first year of William and Mary’s reign. The statute was titled “An Act Declaring
the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of the Crown.”114
Using the old-style Julian calendar, the English Bill of Rights, referencing the
earlier declaration, recited that:
[T]he Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons Assembled at
Westminster, Lawfully, Fully and Freely Representing all the Es-
tates of the People of this Realm, did upon the Thirteenth Day of
February in the Year of our Lord One thousand six hundred eighty
eight, Present unto Their Majesties, then called and known by
the Names of Style of William and Mary, Prince and Princess of
Orange, being present in their proper Persons a certain Declara-
tion in Writing, made by the said Lords and Commons . . . .115
Under England’s seventeenth-century Julian calendar, not abandoned for the Gregorian
model until 1751, each new year did not start until March 25th, so the Declaration
of Rights was then seen as a product of 1688, not 1689.116 Before setting out, among
other things, its prohibitions against “Excessive Bail,” “Excessive Fines,” and “cruel
and unusual punishments,” the English Bill of Rights condemned “the late King James
the Second” and his “Evil Councellors, Judges and Ministers Employed by him” for
subverting “the Protestant Religion, and the Laws of Liberties of this Kingdom.”117
113 Woodruff, supra note 56, at 289. See also English Bill of Rights, supra note 45.
114 It is sometimes reported in English sources as “An Act declareing the Rights and Liberties
of the Subject and Setleing the Succession of the Crowne.” The Bill of Rights 1689, The Glorious
Revolution, https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/parlia
mentaryauthority/revolution/collections1/collections-glorious-revolution/billofrights [http://
perma.cc/G85R-DR6V].
115 Id. Some sources, using then-prevailing spelling conventions, noted that the English
Bill of Rights recited that:
[T]he Lords Spirituall and Temporall and com¯ons assembled at Westmin-
ster lawfully fully and freely representing all the Estates of the People
of this Realme did upon the thirteenth day of February in the yeare of our
Lord one thousand six hundred eighty eight present unto their Majesties
then called and known by the Names of Stile of William and Mary Prince
and Princesse of Orange being present in their proper Persons a certaine
Declaration in Writeing made by the said Lords and com¯ons . . . .
Id.
116 PAUL BLAKE & MAGGIE LOUGHRAN, DISCOVER YOUR ROOTS: DIG UP YOUR FAMILY
HISTORY AND OTHER BURIED TREASURES 89–90 (2006).
117 English Bill of Rights, supra note 45, cl. 1 (1689).
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Like the earlier declaration, the statutory Bill of Rights recited that “Excessive Bail
hath been required of Persons Committed in Criminal Cases, to elude the Benefit of
the Laws made for the Liberty of the Subjects”;118 “excessive Fines have been im-
posed”;119 and “illegal and cruel Punishments inflicted.”120
The English Declaration of Rights laid down an important historical marker,
echoes of which can be clearly seen in America’s Declaration of Independence.121
Both the English and American declarations forthrightly declared that people had
certain rights and that a king had violated them.122 Whereas the English declaration
targeted King James II, who made a serious, but unsuccessful effort in 1689 and
1690 to regain the crown,123 its American counterpart took aim at George III, the
King of Great Britain from 1760 until his death in 1820.124 In a fitting bit of symbol-
ism, James II’s own father, Charles I of the House of Stuart, had, in 1649, been
convicted of high treason and executed near the end of the English Civil War of
1642–51 outside the very Banqueting House where William and Mary listened
attentively as the Declaration of Rights fashioned by the Convention Parliament was
read aloud.125 Charles I, who ruled from 1625 until his death, had quarreled bitterly
with Parliament and asserted his belief in the “divine right of kings.”126 He had
dissolved multiple parliaments, provoked and then violated the famous Petition of
Right in 1628,127 and governed England without any parliament at all between 1629
118 Id. cl. 10.
119 Id. cl. 11.
120 Id. cl. 12.
121 See BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 178–80; see also Massey, supra
note 57, at 1243.
122 William F. Dana, The Declaration of Independence, 13 HARV. L. REV. 319, 334 (1900).
123 JOHN MILLER, JAMES II 220–33 (3d ed. Yale Univ. Press 2000). James II was defeated
in Ireland at the Battle of Boyne (1690) and died in exile in France. Id. at 240.
124 Dana, supra note 122, at 334.
125 Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1252,
1265 (2016); Anni Mäntyniemi, Executed in the Open Street Before Whitehall, HISTORIC
ROYAL PALACES BLOGS (July 18, 2016), https://blog.hrp.org.uk/curators/executed-in-the
-street-before-banqueting-house/ [http://perma.cc/E5P3-82AZ].
126 MILLER, supra note 123, at 34.
127 The Petition of Right of 1628 spoke of the “Rights and Liberties of the Subjects” and
recited, among other things, that “The Great Charter of the Liberties of England” had declared
“[t]hat no Freeman may be taken or imprisoned or be disseised of his Freehold or Liberties, or
his free Customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, but by the lawful Judg-
ment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land”; that in King Edward III’s reign it was declared
and enacted by authority of Parliament, “that no man of what estate or condition that he be,
should be put out of his Land or Tenements nor taken nor imprisoned nor disinherited nor
put to death without being brought to answer by due process of law”; and that:
Nevertheless against the tenor of the said Statutes and other the good
Laws and Statutes of your Realm to that end provided, divers of your
Subjects have of late been imprisoned without any cause showed: And
when for their deliverance they were brought before your Justices by
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and 1640, ultimately plunging the country into a protracted civil war.128 The English
Civil War pitted Parliamentarians, or “Roundheads,” against the royalists, or “Cava-
liers,” with the Parliamentarians finally prevailing at the Battle of Worcester on
September 3, 1651.129
C. The Causes of English Discontent Against the Reign of the Stuarts
During his reign, Charles I had made extensive use of the Star Chamber,130 the
English court sitting without a jury at the royal Palace of Westminster that fre-
quently imposed arbitrary fines, sentences of imprisonment, and, most infamously,
had a reputation for grotesque abuses of power and resorting to methods of torture.131
As one source notes, Charles I called the Star Chamber “into action a great deal, and
extended its powers, and made it a means of great injustice and oppression.”132 As
your Majesty’s Writs of Habeas corpus there to undergo and receive as the
Court should order, and their Keepers commanded to certify the causes
of their detainer, no cause was certified, but that they were detained by
your Majesty’s special command, signified by the Lords of your Privy
Council, and yet were returned back to several prisons, without being
charged with anything to which they might make answer according to
the Law.
Petition of Right, 3 Car. I, ch. 1 (1628), in 6 STATUTES OF THE REALM 23, 23.
128 See MILLER, supra note 123, at 6–15; see also L.J. REEVE, CHARLES I AND THE ROAD
TO PERSONAL RULE 20–23 (1989).
129 REEVE, supra note 128, at 125–28; KEVIN SHARPE, THE PERSONAL RULE OF CHARLES
I 98, 922 (1992). See also SAMUEL BANNISTER HARDING & ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, NEW
MEDIEVAL AND MODERN HISTORY 429 (rev. 1920) (describing the “1629–1640” time frame
as a “Period of arbitrary government”); THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND
COMMENTARY 172 (G. R. Elton ed., 2d ed. 1982).
130 The Star Chamber was so named because of the stars decorating the ceiling in the room
in which it sat in the Palace of Westminster. See JOHN STOW, A SURVEY OF LONDON (rev. 1603),
reprinted in JOHN STOW, A SURVEY OF LONDON (C.L. Kingsford ed., 1908), https://www.british
-history.ac.uk/no-series/survey-of-london-stow/1603/pp97-124 [http://perma.cc/F5CA-FR4U]
(“This place is called the Starre Chamber, because the roofe thereof is decked with the
likenes of Stars guilt . . . .”).
131 See THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 129, at
172; see also John Gunn & Paul Mevis, Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Systems of Trial
and Investigation in Criminal Procedure, in FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN
EUROPE: A CROSS-BORDER STUDY GUIDE 9 (Kris Goethals ed., 2018):
The high-handed king [Charles I] forced disastrous wars and asked
Parliament to raise the necessary funds. When this was refused, he
disbanded Parliament and raised money by extortion from wealthy
landowners. If a nobleman refused to pay up, he was arraigned before
the Star Chamber. Arrested knights appealed to the common law for
release from prison, but the king said he had unlimited powers because
he ruled by divine right, and he dismissed Parliament.
132 JACOB ABBOTT, CHARLES I, at 121 (1901).
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a biography of Charles I reports: “[T]he Star Chamber under Charles I achieved such
a level of notoriety for its capricious judgments and use of torture that the concept
of a ‘Star Chamber’ lives on in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition as the epitome of an
arbitrary and uncontrolled court.”133 Ultimately, Charles I was put on trial for his
“wicked” and tyrannical practices “against the public interest, common right, liberty,
justice, and peace of the people.”134 The last recorded instance of torture occurred
in the realm of Charles I in 1640 to secure a confession for treason, with the Star
Chamber abolished the following year, in 1641.135
Historically speaking, the Star Chamber came to be associated with “exorbitant”
fines136 and “unchecked tyranny.”137 For example, in 1630, a Scottish clergyman, Dr.
Alexander Leighton, was sentenced by the Star Chamber to be branded, flogged, and
pilloried,138 to have his nose slit, and to have one of his ears cut off.139 Likewise, in
133 JEREMY B. BIERBACH, FRONTIERS OF EQUALITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EU AND US
CITIZENSHIP 31 (2017).
134 TOBY BARNARD, THE ENGLISH REPUBLIC 1649–1660, at 3 (2d ed. 1997); STEPHANIE
A. MANN, SUPREMACY AND SURVIVAL: HOW CATHOLICS ENDURED THE ENGLISH REFORMA-
TION, at xxxiii, 104, 110 (2007); 12 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 83 (1930); Massey,
supra note 57, at 1246.
135 GEORGE RYLEY SCOTT, THE HISTORY OF TORTURE THROUGHOUT THE AGES 87 n.1
(2009); 22 THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA 366–67 (Daniel Coit Gilman, Harry
Thurston Peck & Frank Moore Colby eds., 2d ed. 1916). See also EDGAR J. MCMANUS, LAW
AND LIBERTY IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS 1620–1692,
at 107–08 (“Torture virtually disappeared after 1600, even as an extralegal process. Only
seven cases were recorded during the reigns of James I and Charles I, and all seven involved
state crimes. Although the threat of torture was used as late as 1662 to obtain a treason co-
nfession from Thomas Tonge, no actual use of torture after 1640 has been uncovered.”).
136 DE THOYRAS, supra note 97, at 280 (noting that “Alderman Chambers” was condemned
by the Star Chamber to “an exorbitant fine [of 2000l.] by which [and some other oppressions]
he was reduced to a very low condition”).
137 TERRY, supra note 72, at  658.
138 The pillory, also sometimes called stocks, was a clamp which held the convict in posi-
tion in public view while the public could jeer and pelt the victim. See Matthew Green, A
Grim And Gruesome History Of Public Shaming In London: Part 1, LONDONIST (Dec. 2015),
https://londonist.com/2015/12/publicshaming1 [http://perma.cc/L2LP-R4EQ].
139 TERRY, supra note 72. See also GREG ROZA, THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: PREVENTING
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 10 (2011):
In 1630, for example, Puritan clergyman Alexander Leighton was charged
with libel for writing a pamphlet that attacked the Anglican Church.
Leighton was whipped so badly that he almost died. Then his hands and
head were pilloried, or secured in a wooden restraint, and he was placed
outside to be ridiculed by the public. He ear was nailed to the pillory,
his cheek was branded, and his nose was slit; the next week he suffered
that same fate on the opposite side of his face. After undergoing all of
this, he was sentenced to life in prison and fined £10,000 ($15,282)—
an enormous sum for the time.
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1634, a prominent lawyer, William Prynne, was fined £5,000 by the Star Chamber,
ordered to be imprisoned for life, stripped of his Oxford degree and his professional
membership in Lincoln’s Inn, sent to the pillory, and had his ears cut off for publish-
ing a book, Histriomastix.140 That book denounced all dramatic productions as the
Devil’s work, shortly after Charles I’s wife, Queen Henrietta, as well as her ladies-
in-waiting, had participated in a production of Walter Montagu’s The Shepherd’s
Paradise.141 After being confined in prison, Prynne was hauled back before the Star
Chamber after attacking Matthew Wren, the Bishop of Norwich, and was again
fined £5,000, had his life sentence confirmed, and was sent back to the pillory to
have what remained of his ears cut off.142 Prynne, held in the Tower of London, was
branded on his cheeks with the letters “S. L.” (for “Seditious Libeller”) and would
become known as “the man with no ears.”143
Dr. Leighton and Prynne, along with others who had been imprisoned, were later
freed, with Dr. Leighton’s petition, which detailed his “mutilations and tortures,”
reportedly drawing “tears from almost every member of the House of Commons.”144
As that source notes of what happened after the convening of what came to be
known as the Long Parliament: “The Star Chamber and High Commission Courts,
the dreadful engines of oppression and arbitrary power in church and state, which
had taken away the liberties, and confiscated the estates, and tortured the persons of
the wealthy and the worthy in England, were dissolved, Aug. 1, 1641.”145 In Dr.
Leighton’s case, he had presented a petition on November 7, 1640, that complained
of the cruelties he had endured, which led, in 1641, to the House of Commons re-
solving, among other things: “That the great fine of ten thousand pounds, laid upon
Dr. Leighton by sentence of the star chamber, is illegal”;146 “That the sentence of the
corporeal punishment, imposed upon Dr. Leighton, the whipping, branding, sliting the
nose, cutting off his ears, setting in the pillory, and the execution thereof, and the im-
prisonment thereupon, is illegal.”147 “That Dr. Leighton ought to be freed from the
great fine of ten thousand pounds, and from the sentence of perpetual imprisonment,
140 DAVID ROGERS, BY ROYAL APPOINTMENT: TALES FROM THE PRIVY COUNSEL—THE
UNKNOWN ARM OF GOVERNMENT 120 (2015).
141 IDA ASHWORTH TAYLOR, THE LIFE OF QUEEN HENRIETTA MARIA 160 (E. P. Dutton
& Co. ed., 2d ed. 1906). See also ROGERS, supra note 140, at 120.
142 James Hart, In Search of Tradition: Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 82
DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 95 (2004).
143 LOUIS EDWARD INGELHART, PRESS AND SPEECH FREEDOMS IN THE WORLD, FROM AN-
TIQUITY UNTIL 1998: A CHRONOLOGY 48 (1998). See also ROGERS, supra note 140, at 122.
144 THOMAS LOCKERBY, A SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF THE REV. JOHN BROWN, SOMETIME
MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL IN WAMPHRAY; CONTAINING MANY OF HIS INTERESTING LETTERS
HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED, WITH ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES, AND A HISTORICAL APPENDIX;
EXHIBITING A FULL VIEW OF THE TIMES AND SUFFERINGS OF THE COVENANTERS 393 (1839).
145 Id.
146 THOMAS SMITH, SELECT MEMOIRS OF THE ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH DEVINES 455–56
(C. Matthew McMahon & Therese McMahon eds., 2d ed. 2012).
147 Id.
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and to have his bonds delivered to him which he gave for his true imprisonment.”148
“That Dr. Leighton ought to have good satisfaction and reparation for his great
damages and sufferings sustained, by the illegal sentence of the star chamber.”149
While the infamous Star Chamber became known in America for its “outrageous
deeds,”150 the English Bill of Rights became known as the predecessor of American
bills of rights, including the United States Bill of Rights.151 The English Bill of Rights,
which memorialized the end of James II’s reign and the beginning of William and
Mary’s rule, sought to protect rights and liberties.152 But it also, quite notoriously,
included an overtly anti-Catholic provision which provided that “every person who
shall marry a papist shall be excluded, and for ever be incapable to inherit, the
crown of this realm.”153 As historian Maura Jane Farrelly writes in Anti-Catholicism
in America, 1620–1860:
After 1689, when an anti-Catholic coup in England known as the
‘Glorious Revolution’ firmly established that to be ‘English’ was
to be ‘Protestant,’ the Puritans in North America also used their
long-standing animosity toward the Catholic Church to assert
their English identity to each other and to their countrymen on
the other side of the Atlantic.154
Years before the Glorious Revolution, anti-Catholic sentiment had dominated
English life.155 James II, the Duke of York, before ascending to the throne in
February 1685 upon Charles II’s death, had secretly converted to Catholicism in
1668 or 1669. This raised concerns among Protestants about unwelcome Roman
Catholic influence once he assumed the throne.156 Even before Charles II’s brother,
James II, came to power, an anti-Catholic fervor bordering on hysteria had pervaded
England and Scotland. Charles II, a Protestant who had Catholic sympathies, had led
the Restoration, in which the English, Scottish, and Irish monarchies were all restored
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 AMAR & ADAMS, supra note 88, at 125.
151 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A COLLECTION OF ESSENTIAL WORKS 29
(Roger L. Kemp ed., 2010).
152 English Bill of Rights, supra note 45.
153 6 GEORGE L. CRAIK & CHARLES MACFARLANE, THE PICTORIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND:
BEING A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE 219 (1847).
154 MAURA JANE FARRELLY, ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA, 1620–1860, at 5 (2018).
155 Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, a Roman Catholic, was beheaded in 1587. See generally
JENNY WORMALD, MARY, QUEEN OF SCOTS: POLITICS, PASSION AND A KINGDOM LOST (2001)
(detailing the life of Queen Mary of Scotland); James II and VII, THE STUART SUCCESSIONS
PROJECT, http://stuarts.exeter.ac.uk/education/biographies/james-ii-and-vii/ [http://perma.cc
/JSF6-QUW8].
156 James II and VII, supra note 155.
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under Charles II’s authority following Oliver Cromwell’s nearly five-year republi-
can rule (and his son Richard Cromwell’s brief, 264-day rule) as the Lord Protector
of the short-lived Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland.157 While
Charles II ultimately converted to Catholicism on his deathbed in 1685,158 the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, which was grounded in Protestantism, established the
terms on which the British people would continue to accept monarchical rule, and
laid out the rights that had come to be seen as indispensable.159 Though it was driven
by anti-Catholic fervor, the Glorious Revolution produced a list of rights, many of
which (including the rights to be free from excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel
and unusual punishments) had, at least on their face, nothing at all to do with reli-
gion.160 Less than a decade after that revolution, in a tribute that followed Queen
Mary II’s death in 1694, one writer spoke in 1695 of “Liberties that we enjoy as the
direct Fruits of the Revolution.”161 “We are now deliver’d from excessive Bails and
Fines, and cruel unusual Punishments,” the author stressed.162
James II’s reign, which started on February 6, 1685, had been turbulent from the
start.163 In 1685, the newly crowned James II had quashed rebellions led by James
Scott, the Duke of Monmouth, and one of the duke’s Scottish allies, Archibald
Campbell, the 9th Earl of Argyll.164 Scott, the Duke of Monmouth and James II’s
nephew, was Charles II’s firstborn son, though he was the child of Lucy Walter, a
Welsh mistress whom James II derided as a “common prostitute.”165 Both the Duke
of Monmouth and the Earl of Argyll were executed for high treason, the Duke in the
157 JULIA MARCIARI ALEXANDER & CATHERINE MACLEOD, POLITICS, TRANSGRESSION,
AND REPRESENTATION AT THE COURT OF CHARLES II, at 17 (2007); 2 A COLLECTION OF
STATE TRACTS, PUBLISH’D DURING THE REIGN OF KING WILLIAM III, at 1–2 (1706) [here-
inafter 2 A COLLECTION OF STATE TRACTS]. Oliver Cromwell, a Puritan, had fought in the
English Civil War and had been, in 1649, one of the signatories of Charles I’s death warrant.
He played a key role in the Rump Parliament (1649–1653) before becoming the Lord Pro-
tector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland. See generally PETER GAUNT,
OLIVER CROMWELL (1996); CHRISTOPHER HILL, GOD’S ENGLISHMAN: OLIVER CROMWELL
AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION (Norman F. Cantor ed., 1970).
158 KAREN EDMISTEN, DEATHBED CONVERSIONS: FINDING FAITH AT THE FINISH LINE
28–29 (2013).
159 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 806–07 (2001).
160 At that time, of course, the legal protections against excessive bail, excessive fines, and
cruel and unusual punishments had a lot to do with protecting those with certain religious beliefs.
161 2 A COLLECTION OF STATE TRACTS, supra note 157, at 522–52.
162 Id. at 526.
163 MILLER, supra note 123, at 118–19.
164 Id. at 136–43.
165 See generally 4 SAMUEL PEPYS, THE DIARY OF SAMUEL PEPYS 311 (Henry B. Wheatley
ed., 1893); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr. Collection: Duke of Monmouth, http://libguides.law.uga.edu
/c.php?g=177206&p=1164806 [http://perma.cc/5M2B-VG8K]. See also ANNA KEAY, THE
LAST ROYAL REBEL: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF JAMES, DUKE OF MONMOUTH (2016).
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Tower of London and the Earl in Edinburgh.166 Indeed, after Argyll’s Rising and the
Duke of Monmouth’s failed rebellion, scores of rebels—in the hundreds, though the
exact number is unknown—were condemned to death, most notoriously by Eng-
land’s Lord Chief Justice George Jeffreys.167 Jeffreys was sent by James II to swiftly
mete out the king’s justice, and the series of trials in which Monmouth’s rebels were
sentenced to die by Jeffreys came to be known as the “Bloody Assizes.”168 Many of
the rebels in Argyll’s Rising and Monmouth’s Rebellion were hanged, grotesquely
drawn and quartered, or sent to perform hard labor in the West Indies.169
Jeffreys even condemned to death an elderly woman, Lady Alice Lisle, for shelter-
ing and feeding a rebel.170 Her sentence—to be burned alive—was only changed to
a beheading through a plea to King James II himself.171 “The barbarity and breadth
of the punishment,” a history of the Stuart dynasty notes of the harsh treatment of the
rebels, “gained Jeffreys and ultimately James reputations as cold-blooded murderers.”172
Prominent figures at the Convention Parliament—among them, Sir Richard Temple—
showed considerable animosity toward Jeffreys,173 with Jeffreys becoming known
as England’s “most reviled judge.”174 After the onset of the Glorious Revolution,
Jeffreys had made plans to flee England on a coal-barge, but before he was able to
escape, he’d been caught175 and then confined in the Tower of London, where he
166 See FREDERICK BURWICK, PLAYING TO THE CROWD: LONDON POPULAR THEATRE,
1780–1830, at 144 (2011); 2 JOHN DEBRETT, THE PEERAGE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN & IRELAND 616–17 (London, J. Mayes et al. eds., 9th ed. 1814); JAMES K. MCDONELL
& ROBERT B. CAMPBELL, LORDS OF THE NORTH 11 (1997).
167 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967–68 (1991).
168 Id.; Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 46–48 (2000). See also Note, What is
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54, 54–55 (1917).
169 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967–68; CHARLES PASTOOR & GALEN K. JOHNSON, HISTORICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE PURITANS 52 (2007).
170 See James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 155
(1983); Virginia Salima Moorhead, The Trial of Lady Alice Lisle, ALEXANDER CAMPBELL KING
L. LIB., U. GA. SCH. L., http://libguides.law.uga.edu/c.php?g=177206&p=1164821 [http://perma
.cc/G6CB-2AA4].
171 Moorhead, supra note 170.
172 HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF STUART ENGLAND, supra note 102, at 48. See GWENDA
MORGAN & PETER RUSHTON, BANISHMENT IN THE EARLY ATLANTIC WORLD: CONVICTS,
REBELS AND SLAVES 76 (2013); THE PANOPLIST, OR THE CHRISTIAN’S ARMORY 341–42
(Boston, Crocker & Brewster, 1850). See also Stephen A. Timmons, Executions Following
Monmouth’s Rebellion: A Missing Link, 76 HIST. RES. 286–91 (2003).
173 See Davies, supra note 107, at 79.
174 Ruth Tyler Bryan, George Jeffreys, First Baron Jeffreys of Wem, ALEXANDER
CAMPBELL KING L. LIB., U. GA. SCH. L., http://libguides.law.uga.edu/c.php?g=177206&p=11
64803 [http://perma.cc/UQ7Z-PFS6].
175 See HUMPHREY W. WOOLRYCH, THE LIFE OF JUDGE JEFFREYS, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
KING’S BENCH UNDER CHARLES II., AND LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND DURING THE
REIGN OF JAMES II. 278–81 (Phila., Lindsay & Blakiston 1852).
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later died.176 Jeffreys was an alcoholic,177 and after being recognized at the Red Cow,
a pub near King Edward’s Stairs where he was drinking “a pot of ale,” it wasn’t long
before cries of “Vengeance! Justice! Justice!” had gone up from an angry mob.178
D. The Case of Titus Oates
Without a shadow of a doubt, English parliamentarians produced the Declara-
tion of Rights (and its statutory counterpart) to secure what they perceived to be the
indispensable rights and liberties of British subjects.179 And it did not take long
before its prohibitions against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual
punishments took center stage.180 Historical sources reveal that, following the onset
of the Glorious Revolution, England’s Parliament conducted a full-throated review
of notorious actions and punishments meted out in James II’s reign.181 The review
by Parliament of punishments handed out by the King’s Bench during James II’s
reign is reflected in parliamentary debates that reveal the unique historical impulses
(and impetus) behind the English Declaration of Rights.182 “At the Revolution,” one
source notes of the Glorious Revolution, the disgraced Protestant clergyman Titus
Oates—one of the prior targets of James II’s wrath—“had been released, probably
176 Bryan, supra note 174.
177 DANIEL DIEHL & MARK P. DONNELLY, TALES FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON 146 (2004).
178 WOOLRYCH, supra note 175, at 278–81.
179 See English Bill of Rights, supra note 45; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967
(1911); Parr, supra note 168, at 43.
180 THE HISTORY OF THE DESERTION, OR AN ACCOUNT OF ALL THE PUBLICK AFFAIRS IN
ENGLAND, FROM THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER 1688 TO THE TWELFTH OF FEBRUARY FOL-
LOWING 128–29 (London, Ric. Chiswell 1689) (containing the recitals condemning “Excessive
Fines” and “Illegal and cruel Punishments,” and reprinting the prohibition on “Excessive Bail,”
“Excessive Fines,” and “cruel and unusual punishments”); THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF
ORANGE; OR, A BRIEF RELATION OF THE GLORIOUS AND MAGNANIMOUS ACHIEVEMENTS OF
HIS MAJESTIES RENOWNED PREDECESSORS, AND LIKEWISE OF HIS OWN HEROIC ACTIONS
TILL THE LATE WONDERFUL REVOLUTION 140–42 (London, Nath. Crouch ed., 1693) [hereinafter
HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF ORANGE] (same); 1 THE TWELFTH AND LAST COLLECTION OF
PAPERS RELATING TO THE PRESENT JUNCTURE OF AFFAIRS IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND
17–18 (London, Richard Janeway ed., 1689) (same); UTRUM HORUM; OR GOD’S WAYS OF
DISPOSING OF KINGDOMS: AND SOME CLERGY—MEN’S WAYS OF DISPOSING OF THEM 55,
57 (London, Richard Baldwin ed., 1691) [hereinafter UTRUM HORUM] (same); accord 1 OF
THE USE AND ABUSE OF PARLIAMENTS: IN TWO HISTORICAL DISCOURSES 114 (London, 1744).
181 See English Bill of Rights, supra note 45; HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF ORANGE, supra
note 180, at 140–42; 1 THE TWELFTH AND LAST COLLECTION OF PAPERS RELATING TO THE
PRESENT JUNCTURE OF AFFAIRS IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND, supra note 180, at 16–17;
UTRUM HORUM, supra note 180, at 51, 53–55.
182 See HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF ORANGE, supra note 180, at 140–41; 1 THE TWELFTH
AND LAST COLLECTION OF PAPERS RELATING TO THE PRESENT JUNCTURE OF AFFAIRS IN
ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND, supra note 180, at 16–17; UTRUM HORUM, supra note 180, at 51,
53–55.
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because excessive fines and punishments had been declared illegal by the Declaration
of Rights.”183
In fact, one of the most prominent cases that came into focus after the issuance of
the English Declaration of Rights involved Titus Oates, the clergyman who’d been put
on trial for perjury in 1685 at the outset of James II’s reign.184 In 1678, Oates had
falsely claimed that there was a diabolical, Jesuit-led “Popish Plot” to assassinate King
Charles II,185 and the falsities concocted by Oates had gone so far as to implicate the
future Catholic king, the Duke of York, among other prominent aristocrats.186 Oates
and others testified that Roman Catholics had plotted to murder Charles II to make way
for the succession of the Duke of York, a Catholic.187 The lies told by Oates led to the
execution of more than a dozen Catholics,188 and once those lies were exposed, Oates
was called “the Blackest of Villains that ever lived upon the face of the Earth.”189 At
one point, Oates had denounced the then–Duke of York as “a traitor,” leading the Duke
to sue Oates for libel in 1684. Oates was fined £100,000 in that libel suit and then
imprisoned in the King’s Bench prison for his inability to pay that princely sum.190
183 Eveline Cruickshanks et al., Divisions in the House of Lords on the Transfer of the
Crown and Other Issues, 1689–94: Ten New Lists, in PEERS, POLITICS AND POWER: THE HOUSE
OF LORDS 1603–1911, at 89 (Clyve Jones & David Lewis Jones eds., 1986). See also id. at
88 (“The case of Titus Oates took up a great deal of time in the first session of the Conven-
tion, delayed the bill of rights and other more important matters, produced a deadlock between
the Houses and raised issues of constitutional importance.”).
184 Ryan, supra note 3, at 577.
185 Proceedings on a Writ of Inquiry of Damages between his Royal Highness James Duke
of York, in an Action upon the Statute de Scandalis Magnatum, and Titus Oates, in the King’s
Bench: 36 Charles II A.s. 1984, reprinted in 10 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS
AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 126–48 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816); AN HISTORICAL
NARRATIVE OF THE HORRID PLOT AND CONSPIRACY OF TITUS OATES, CALLED THE POPISH
PLOT, IN ITS VARIOUS BRANCHES AND PROGRESS, SELECTED FROM THE MOST AUTHENTIC
PROTESTANT HISTORIANS, TO WHICH ARE ADDED SOME CURSORY OBSERVATIONS ON THE
TEST ACT 60–61 (London, W.E. Andrews 1816); 1 THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM PENN (1644–1679)
558 n.2 (Mary Maples Dunn & Richard S. Dunn eds., 1981); Reginald Talbot, Judge Jeffreys,
23 L. MAG. & REV. 336, 345 (1898). See generally JOHN POLLOCK, THE POPISH PLOT: A STUDY
IN THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES II (Duckworth 1903).
186 See generally 8 JOHN RICHARD GREEN, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 139–221
(New York & London, Funk & Wagwalls Co. 1903) (discussing the “Popish Plot”).
187 CAROLINE JOWETT, THE HISTORY OF NEWGATE PRISON 54–55 (2017); Davies, supra
note 107, at 61.
188 See POLLOCK, supra note 185, at xxi, 196, 332 (taking note of the executions).
189 9 A COLLECTION OF SCARCE AND VALUABLE OF THE MOST INTERESTING AND ENTERTAIN-
ING SUBJECTS: BUT CHIEFLY SUCH AS RELATE TO THE HISTORY AND CONSTITUTION OF THESE
KINGDOMS 240 (Walter Scott ed., 2d. ed 1813).
190 2 THOMAS COVENTRY & SAMUEL HUGHES, AN ANALYTICAL DIGESTED INDEX TO THE
COMMON LAW REPORTS FROM THE TIME OF HENRY III TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
REIGN OF GEORGE III, at 1226 (1832); 5 THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY: THE
ASCENDANCY OF FRANCE, 1648–88, at 317 (F.L. Carsten ed., 1961).
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After the Duke of York was elevated to His Majesty James II, the lies spread by
Titus Oates came back to haunt him even more as Oates was brought from the prison
to face criminal charges for perjury.191 The first trial took place on May 8, 1685, with
Oates representing himself.192 And in those days of swift and rough justice, the second
trial took place the very next day.193 Oates was convicted on both counts, with George
Jeffreys, the presiding judge, publicly excoriating Oates for his “Villainy” and calling
his crime “a very heinous one.”194 “That men should take away the lives of their
fellow-creatures, by perjury and false accusations,” Jeffreys had instructed the jury
at the first trial, making clear his own views and urging jurors to respect their con-
sciences, “is of such dreadful consequences, that if the justice of the nation shall be
afraid to have such matters detected, there would be an end of all the security we
have of our lives, liberties, and whatsoever is dear to us.”195
Judge George Jeffreys—the mean-spirited, hard-drinking stooge of James II—was
clearly out to get Titus Oates, one of the many targets of Jeffreys’ ire. “I cannot but
say,” Jeffreys told the jurors after all the evidence at that trial was presented, “my
blood does curdle, and my spirits are raised,” by “the discoveries” made during the
trial, with Jeffreys calling Oates a “monstrous villain.”196 “[T]he blackness of his
soul, the baseness of his actions,” Jeffreys said of Oates at the first trial, “ought to
be looked upon with such horror and detestation, as to think him unworthy any
longer to tread upon the face of God’s earth.”197 “[T]he destruction of poor innocent
persons, by false accusations, by the pernicious evidence of perjured witnesses,”
Jeffreys instructed the jurors at the second trial, “makes their crime infinitely more
odious, than common murder.”198
191 The Trial of Titus Oates, D.D. at the King’s Bench, for Perjury: 1 James II A.D. 1685,
reprinted in 10 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
YEAR 1783, at 1079–80 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816) [hereinafter Howell’s Edition of The Trial of
Titus Oates].
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1227.
194 Id. at 1313.
195 Id. at 1212. See also The Trial of Titus Oates D.D. at the King’s-Bench, for Perjury,
May 8, 1685: 1 Jac. II, reprinted in 4 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS AND PRO-
CEEDINGS UPON HIGH-TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS FROM THE REIGN
OF KING RICHARD II TO THE END OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE I, at 59–60 (Thomas Salmon
& Sollom Emlyn eds., 2d ed. 1730) [hereinafter Salmon & Emlyn’s Edition of The Trial of
Titus Oates].
196 Salmon & Emlyn’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 195, at 59.
197 Id.
198 Howell’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 191, at 1300. See also BESSLER,
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 174–75; GILBERT BURNET, BISHOP BURNET’S HISTORY
OF HIS OWN TIME: FROM THE RESTORATION OF KING CHARLES THE SECOND TO THE TREATY
OF PEACE AT UTRECHT, IN THE REIGN OF QUEEN ANNE 383 (London, Henry G. Bohn, new ed.
1857); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 236 (2001); CHARLES E. LITTLE,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CLASSIFIED DATES WITH AN EXHAUSTIVE INDEX 897 (1900); OATES’S
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It took the first jury only about a quarter of an hour to deliberate before it
reached its guilty verdict on the first perjury charge.199 “I am satisfied in my conscience
you have given a good and a just verdict,” Jeffreys explained.200 And at the second trial,
it took the jury just a half an hour to find the defendant guilty on the second perjury
charge.201 “I must tell you, you have given a verdict that becomes your honesty, in-
tegrity, and loyalty,” a pleased Jeffreys praised the second jury, adding: “And I declare,
in the presence of Almighty God, the Searcher of Hearts, that had I been of the Jury,
I must have given the same verdict.”202 Before Oates was sentenced, Jeffreys observed
that “the Old Laws of England” had punished perjury with death, but that those laws
had been changed so that a perjurer would “be punished according to the discretion
of this Court, so far as that the Judgment extend not to Life or Member.”203
The law had grown “more moderate,” Jeffreys declared, noting that the law had
once allowed “cutting out of the Tongue” to punish “that impious Crime of Perjury.”204
The “foul and malicious Perjury” that had brought “so many horrid and dreadful
Consequences,” Jeffreys announced, warranted “an exemplary Punishment upon this
villainous perjur’d wretch, to Terrify others for the future.”205 The words uttered by
Jeffreys, known as the “hanging judge” for his role in the Bloody Assizes, must have
been especially ominous for Oates to hear even though Jeffreys—the powerful judge—
had just conceded that the King’s Bench didn’t possess the power to impose a death
sentence upon Oates, an ordained priest of the Church of England.206 Although
Jeffreys expressed regret that Oates could not be hanged for perjury, the harsh
punishment that was inflicted on Oates has been described as the impetus for the
later-enacted English prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments.”207
MANIFESTO; OR, THE COMPLAINT OF TITUS OATES AGAINST THE DOCTOR OF SALAMANCA;
AND, THE SAME DOCTOR AGAINST TITUS OATES: COMPRIZED IN A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE
SAID PARTIES, ON OCCASION OF SOME INCONSISTENT EVIDENCE GIVEN ABOUT THE HORRID
AND DAMNABLE POPISH PLOT (London, R.L. 1683); 1 NUGENT ROBINSON, A HISTORY OF THE
WORLD WITH ALL ITS GREAT SENSATIONS TOGETHER WITH ITS MIGHTY AND DECISIVE BAT-
TLES AND THE RISE AND FALL OF ITS NATIONS FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT
DAY 332 (New York, P.F. Collier 1887); THE TRYALS, CONVICTIONS & SENTENCE OF TITUS
OTES 56–58 (London, R. Sare 1685); Titus Oates, Preface to THE MEMOIRES OF TITUS OATES,
at A3 (1685).
199 Howell’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 191, at 1227.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1309.
202 Id. at 1227, 1310.
203 Salmon & Emlyn’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 195, at 103–04.
204 Id. at 103.
205 Id. at 104; HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF STUART ENGLAND, supra note 102, at 48; THE
MEMOIRES OF TITUS OATES, supra note 198, at A3. See also Salmon & Emlyn’s Edition of
The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 195, at 59.
206 See, e.g., RICHARD WEST, THE LIFE & STRANGE SURPRISING ADVENTURES OF DANIEL
DEFOE 24 (1997) (“The suffering of Oates must have shocked Defoe, who always believed
at least part of the story about a Popish plot.”).
207 LEVY, supra note 198, at 236.
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The actual sentence imposed on Titus Oates was pronounced by Francis Wythens,
one of the Lord Chief Justice’s fellow justices.208 For each count of perjury, the
King’s Bench first ordered that Oates pay a fine of “1000 Marks.”209 The court then
ordered that Oates “be stript of all [his] Canonical Habits.”210 As to Oates’s first
perjury conviction, the court further ordered that Oates “stand upon the Pillory, and
in the Pillory, here before Westminster-hall gate” on the following Monday for an
hour’s time between 10:00 AM and noon with a paper over his head declaring his
crime.211 Before standing in the pillory for perjury, Oates was first to be paraded
“round about to all the Courts in Westminster-hall” with that ignominious placard—
the paper declaring his crime—over his head.212 As for the second perjury convic-
tion, the court ordered that Oates was, upon the following Tuesday, to be placed
again in the pillory “at the Royal Exchange in London, for the space of an hour,
between the hours of twelve and two; with the same inscription.”213 With Titus Oates
standing before the bar of justice to receive his sentence, Wythens, as a transcript
of the sentencing reveals, also pronounced this judgment of the King’s Bench: “You
shall upon the next Wednesday, be Whipt from Aldgate to Newgate.”214 “Upon Fryday,
you shall be Whipt from Newgate to Tyburn, by the Hands of the Common Hang-
man.”215 The total distance from Aldgate to Newgate to Tyburn is a full three miles.216
But that was not all that the King’s Bench, led by George Jeffreys, had in store
for Titus Oates, the notorious perjurer.217 Speaking for the King’s Bench and to Oates
himself, Wythens also had this to say to the man who became known as “Titus the
Liar”: “we cannot but remember, there was several particular Times you Swore false
about; And therefore, as Annual Commemorations, that it may be known to all People,
as long as you live; We have taken special Care of you, for an Annual Punishment.”218
That annual punishment, one that would shock the consciences of many Englishmen:
“Upon the Twenty fourth of April, every Year, as long as you live, you are to Stand
Upon the Pillory, and In the Pillory, at Tyburn, just opposite to the Gallows, for the
space of an Hour, between the Hours of Ten and Twelve.”219 “You are to Stand Upon,
and In the Pillory, here at Westminster-Hall-gate, every Nineth of August, in every
208 See Howell’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 191, at 1315; WOOLRYCH,
supra note 175, at 132–33.
209 Howell’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 191, at 1316.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 THE TRYALS, CONVICTIONS & SENTENCE OF TITUS OTES, supra note 198, at 60. See
also WOOLRYCH, supra note 175, at 132.
216 EDGAR SANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 260 (London, Blackie & Son
1882).
217 Salmon & Emlyn’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 195, at 104–05.
218 Id. at 105.
219 Id.
1022 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:989
Year, so long as you live.”220 “You are to Stand Upon, and In the Pillory, at Charing-
Cross, on the Tenth of August, every Year, during your Life, for an Hour, between Ten
and Twelve.”221 “The like, over against the Temple-gate, upon the Eleventh.”222 “And
upon the Second of September . . . you are to Stand Upon, and In the Pillory, for the
space of one Hour, between Twelve and Two, at the Royal Exchange.”223 “And all
this you are to do every Year, during your Life; and to be Committed close Prisoner,
as long as you live.”224 Wythens’ final words for Oates: “This I Pronounce to be the
Judgment of the Court upon you, for your Offences. And I must tell you plainly, if it
had been in my Power to have carry’d it further, I should not have been unwilling to
have given Judgment of Death upon you: For, I am sure, you deserve it.”225
This draconian sentence, handed down in King James II’s reign,226 became the sub-
ject of much public controversy, especially in Parliament after William and Mary
rose to power.227 Oates himself was a Protestant man of the cloth and no commoner; he
had been a clergyman and had once been hailed as a hero for exposing the supposed
Jesuit-driven “Popish Plot” to assassinate Charles II.228 “[T]he literature of the time,”
one historian emphasizes, “shows that part of the drama in this celebrated case in-
volved Oates’s status.”229 In broadsides, woodcuts depicted the humiliated Oates in the
pillory in full clerical garb, with one captioned “The Doctor Degraded.”230 It was ac-
companied by these lines of doggerel for the reading public: “And now must Oates
stand in the Pillory?” / “There to be battered so with Rotten Eggs,” / “Both on the Face,
the Body and the Legs.”231 “O Cruel Fate!” the lines of verse began, with the woodcut
including this inscription over Oates’s head: “Here stand I” / “For Perjury.”232 In
those days, harsh corporal punishments were all too common.233
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 THE TRYALS, CONVICTIONS & SENTENCE OF TITUS OTES, supra note 198, at 60. See
also JOWETT, supra note 187, at 54; Salmon & Emlyn’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates,
supra note 195, at 105.
226 See Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the
Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 670 n.66 (2004); Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth
Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments that are Both Cruel and Unusual?,
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 575–77 (2010).
227 See Schwoerer, supra note 58, at 107–27 (discussing the coronation of William and Mary).
228 See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 156 (2003).
229 Id. at 157.
230 Id. at 156.
231 Id.
232 1 CATALOGUE OF PRINTS AND DRAWINGS IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM: DIVISION I. POLITICAL
AND PERSONAL SATIRES (No. 1 to No. 1235) 698–99 (London, Chriswick Press 1870).
233 See, e.g., CYNDI BANKS, PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 10–11 (2005):
In England, branding was extensively used, and as late as 1699 the law
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E. The Use of Excessive Bail, Excessive Fines, and Cruel and Unusual Punishments
The Glorious Revolution produced a new king and queen, just as it prompted
Parliament carefully to scrutinize the penalties and punishments, as well as bail im-
positions,234 meted out in the past.235 For example, the Earl of Devonshire had been
fined £30,000 by the King’s Bench for striking a man with a cane,236 and Samuel
required that criminals be branded on the face with a letter designating
the crime committed. Thus a murderer would be branded with the letter
M, thieves with the letter T, and fighters and brawlers with the letter F.
Branding was also commonly in use as a form of punishment in colo-
nial America.
234 See 9 DANBY PICKERING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE, FROM THE FIRST YEAR OF K.
WILLIAM AND Q. MARY, TO THE EIGHTH YEAR OF K. WILLIAM III, at 68 (Cambridge, Joseph
Bentham 1764) (noting in the English Declaration of Rights of 1688 that “excessive bail hath
been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made
for the liberty of the subjects”).
235 See Rumann, supra note 226, at 670–71, n.59.
236 3 RAPIN DE THOYRAS, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 92 n.1 (1744). The Earl of Devonshire
had been committed to the King’s Bench prison until such time as he could pay the fine. Id. A
bond was ultimately posted for the full sum of 30,000 pounds, which was later “found among
the papers of King James after his abdication,” whereupon “it was given up to the Earl by King
William.” Id. at 93 n.1. It was contended in 1689 that the fine that had been imposed upon the
Earl of Devonshire was excessive and “a great violation of the privileges of the peers of this
realm.” Id. at 93. After a “committee of privileges” was appointed by the House of Lords to ex-
amine the harsh sentence, it was demanded that the judges who had rendered the judgment
in the Earl of Devonshire’s case “should be required to attend at the bar of this House, to answer
for the great offence, which they have committed thereby.” Id. at 92–93.
Each of the judges “were severally asked what they had to say for themselves in this
business,” with Mr. Justice Powell offering this explanation and response:
That it was his great misfortune, that he was misguided by some books,
which he looked on as authorities, which he found by their Lordships
judgment were not so: And he humbly begged their Lordships and the
Earl of Devonshire’s pardon. As to the fine, he looked upon three thou-
sand pounds to be a fine enough; and that his silence in that business
was his greatest fault, for which he also begged pardon.
Id. at 93. Sir Robert Wright, another of the judges, also contended:
[A]s to the breach of privilege, they were misguided by precedents. As to
the fine, which is usually set according to the quality and estate of the
person fined, it came from the puny judge thirty thousand pounds, and
so to him last, according to the course of the court; and if he was
mistaken, he begged pardon, for he never had the least disrespect to the
Earl of Devonshire.
Id. The final judge, Sir Richard Holloway, had this to say, as it was later reported in The
History of England:
[T]hat he as second Judge pronounced the fine thirty thousand pounds,
which was set nemine contradicente; and if a lesser fine had been pro-
posed, he should have accepted it, and did not justify the proceedings,
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Johnson, a clergyman, had not only been fined, but also ordered to be whipped se-
verely for writing and publishing two seditious libels.237 The Earl of Devonshire had
struck Colonel Culpepper at Whitehall on April 24, 1687, for an affront to his honor for
which the Earl felt he had not received any satisfaction, and it was for that conduct
that the King’s Bench had imposed the hefty fine.238 Samuel Johnson, arraigned on
an information for publishing “two pernicious, scandalous and seditious libels,” had
also been ordered “to stand thrice in the pillory, pay a fine of 500 marks, and to be
whipped from Newgate to Tyburn.”239
but looked on it as an excessive fine, and begged my Lord Devonshire’s
pardon, and submitted all to their Lordships.
Id.
When the Lords asked the three judges if they had discussed the fine before handing it
out, Wright denied that had happened, and Holloway declared he “had no direction from either
the King or Lord Chancellor concerning the said fine,” while Powell “appealed to the memory
of Sir Richard Holloway, that there was a discourse of the fine, five or six days before at the
Lord Chancellor’s” but Holloway “pretended he did not remember” and Wright “denied that
they were there purposely about the said fine.” Id. Powell specifically recalled that the Lord
Chancellor had “first proposed twenty thousand pounds and afterwards said, it would be better,
if thirty thousand pounds, and then the King might abate ten thousand pounds.” Id. On May 15,
1689, “the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, upon a full consideration of the several cases and
precedents, wherein the privileges of Peers had been concerned,” declared:
[t]hat the court of King’s bench, in over-ruling the Earl of Devonshire’s
plea of privilege of Parliament, and forcing him to plead over in chief,
it being within the usual time of privilege, did thereby commit a manifest
breach of privilege; and that the fine of thirty thousand pounds imposed
by the court of King’s Bench upon the said Earl was excessive and ex-
orbitant, and against Magna Charta, the common right of the subject,
and the law of the land; and that no peer of this realm, at any time, ought
to be committed for non-payment of a fine to the king.
Id.
237 Id. at 93, 93 n.1. Samuel Johnson, a chaplain and the “author of several tracts which had
given offence to the courts of King Charles II. and James II,” had been charged and brought
before the King’s Bench “for making, printing, and publishing a scandalous and seditious libel,
intitled, An humble and hearty address to all the Protestants in King James’s army.” Id. After
being forced to plead, a jury found him guilty of the offense, and the very same justice who
had announced Titus Oates’s draconian sentence had ordered Mr. Johnson:
(1) To pay five hundred marks to the King, and to lie in the prison of the
King’s Bench till it be paid. (2) To stand in the pillory three days, in three
several places, viz., the Palace-Yard Westminster, Temple-Bar, and the
Old-Change. (3) To be whipt by the common hangman from Newgate
to Tyburn.
Id. Mr. Johnson’s sentence, carried out in November 1686, was reportedly “executed with rigour
and cruelty, the whipping, being with a whip of nine cords.” Id. at 94 n.1.
238 Woodruff, supra note 56, at 289–90.
239 The Proceedings Against Mr. Samuel Johnson: 2 James II. A.D. 1686, reprinted in 11
A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND
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At the urging of the House of Commons, William III granted relief to both the
Earl of Devonshire and Mr. Johnson,240 with Parliament resolving on June 11, 1689,
that the judgment against Mr. Johnson was “cruel and illegal.”241 At the outset of
William and Mary’s reign, Titus Oates himself appealed directly to Parliament for
relief from the judgment of the King’s Bench, alleging that he was unjustly con-
victed,242 and that his sentence should be remitted.243 The History of England (1744)
observes that “Titus Oates . . . took the opportunity now of the indignation of the
Parliament, against the illegal proceedings of the late reign, to apply to the Lords,
for a reversal of the two judgments against him on the point of perjury.”244
In truth, the case of Titus Oates had long been on the public’s mind.245 After the
imposition of his 1685 sentence, Oates, the defrocked Anglican minister, had been
languishing in Newgate Prison, and scourged and humiliated multiple times in the
pillory on the anniversaries of his own perjuries.246 But he was set free in 1688 after
James II was forced from the throne in the Glorious Revolution, with Oates seeking
complete absolution—as well as financial compensation—from the newly installed
Protestant King.247 In an appeal to the House of Lords, Oates filed a writ of error, but
that body rejected it, labeling Oates “so ill a Man” for what he had done.248 But in the
OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO PRESENT TIME 1339–40
(T.B. Howell ed., 1811) [hereinafter The Proceedings Against Mr. Samuel Johnson].
240 See 3 THOMAS B. MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF
JAMES THE SECOND 356 (1899) (“Some living Whigs obtained without difficulty redress for in-
juries which they had suffered in the late reign. The sentence of Samuel Johnson was taken into
consideration by the House of Commons. It was resolved that the scourging which he had under-
gone was cruel, and that his degradation was of no legal effect.”); id. at 357 (noting that William
III compensated Mr. Johnson “for the wrongs which the Commons had brought to his notice”
by conferring the sum of one thousand pounds along with “a pension of three hundred [pounds]
a year for two lives”); id. (“While the Commons were considering the case of Johnson, the Lords
were scrutinizing with severity the proceedings which had, in the late reign, been instituted
against one of their own order, the Earl of Devonshire. The judges who had passed sentence on
him were strictly interrogated; and a resolution was passed declaring that in his case the privi-
leges of the peerage had been infringed, and that the Court of King’s Bench, in punishing a hasty
blow by a fine of thirty thousand pounds, had violated common justice and the Great Charter.”).
241 The Proceedings Against Mr. Samuel Johnson, supra note 239, at 1351.
242 LUKE OWEN PIKE, A HISTORY OF CRIME IN ENGLAND: ILLUSTRATING THE CHANGES
OF THE LAWS IN THE PROGRESS OF CIVILISATION 232 (1876).
243 Associates of Oates were also fined, whipped, and subjected to the pillory. AN HIS-
TORICAL NARRATIVE OF THE HORRID PLOT AND CONSPIRACY OF TITUS OATES, CALLED THE
POPISH PLOT, IN ITS VARIOUS BRANCHES AND PROGRESS, SELECTED FROM THE MOST AUTHEN-
TIC PROTESTANT HISTORIANS, TO WHICH ARE ADDED SOME CURSORY OBSERVATIONS ON
THE TEST ACT 281 (1816).
244 3 DE THOYRAS, supra note 236, at 94.
245 See STEPHEN HALLIDAY, NEWGATE: LONDON’S PROTOTYPE OF HELL 99 (2007).
246 See id.
247 Id.
248 See BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 175; see also HISTORICAL MANU-
SCRIPTS COMM’N, THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1689–1690, at 78 (1889).
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charged atmosphere that followed James II’s abdication, opinion was divided. While
thirty-five peers voted to affirm the judgment against Oates, twenty-three men voted
to reverse it.249 Those in the minority called Oates’s punishment “barbarous, inhu-
mane, and unchristian” and “contrary to” the English Declaration of Rights.250 “[T]here
is,” they concluded, “no precedent[ ] to warrant the punishments of whipping and com-
mitting to prison for life, for the crime of perjury; which yet were but part of the
punishments inflicted upon him.”251 “[U]nless this judgment be reversed,” they argued,
“like cruel, barbarous, and illegal judgments” would be inflicted, with the dissenters
highlighting language in the newly issued Declaration of Rights “whereby it doth
appear, that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted.”252 Their view: Oates’s sentence was “errone-
ous, and ought to be reversed” because it was “contrary to law and ancient practice.”253
The dissenters had a lot to say, and they believed—and vociferously expressed
the view—that Oates’s rights had been violated.254 Elsewhere, they opined “that the
Judgments given in the Court of King’s-Bench against Titus Oates are altogether
illegal and cruel,” “illegal and unjust,” and “ought plainly to be declared positively
against Law, Justice, and the undoubted Right of the Subject.”255 In the context of the
parliamentary debate, the dissenters further stressed that the notion advanced by
some of looking only to bar such punishments prospectively—that is, that “it shall not
be lawful at any time hereafter to inflict the like excessive punishments again”—
would not be “strong enough to deter a corrupt or partial Judge from practicing the
same, because it is without a penalty upon such Judge.”256 In the Earl of Devonshire’s
case, it was adjudged in 1689 that the £30,000 fine that had been imposed upon him
during James II’s reign by the Court of King’s Bench was “excessive and exorbitant,
against Magna Charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law of the
land.”257 In that case, the House of Lords had appointed a committee to examine the
249 Howell’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 191, at 1325–26. See also
BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 175–76.
250 Howell’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 191, at 1325. See also
BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 175.
251 Howell’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 191, at 1325. See also
BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 175–76.
252 Howell’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 191, at 1325–26. See also
BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 175.
253 Howell’s Edition of The Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 191, at 1325–26. See also
BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 175–76.
254 1 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS FROM THE RESTORATION
IN 1660, TO THE PRESENT TIME 369 (1742).
255 Id.
256 Id. at 368–69.
257 Proceedings in the House of Lords on the Case of the Earl of Devonshire after the
Revolution, reprinted in 11 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS
FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD
TO PRESENT TIME 1367–70 (T.B. Howell ed., 1811). See also 3 JOSEPH GROVE, THE HISTORY
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draconian fine, with the judges who had imposed the fine ordered “to attend at the bar
of this House, to answer for the great offence, which they have committed thereby.”258
The judgment that the fine was excessive was made after various judicial officers,
setting out their own views, testified before Parliament.259
Much more than money was at stake for Titus Oates. Whereas the Earl of
Devonshire had to grapple with a draconian fine, Oates’s conviction and sentence had
inflicted great infamy and stripped a man of his honor and dignity along with his cleri-
cal robes.260 “[T]here is no doubt,” the dissenters declared in Oates’s high-profile
case, “but all Judges will be hereafter cautious of setting great fines, since of late the
subject, in that point, has been grievously oppressed, as does appear by several
exorbitant fines annulled in this present Parliament.”261 It was only after the House
of Commons conducted its own review of Oates’s punishment, and after contentious
debate in that body and in the House of Lords, that Oates received a pardon and a
small pension from William III.262 The House of Lords had advised William III:
[T]hat whereas Titus Oates . . . had already received a severe
punishment for the perjury whereof he had been formerly con-
victed, and some of the said punishments would still be contin-
ued upon him, unless they should be remitted by his Majesty; his
Majesty would be graciously pleased to grant his pardon to the
said Oates.263
The House of Commons also specifically invoked the “cruel and unusual” punishments
clause in the Declaration of Rights to justify the remission of Oates’s 1685 sentence,
calling it “barbarous,” an “ill Example to future Ages,” and “unusual” in that “an En-
glishman should be exposed upon a Pillory, so many times a Year, during his Life.”264
OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CARDINAL WOLSEY: PRIME MINISTER TO KING HENRY VIII 100
(1744) (referring to the “excessive and exorbitant” fine against the Earl of Devonshire).
258 3 DE THOYRAS, supra note 236, at 93.
259 Id. at 92–93, 92–93 n.1.
260 See BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 174–76; HALLIDAY, supra note
245, at 99.
261 1 JAMES E. THOROLD ROGERS, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF THE PROTESTS OF THE
LORDS 84 (1875).
262 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 175–76; THE LIFE OF WILLIAM III,
LATE KING OF ENGLAND, AND PRINCE OF ORANGE 233 (3d ed. corr., 1705) [hereinafter THE
LIFE OF WILLIAM III].
263 2 ARTHUR TREVOR, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM THE THIRD, KING OF ENGLAND,
AND STADHOLDER OF HOLLAND 59 (1836).
264 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 175–76; 3 MACAULAY, supra note
240, at 364–65; 2 A COLLECTION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN ENGLAND, FROM THE
YEAR M,DC,LXVIII TO THE PRESENT TIME 455–56, 459–63 (1741); 2 TREVOR, supra note
263, at 59. The House of Lords also recommended that William III grant Oates “a Pension of
three Pounds a Week for his subsistence.” THE LIFE OF WILLIAM III, supra note 262, at 233.
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F. Corporal Punishments, the English Common-Law Tradition, and the
“Reasons for the Disaffectation of the Nation to the late Government”
In seventeenth-century England, when the English Declaration of Rights and its
corresponding Bill of Rights were promulgated, there was a general disgust for
arbitrary and excessive punishments, though harsh corporal punishments and capital
punishment were then still seen as a regular, and almost routine, part of English
criminal justice.265 For example, in proceedings before the Old Bailey, London’s
central criminal court, there is an entry from 1674 that reflects that nine people were
“ordered to receive Capital punishment,” while “there were nine others that got off
by the benefit of the Clergy.”266 Benefit of clergy, as originally conceived, exempted
clergymen from execution, although it evolved, in time, to shield first-time offenders
or those who simply could recite Psalm 51—colloquially known as the “neck
verse”—from the gallows.267 “Twelve,” the Old Bailey entry continued, “prayed and
obtained the favour of Transportation, and four sentenced to Shove the Fumbler,268
or receive the correction of the gentle Lash for several crimes respectively no less
tedious, than impertinent here to be recited.”269 Another entry, from 1677, also
noted: “A man was likewise Condemned to die for a kind of unusual Crime, but such
as the Law, by reason of its bad example and mischievous tendency, has thought fit
to restrain with capital Punishment . . . . He begg’d heartily for Transportation, but
it could not be granted.”270
The gallows at Tyburn—the London locale where so many criminals were put
to death over many centuries—became a potent symbol of monarchical power, as
did the pillory to which men such as Titus Oates were subjected.271 In an “Ordinary’s
Account” from March 4, 1685, one finds references in the Old Bailey’s records to
“Condemned Criminals” in Newgate Prison and to executions that had recently
taken place, including at Tyburn.272 “IT is sad to Consider,” the account lamented,
265 See Lizzie Seal, A Brief History of Capital Punishment in Britain, HIST. EXTRA (Mar. 27,
2018, 10:09 AM), https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/a-brief-history-of-capi
tal-punishment-in-britain [http://perma.cc/V8CC-6VNF].
266 Old Bailey Proceedings Punishment Summary, 12th December 1674, OLD BAILEY
PROCEEDINGS ONLINE, https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id=s16741212-1&div=s
16741212-1&terms=capitalpunishment#highlight [http://perma.cc/3R72-X4LB] [hereinafter
December 12, 1674 Old Bailey Entry].
267 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 268.
268 “Shove the Fumbler” is a phrase used to mean to “[b]e whipped at the cart’s tail.” 1
EDWARD BULWER LYTTON, PAUL CLIFFORD 16 n.1 (1893).
269 December 12, 1674 Old Bailey Entry, supra note 266.
270 Miscellaneous: Perverting Justice, 17th January 1677, OLD BAILEY PROCEEDINGS ON-
LINE, https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id=t16770117-3&div=t16770117-3&terms
=capitalpunishment#highlight [http://perma.cc/V9NS-ZB2L].
271 ROBERT BARD, TYBURN: THE STORY OF LONDON’S GALLOWS (2012).
272 Ordinary’s Account, 4th March 1685, OLD BAILEY PROCEEDINGS ONLINE, https://www
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“that notwithstanding the frequent Examples of publick Justice on Capital Offend-
ers, for the warning of all others, to Avoid the same Crimes,” that “in the short
Intervale of time from the former sessions, there should be such a Confluence of
persons now Condemned.”273 Other seventeenth-century entries in the records of the
Old Bailey reflect a woman sentenced to death for “murthering her Bastard child,”274
with many others sentenced to be “hanged by [their] necks till [they] be dead.”275
Although the punishment of transportation gradually became a popular alternative
to bodily punishments and executions,276 with George III abolishing branding in
1779,277 the gallows at Tyburn continued to operate until 1783, when John Austin,
a highwayman, was hanged there.278 After that, executions were relocated to outside
London’s Newgate Prison.279
The English Bill of Rights, restraining the king and queen’s power, established a
constitutional monarchy, but it was the product of a particular, seventeenth-century his-
torical context. Sir John Hawles (1645–1716), a lawyer who served in the House of
Commons and who, in 1695, became England’s solicitor general,280 later spoke of
“[the] strange Revolution which hath of late happened in our Nation,” which, he
added, “naturally leads one into the Consideration of the Causes of it.”281 In discussing
the Glorious Revolution, Hawles spoke of “the Subversion of the Established Religion”
and about “Taxes in the Nation.”282 But he also pointed to “some other Reasons for the
Disaffectation of the Nation to the late Government,” ranking those reasons under
“six Heads.”283 The first of those: “Exorbitant Fines; Cruel and Illegal Prosecutions;
.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id=OA16850304&div=OA16850304&terms=capitalpunish
ment#highlight [http://perma.cc/3G3F-6PUY].
273 Id.
274 Killing: Infanticide, 16th January 1678, OLD BAILEY PROCEEDINGS ONLINE, https://www
.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id=t16780116-1&div=t16780116-1&terms=punishmentof
death#highlight [http://perma.cc/4XAG-385D].
275 Old Bailey Proceedings, 11th December 1678, OLD BAILEY PROCEEDINGS ONLINE,
https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp ?id=16781211&div=16781211&terms=punish
mentofdeath#highlight [http://perma.cc/363U-GM37].
276 See Simon Devereaux, Imposing the Royal Pardon: Execution, Transportation, and Con-
vict Resistance in London, 1789, 25 L. & HIST. REV. 101 (2007).
277 HYPATIA BRADLAUGH BONNER, THE GALLOWS AND THE LASH: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE
NECESSITY FOR CAPITAL AND CORPORAL PUNISHMENTS 7 (1897).
278 GREGORY J. DURSTON, WHORES AND HIGHWAYMEN: CRIME AND JUSTICE IN THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY METROPOLIS 551 (2012).
279 JOWETT, supra note 187, at 85.
280 2 STATE TRIALS: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 122–23 (H.L. Stephen ed., 1899).
281 Remarks on Fitzharris’s Trial, by Sir John Hawles, Solicitor General to King William
the Third, reprinted in 8 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEED-
INGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD
TO PRESENT TIME 425 (1810).
282 Id. at 425–26.
283 Id. at 426; Remarks Upon the Trials of Edward Fitzharris, reprinted in 1 A COMPLETE
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Outrageous Damages; . . . Dispensing with . . . Penal Laws; and undue Prosecutions
in Criminal, but more especially in Capital Matters.”284
In 1680, the House of Commons had examined the matter of fines.285 “[T]he high-
est Fine, at that time complain’d of,” Hawles stressed, “was but 1000 l.”286 “[A]nd
yet,” he observed, in just a few short years such fines “were heighten’d to 10,000 l.
20,000 l. 30,000 l. and 40,000 l.”287 The second reason Hawles listed: “[T]he Punish-
ment of Oates, Dangerfield, and Mr. Johnson; and the close Imprisonment of Mr.
Hamden, Sir Samuel Barnardiston, and of several other Persons, as they were against
the Law, so they were without Precedent.”288 After the Rye House Plot of 1683 was
COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH-TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES
AND MISDEMEANOURS FROM THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE I, at 68 (1730).
284 Remarks Upon the Trials of Edward Fitzharris, supra note 283.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Remarks upon the Trial of Edward Fitzharris, Stephen College, Count Coningsmark,
the Lord Russel, Colonel Sidney, Henry Cornish and Charles Bateman, reprinted in 2 A COL-
LECTION OF STATE TRACTS, supra note 157. After the death of Queen Mary II in 1694, in A
Defence of the Archbishop’s Sermon on the Death of her Late Majesty of Blessed Memory
(printed in 1695), the writer spoke of “Liberties that we enjoy as the direct Fruits of the Revo-
lution.” Id. at 522, 525. “We are now deliver’d from excessive Bails and Fines, and cruel unusual
Punishments,” the writer stressed, among other things. Id. at 526. Accord A COMPLEAT HIS-
TORY OF THE WHOLE PROCEEDINGS OF THE PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN AGAINST DR.
HENRY SACHEVERELL: WITH HIS TRYAL BEFORE THE HOUSE OF PEERS, FOR HIGH CRIMES
AND MISDEMEANORS 162 (1710) (discussing the case of Sir Samuel Barnardiston and the
finding that “the said Fine of ten Thousand Pounds was exorbitant, and excessive, and not
warranted by Legal Precedent in former Ages; for all Fines ought to be with a Salvo con-
tenemento suo, and not to the Party’s Ruin”); cf. 3 DANIEL NEAL, THE HISTORY OF THE
PURITANS; OR, PROTESTANT NONCONFORMISTS; FROM THE REFORMATION IN 1517, TO THE
REVOLUTION IN 1688; COMPRISING AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR PRINCIPLES 248 (1837) (“This
year the king, by the assistance of the tories and Roman Catholics, completed the ruin of the
constitution, and assumed the whole government into his own hands. The whigs and Non-
conformists were struck with terror, by the severe prosecutions of the heads of their party.
Mr. Hampden was fined 40,000l. sir Samuel Barnardiston 10,000l. for defaming the evidence
in the Ryehouse plot. Mr. Speke 2000l. and Mr. Braddon 1000l. for reporting that the earl of
Essex had been murdered in the Tower. Mr. John Duttoncolt 100,000l. for scandalum magnatum
against the Duke of York, who now ruled all at court. Oates was fined for the same crime
100,000l. and never released till after the Revolution. Thirty-two others were fined or pilloried
for libelling the king or the duke of York.”). Compare From the Philadelphia Gazette, THE
HILLSBOROUGH RECORDER (Hillsborough, N.C.), Mar. 29, 1820, at 1 (discussing “American
merchants” indebted to “foreigners” who “tear from them every vestige of property the moment
it is acquired,” noting that “[l]aws should remedy evils, not perpetuate them,” and commenting:
“Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Is it not excessive to hold a man to the payment of
debts, after he has given up to his creditors every thing he possessed in the world, and when
these creditors are convinced that he never can pay them? . . . Cruel and unusual punishment
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exposed, Sir Samuel Barnadiston, an English politician, was put on trial for seditious
libel on the basis of letters he had written about George Jeffreys and the Rye House
plotters.289 After Jeffreys directed that the jury return a guilty verdict against
Barnardiston, Jeffreys pronounced the sentence on April 19, 1684, imposing a fine
of 10,000 l.290 That sum was seen as excessive.291
It was thus a whole series of injustices that prompted Parliament to demand
greater protection for British subjects—and to weigh in against “excessive” bail and
fines and against “cruel and unusual punishments.”292 Thomas Dangerfield, like
shall not be inflicted? Is it not a cruel punishment to tear from a man the subsistence and
comforts of his family as often as they are acquired? or compel him to demoralize himself by
evading the law in order to protect them?”), with A Case of Unparalleled Distress, THE MORN-
ING POST (London), Dec. 18, 1829, at 1 (“A highly respectable Man is now and long has been
confined in the King’s Bench Prison for an alleged Debt, got up against him in a manner most
extraordinary, by which he is deprived of every shilling as well as every article belonging to
him. The costs of the proceedings, as cruel and unusual as they have been protracted, are
enormous. In this his case of utter destitution, he humbly implores the AID of a BENEVOLENT
PUBLIC, whom he refers to the indisputable proofs and documents in the hands of Mr. Goyder,
11, Dartmouth-street, Westminster, who will exhibit them, as well as give additional reference
to one of the most eminent Solicitors in London, employed by this distressed Applicant, who has
not had the comforts of bed or bedding during his imprisonment in this inclement season. Any
donation paid into the hands of Mr. Goyder will be most thankfully and gratefully received.”).
289 3 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 244–46 (Leslie Stephen ed., 1885).
290 1 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 1166 (Stephen & Lee eds., 1908). See also
id. (“Barnardiston resisted payment, and was imprisoned until June 1688, when he paid
6,000l., and was released on giving a bond ‘for the residue.’ The whole case was debated in
the House of Lords, 16 May 1689, and Jeffreys judgment reversed. It was stated at the time
that during his long imprisonment Sir Samuel’s private affairs had become much disordered,
and that he lost far more money than the amount of the fine.”).
291 See, e.g., ARCHER M. WHITE, OUTLINES OF LEGAL HISTORY 205 (1895) (“By 12 Charles
II. c. 24, fines were regulated, and by the Bill of Rights (1 William and Mary, session 2, c. 2)
excessive fines were forbidden. But they had previously been imposed in Hampden’s case and
in Williams’ case. In the Earl of Devonshire’s case (11 St. Tr. 1353), the fine was £30,000,
merely for striking within the king’s palace. The fines of the Star Chamber were most excessive,
especially in James I.’s reign. In Barnardiston’s case the law was discussed; and now fines are
regulated by the various statutes which deal with the different offences punishable by fine,
based upon the principle of the Bill of Rights.”); see also id. at 197 (“The history of bail may
be shortly summarised as follows. It was originally at the discretion of the sheriff. Then came
the Statute of Bail (3 Edward I. c. 12); and various statutes from Edward III. to the seventeenth
century; 4 Edward III. c. 1; 34 Edward III. c. 1; 23 Henry VI. c. 9; 1 Richard III. c. 3; 3 Henry
VII. c. 3. The last two statutes gave justices of the peace the power to bail. The next step was
the provision of the Bill of Rights, in 1689, against the requisition of excessive bail.”).
292 See, e.g., 2 THE SECRET HISTORY OF EUROPE 142–43 (1712) (“What then must the
Cryes and the mangled Bodies of Mr. Johnson, Mr. Dangerfield and Oates, raise in every
Humane Mind. The Invention of Phalaris of Tiberius, Caligula, Nero and Domitian, and all
the Enemies of Mankind of Old, comes short of the Cruelty exercis’d of those Three English
Men. And the Scene of Blood and Horror, that fill’d the Streets of London at that time, was
such as must certainly give all that saw it, an inexpressible Dread of a Popish and Arbitrary
Government. If those Horrid Punishments had been Legal, it must set every honest Heart
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Titus Oates, had been fined and ordered to be whipped from Aldgate to Newgate
and from Newgate to Tyburn for his own role in the fictitious Popish Plot—in his
case, for libel.293 During James II’s relatively short reign, Sir William Williams, the
Speaker of the House of Commons, had himself been convicted of criminal libel and
fined £10,000 (later reduced to £8,000) for ordering the printing in the House of
Commons of Dangerfield’s libels against the Duke of York.294 Notably, after
Dangerfield’s initial flogging—said to have left him “[h]alf dead”—his life came
to an abrupt end on June 22, 1685, after an English barrister, Robert Francis, got into
a heated argument with Dangerfield while Dangerfield was on route, by coach, back
to Newgate Prison after surviving the day’s horrendous flogging.295
Robert Francis, the “hot-headed” Tory barrister, had jeered at Dangerfield, with
Dangerfield responding by spitting in his face.296 That prompted Francis to strike
Dangerfield in the face with a cane, hitting him in or near his eye.297 The blow struck
with such force that an already weakened Dangerfield died just hours later.298 Francis
himself was later put on trial for murder, convicted of the charge, and put to death.299
“No doubt,” A History of the Criminal Law of England observes, “the floggings to
against him that cou’d inflict them. But they were all as Unjust as they were Barbarous. After
this, why shou’d I make any mention of so slight a Matter as Fines or Damages, though adjudg’d
with an Exorbitancy that never was heard of; as Mr. Duttoncolt 100000l. for speaking against
the Duke of Beaufort; Mr. Thomas Pilkington 100000l. for saying K. James was a Papist; Sir
Samuel Barnardiston 10000l. for writing some News to a Friend in the Country about the Plot.
Why should I speak of the Duke of Devonshire’s Fine of 30000l. for giving Culpeper a Box
on the Ear, and of many other Damages and Fines, of 10000l., 20000l. 40000l. and 100000l. The
Truth of which, says Sir John Hawles, many Living Witnesses to their Sorrow can testify.”).
293 JOHN KENYON, THE POPISH PLOT 193–94, 199 (1972); 14 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY 16–18 (Leslie Stephen ed. 1888).
294 JOSEPH MAINGOT, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN CANADA 79 (2d ed. 1997).
295 KENYON, supra note 293, at 258.
296 JOHN PAGET, THE NEW “EXAMEN” OR AN INQUIRY INTO THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO
CERTAIN PASSAGES IN LORD MACAULAY’S HISTORY 370–71 (1861); 1 THE BRITISH
CHRONOGIST; COMPREHENDING EVERY MATERIAL OCCURRENCE, ECCLESIASTICAL, CIVIL,
OR MILITARY, RELATIVE TO ENGLAND AND WALES 338 (1789).
297 REV. E. HALE, THE FALL OF THE STUARTS AND WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1678 TO 1697,
at 87 (1889).
298 See id. The punishments of Oates and Dangerfield have been described as “cruel” and tor-
turous. E.g., 2 J. FRANK BRIGHT, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 763 (1879) (“Oates and Dangerfield
had been tried and punished. Well as they deserved punishment, the manner in which the trial
was conducted by Jeffreys and the inhuman tortures inflicted upon them are beyond excuse.
Twice within forty-eight hours Oates was flogged from Newgate to Tyburn. On the last
occasion no less than 1700 lashes were inflicted on him; it was certainly intended that he should
die under the infliction of this terrible punishment, as his accomplice Dangerfield did.”).
299 HALE, supra note 297, at 87; The Trial of Robert Frances: 1 James III., reprinted in
11 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND
OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO PRESENT TIME 503–10
(T.B. Howell ed., 1811); THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES THE SEC-
OND 332 (1849).
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which Oates and some others were sentenced were the ‘cruel punishments’ which
Parliament referred to” in the English Bill of Rights, with that source emphasizing
that “the fine of £40,000 to which John Hampden (the grandson of the celebrated
Hampden) was sentenced in 1684, would be one of the ‘excessive fines.’”300
The abuses of the Stuart kings were legion, and the punishments and penalties
in that era drew the particular ire of the English people.301 Sir Samuel Barnardiston,
one of the other figures specifically referenced by Hawles, had been found to have
breached the privileges of the House of Lords.302 Barnardiston had then been fined
three hundred pounds, and further ordered “to be kept in the custody of the usher of
the black rod till the fine should be paid.”303 There was “strong proof,” per a summa-
tion in A Complete Collection of State Trials, however, that the members of the House
of Lords knew that their act “had exceeded their jurisdiction, and that they had no
power to inflict this kind of punishment.”304 The House of Commons had itself re-
solved that Sir Barnardiston had “acted as became a good subject and commoner of
England” and, to make its point, had, in protest, “postponed all committees, and refused
to enter upon any business till this question of jurisdiction should be settled.”305 In-
deed, it was these kind of gross and tyrannical abuses of power—carried out by Lord
Chief Justice George Jeffreys and men of his ilk—that so incensed, and galvanized, the
British people.306 “[I]n the late eighteenth century,” Yale Law School professor Akhil
Amar has observed, “every schoolboy in America knew that the English Bill of Rights’
300 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 490
(1883). Cf. id. (“The severest sentence for a common law misdemeanour that I am aware of
since the Revolution, was passed upon one Hales for forging a promissory note in 1729. He
was to stand twice in the pillory, to be fined fifty marks, be imprisoned for five years, and
find security for his good behaviour for seven years.”).
301 See, e.g., The Whole Proceedings in the Case of Benjamin Flower: 39 George III. A.D.
1799, reprinted in 27 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO
THE YEAR 1783, at 1040–41 (T.B. Howell & Thomas Jones Howell eds., 1820) [hereinafter
Case of Benjamin Flower]. Such abuses would stay in the collective memory of the British
people long after the adoption of the English Bill of Rights. E.g., THE MORNING CHRONICLE
(London), Dec. 23, 1811, at 3 (“The Bill of Rights farther provided, ‘That excessive bail ought
not to be required, nor excessive fees imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’
This, no man could dispute, embraced rights and privileges of great price, and which any man
must be supposed indifferent to his own interests, and to those of his posterity, if he stood
by and patiently suffered them to be wrested from him. And, could any man look to the fine,
in one instance, of 1000l. and to the imprisonments in distant jails, which had lately been in-
flicted in a variety of instances, merely for a candid avowal of an obnoxious opinion, and, laying
his hand on his heart, honestly declare, that in those instances, ‘excessive fines had not been
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted?’”).
302 Case of Benjamin Flower, supra note 301, at 1040.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 1041.
305 Id.
306 See Bruce Fein, Put Away Sword of Damocles, 84 A.B.A. J. 112, 112 (Mar. 1998).
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1689 ban on excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments—a
ban repeated virtually verbatim in the Eighth Amendment—arose as a response to
the gross misbehavior of the infamous Judge Jeffreys.”307
The terminology of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment may seem archaic
to modern ears, but its terminology is rooted in the English common law and the use
of English language from prior centuries.308 The concept of cruelty, in fact, was specifi-
cally associated with tyrants and tyrannical behavior,309 with early Anglo-American
lawyers and legal commentators frequently calling punishments either “usual” or
“unusual”—that is, as either consistent with English common law or as unlawful
departures from custom or precedent.310 For example, later editions of William
Hawkins’s A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown emphasized that ducking—plunging
a person into a body of water with what was often called a cucking stool or ducking
stool—was the “usual punishment” for “a common scold.”311
307 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 87 (1998).
308 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284–86 (1983) (“The principle that a punishment
should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law
jurisprudence.”); Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U.
L. REV. 837, 857–64 (2018); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF.
L. REV. 277, 296–98, 319–22 (2014) (discussing the history of the Excessive Fines Clause);
Massey, supra note 57, at 1240–64 (discussing the historical development of the Excessive
Fines Clause and discussing excessive fines during Charles II’s and James II’s reign); Nicholas
M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines
Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833 (2013) (discussing the history of the Excessive Fines
Clause); Rumann, supra note 226, at 667–72 (discussing the origins of the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibitions).
309 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE; EXHIBITING
THE ORIGIN, ORTHOGRAPHY, PRONUNCIATION, AND DEFINITION OF WORDS 865 (3d ed. 1830)
(defining tyrannic and tyrannical as “[p]ertaining to a tyrant; suiting a tyrant; arbitrary; unjustly
severe in government; imperious; despotic; cruel”); id. (defining tyrannically as “[w]ith unjust
exercise of power; arbitrarily; oppressively”); id. (defining tyranny as “[a]rbitrary or despotic
exercise of power; the exercise of power over subjects and others with a rigor not authorized
by law or justice, or not requisite for the purposes of government. Hence, tyranny is often syn-
onymous with cruelty and oppression”); id. (defining tyrant as “[a] monarch or other ruler
or master, who uses power to oppress his subjects; a person who exercises unlawful au-
thority, or lawful authority in an unlawful manner” and as “[a] despotic ruler; a cruel master;
an oppressor”).
310 See John D. Bessler, The Concept of “Unusual Punishments” in Anglo-American Law:
The Death Penalty as Arbitrary, Discriminatory, and Cruel and Unusual, 13 NW. J. L. & SOC.
POL’Y 307 (2018). Noah Webster defined usual as “[c]ustomary; common; frequent; such as oc-
curs in ordinary practice, or in the ordinary course of events.” WEBSTER, supra note 309, at 896.
In contrast, Webster defined unusual as “[n]ot usual; not common; rare.” Id. at 893.
311 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS & THOMAS LEACH, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN; OR
A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER PROPER
HEADS (6th ed. 1777) (entry for “Cucking Stool” in unpaginated “A Table of Principal Matters”:
“Sometimes called Ducking Stool, the usual punishment for a common scold.”). See also 1
WILLIAM HAWKINS & JOHN CURWOOD, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN; OR, A
SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER PROPER
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Ducking was still in use in seventeenth-century England, though it was later
characterized as a “cruel and unusual” punishment in the United States.312 In A Law
Grammar; or, An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of English Jurisprudence
(1791), the term “castigatory” was, itself, described as “the name of the instrument by
which a woman is punished when convicted of being a common scold.”313 “It is
HEADS 770 (8th ed. 1824) (same); 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN: OR A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED
UNDER THEIR PROPER HEADS 200 (1716) (“[A] common Scold is punishable by being put into
the Ducking-Stool”); compare James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Raw. 222 (1825). The
opinion in James describes James’s counsel’s efforts as follows:
To prove that it was disused, even in England, the counsel referred to the
case of Regina v. Foxby, 6 Mod. 11, which occurred a few years after
the first settlement of this state. Lord HOLT there makes a jest of the
matter, and the defendant was permitted to escape, on promise of future
good behavior. Later English writers mention ducking as existing only
in the memory of a few superannuated persons, and speak of the mould-
ering ruins of that formidable engine, the ducking-stool, as one of the
vestiges of a barbarous antiquity.
. . . .
But, supposing this punishment existed at common law, was in full force
in England, at the period of William Penn’s emigration, and was intro-
duced by his followers into the new province; still the counsel contended
the common law had been altered in this particular by the colonists
themselves. The attention of the legislature was early attracted to this
matter, and we find several laws on this subject in the first years of the
infant colony. In 1682, the first years of the settlement, it was enacted
by the 34th section of “The great law,” that scolding should be punished
by “three days’ imprisonment.” In 1683, the punishment for this offence
was changed to “gagging or five shillings fine.” In 1700, the legislature
again altered this punishment to “five days’ imprisonment, or gagging,
or five shillings fine.” It is true, that this last act was repealed by the queen
in council; but that revived the act of 1683, which never having been
repealed since, is now in force, and therefore superseded the provisions
of the common law upon this subject.
Id.
312 Ducking, WESTERN CAROLINIAN (Nov. 30, 1824), at 3 (“A woman has been lately tried,
and convicted in Philadelphia, for being a common scold. She has been sentenced, by the
Judge, to be placed on a machine . . . and ducked in the Delaware. This punishment has never
been before inflicted in the United States—and the English law, from whence it is derived,
has been thought obsolete, both in England and this country. The Constitution of the United
States forbids cruel and unusual punishments. This is certainly unusual; and when we consider
the humiliation of the unfortunate victim, and the insults to which she will be subjected by an
unfeeling mob, the punishment is certainly cruel, and by no means graduated to the offence.
And although we pretend not to defend those unfortunate females, who have no controul over
that most unruly member, the tongue—yet we desire to see justice, however rigid, tempered
with decorum, as well as mercy.”).
313 A LAW GRAMMAR: OR, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENGLISH
JURISPRUDENCE 535 (1791).
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also,” that source added in its section on terms of law, “called the trebucket or cucking-
stool, which is frequently corrupted into ducking-stool, because part of the judgment
is, that when the offender is placed in it, she shall be plunged into water.”314 That law
grammar pointed out that “this mode of punishment has been long disused . . . .”315
As evidence, it cited to a “Mr. Morgan,”316 the editor of a popular law dictionary
originally complied by Giles Jacob, in which it was stated in the revised entry for
“Castigatory for scolds” by Mr. Morgan:
Though this punishment is now disused, the editor (J. M.) re-
members to have seen the remains of one, on the estate of a
relation of his in Warwickshire, consisting of a long beam, or
rafter moving on a fulcrum, and extending to the centre of a
large pond, on which end the stool used to be placed.317
Tradition, sometimes called “long usage” or “immemorial usage,” was part and
parcel of the English common law.318 Guy Miège (1644–c.1718), a Swiss writer
from Lausanne who taught English as a foreign language,319 published his own book
in 1691—shortly after the enactment of the English Bill of Rights—titled The New
State of England Under Their Majesties K. William and Q. Mary.320 In it, Miège
described the “the publick Justice administered at four times of the Year in Westmin-
ster” and by “Twelve Judges,” of the courts known as Assizes,321 “twice a Year . . .
in the Country . . . in the several Counties the King is pleased to appoint them for.”322
Observing that England’s judicial system had been “divided into Six Parts, called
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY: CONTAINING THE INTERPRETATION AND DEFINI-
TION OF WORDS AND TERMS USED IN THE LAW; AS ALSO THE LAW AND PRACTICE, UNDER THE
PROPER HEADS AND TITLES (J. Morgan ed., 10th ed. 1782) (unpaginated entry for “Castigatory
for scolds” and the editor’s notation about the disuse of the punishment). Compare GILES JACOB,
A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY: CONTAINING, THE INTERPRETATION AND DEFINITION OF WORDS AND
TERMS USED IN THE LAW; AND ALSO THE WHOLE LAW, AND THE PRACTICE THEREOF, UNDER
ALL THE HEADS AND TITLES OF THE SAME (6th ed. 1750) (the unpaginated entry for “Cucking-
stool” describes it as “an Engine invented for the Punishment of Scolds, and unquiet Women,
by Ducking them in Water, called in ancient Time a Tumbrel; and sometimes a Trebucket”;
“it was in Use even in our Saxons Time, by whom it was described to be Cathedra”; “[s]ome
think it is a Corruption from Duckingstool”), with JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY, supra
(containing unpaginated entries for “Cuckingstool” and “Castigatory for scolds”).
318 See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual,” supra note 18, at 1745.
319 See A. P. R. HOWATT & H. G. WIDDOWSON, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACH-
ING 56–59 (2d ed. 2004).
320 GUY MIÈGE, THE NEW STATE OF ENGLAND UNDER THEIR MAJESTIES K. WILLIAM AND
Q. MARY (1691).
321 Id. at 80.
322 Id.
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Circuits,”323 Miège wrote in a chapter titled “Of the Punishments inflicted on Male-
factors” that hanging “is the usual Punishment of Death in England, either for High
Treason, Petty Treason, or Felony.”324 Royals and nobles, in that time, were often given
“special” treatment, with such persons typically put to death with different methods
of executions.325 “As to Persons of great Birth and Quality, convicted of High Treason,
Petty Treason, or Felony, tho the Judgment be the same with that of common Per-
sons,” Miège qualified, “yet by the Kings Favour they are usually Beheaded.”326
In the entry for law in An American Dictionary of the English Language, Noah
Webster described “[u]nwritten or common law” as “a rule of action which derives its
authority from long usage, or established custom.”327 It is thus clear that, over the
centuries, various modes of punishments came to be considered usual—or standard—
ones, depending on the nature of the case and the status, lowly or high, of the offender.
Indeed, in his popular Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone,
the prominent English jurist, used the specific phrase “usual punishment” in writing
about the punishment of “petit treason” committed “by those of the female sex.”328
323 Id.
324 Id. at 125. A later edition of Miege’s book said much the same thing. GUY MIEGE, THE
PRESENT STATE OF GREAT-BRITAIN AND IRELAND, IN THREE PARTS 295 (4th ed. 1718) (“The
most usual Punishment in England for capital Crimes, is Hanging.”).
325 MIÈGE, supra note 320, at 127.
326 Id. Cf. id. at 128 (“Burning alive is sometimes used, but only for Witches, and Women
convicted of High Treason, or Petty Treason.”); id. (“Pressing to Death . . . is a Punishment
for those only that being Arraigned either of Petty Treason or Felony, refuse to Answer, or
to put themselves upon the ordinary Trial of God and the Country.”); id. at 129 (“For Petty
Larceny, or small Theft, that is under the ancient value of 12 d. the Punishment since Edward
III. is by Whipping, and in the late Reigns has been often by Transportation into the West-
Indies, where they live for some Years a slavish Life.”); id. at 130 (“Perjury, whereby Mens
Estates, Reputation, and Lives ly at stake, is commonly punished only with the Pillory; never
with Death, though it has cost the Lives of many.”); id. (“Forgery, Blasphemy, Cheating,
Libelling, False Weights and Measures, Forestalling the Market, Offences in Baking and
Brewing, are also punished with standing in the Pillory. But sometimes the Offender is
Sentenced besides to have one or both Ears nailed to the Pillory and cut off, or his Tongue
there bored through with a hot Iron.”); id. at 131 (“Vagabounds, and the like, who can give
no good account of themselves, are punished by setting their Legs in the Stocks for certain
hours. And Scolding Women (that are always teazing their Neighbors) by being set in a
Cucking Stool placed over some deep Water and duck’d there in three several times, to cool
their heat . . . .”); id. (“Other Misdemeanours are commonly punished with Imprisonment or
Fines, and sometimes with both.”); id. (“Those are the Corporal Punishments commonly
used in England for Criminals that happen to fall into the hands of Justice.”).
327 WEBSTER, supra note 309, at 488.
328 The passage in Blackstone’s Commentaries reads as follows:
The punishment of petit treason, in a man, is to be drawn and hanged,
and, in a woman, to be drawn and burned: the idea of which latter pun-
ishment seems to have been handed down to us from the laws of the
antient Druids, which condemned a woman to be burned for murdering
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“Where the wife killeth her husband, it is petit treason,” another English jurist,
Francis Bacon, had previously defined that offense, noting that the offending woman
would be burned to death.329
In volume four of his Commentaries, published in 1769, Blackstone explicitly
referenced what, by then, had been the long-standing English prohibition on “cruel
and unusual punishments.”330 As to fines and prison sentences, Blackstone wrote
that “the duration and quantity” of such fines or terms of incarceration were properly
left to judges.331 “[H]owever unlimited the power of the court may seem,” Blackstone
emphasized of such judgments, if not specifically guided by acts of Parliament, “it
is far from being wholly arbitrary,” for the judge’s “discretion is regulated by law.”332
“For the bill of rights has particularly declared,” Blackstone wrote, “that excessive
fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”333 Al-
though the English prohibitions were framed with the hortatory “ought not,” they
were seen, as the English Bill of Rights expressly put it, as “utterly and directly
contrary to the known laws and statutes, and freedom of this realm.”334
The “excessive fines” and “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibitions in the
English Bill of Rights were, consequently, seen from a very early date—as Blackstone
made clear—as restricting the arbitrary or discretionary sentencing authority of
abusive judges.335 As to Article 10 of the English Bill of Rights, Blackstone specifi-
cally pointed to “some unprecedented proceedings in the court of king’s bench, in
the reign of king James the second.”336 In On the Powers and Duties of Juries, and
on the Criminal Laws of England, Sir Richard Phillips, the former sheriff of London
and Middlesex, concurred, writing of lower-level offenses: “The practice of banish-
ing persons convicted of misdemeanors to distant prisons, is evidently contrary to
the tenth clause of the Bill of Rights, which prohibits the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishments.”337 As Phillips explained:
her husband; and it is now the usual punishment for all sorts of treasons
committed by those of the female sex.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 204 (1769).
329 4 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, BARON OF VERULAM, VISCOUNT ST. ALBAN, AND
LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND 294 (2d ed. 1826).
330 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 328, at 372.
331 Id. at 371.
332 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 328, at 378.
333 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 173.
334 9 DANBY PICKERING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE, FROM THE FIRST YEAR OF K. WILLIAM
AND Q. MARY, TO THE EIGHTH YEAR OF K. WILLIAM III, at 68 (1764).
335 Rumann, supra note 226, at 667.
336 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 173.
337 RICHARD PHILLIPS, ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF JURIES, AND ON THE CRIMINAL
LAWS OF ENGLAND 298 (2d ed. 1813). Exile, banishment, and transportation were once usual
punishments in various locales. E.g., 1 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANCIENT GREECE
AND ROME 145 (2010) (“Exile was the usual punishment for murder.”); 6 POLYTECHNIC J.
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[T]his clause had reference only to discretional punishments,
and not to those defined by law, and consequently applies partic-
ularly to punishments inflicted for misdemeanors, and still more
particularly to discretionary punishments in regard to liberty, the
only punishments in which a sound discretion would ever be likely
to be abused.338
G. Lex Scripta vs. Lex non Scripta and Arbitrary and Excessive Penalties
The British people had no written constitution, and leading English jurists, as well
as prominent commentators, saw a difference between punishments authorized by
106 (1842) (“Capital punishment has become exceedingly rare, exile to Siberia being now
the usual punishment.”); THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE COURT AND CABINET OF ST. CLOUD
112 (4th Am. ed. 1805) (“[T]ransportation was an usual punishment.”); 1 CHARLES PETER
THUNBERG, TRAVELS IN EUROPE, AFRICA, AND ASIA, MADE BETWEEN THE YEARS 1770 AND
1779, at 138 (1795) (“[T]he usual punishment, which is transportation to Batavia.”). Those
punishments are no longer used. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630,
630 (2d Cir. 1926) (“However heinous his crimes, deportation is to him exile, a dreadful
punishment, abandoned by the common consent of all civilized peoples.”). See also Michael
F. Armstrong, Banishment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 758 (1963)
(arguing that banishment is a cruel and unusual punishment); Saad Gul, Return of the Native?
An Assessment of the Citizenship Renunciation Clause in Hamdi’s Settlement Agreement in
the Light of Citizenship Jurisprudence, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 131, 145 (2007) (“[F]ederal
courts have held that banishment is prohibited as cruel and unusual punishment.”).
338 PHILLIPS, supra note 337, at 298–99. In an “Address to the People of Great Britain and
Ireland” delivered to the London Corresponding Society on January 20, 1794, “at the Globe
Tavern, Strand,” and reportedly “read and agreed to,” one finds these words:
When we ask, how we enjoy these transcendent privileges; we are referred
to Magna Charta, and the Bill of Rights? and the glorious Revolution
in the year 1688 is held out to us as the bulwark of British liberty.
Citizens;—We have referred to Magna Charta, to the Bill of Rights,
and to the Revolution, and we certainly do find that our ancestors did
establish wise and wholesome laws: but we as certainly find, that of the
venerable constitution of our ancestors, hardly a vestige remains.
. . . .
A man accused of felony (for which, by the common law of England,
his life and goods are forfeited,) may be bailed on finding two sureties
for forty pounds each; but upon a charge of misdemeanor by words only,
bail to the amount of one thousand pounds has been demanded.
Upon conviction, also, for such misdemeanor, enormous fines, long
and cruel imprisonments unknown to our ancient laws, and unsanctioned
by any new statutes, have of late (and but of late) been too frequently and
too oppressively inflicted. And all this, although by this bill of rights it is
declared, that “excessive bail shall not be demanded, nor ‘cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted.’”
31 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR
1803, at 481 (1818).
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Parliament (i.e., “Lex Scripta, the written Law”) versus excessive or sanguinary
punishments imposed by the whim or caprice of judges that had no grounding in
custom or tradition (i.e., “Lex non Scripta, the unwritten Law”).339 “I contend then,”
Phillips argued, “that the sending or banishing a man to a prison distant from the place
where he committed the crime, is contrary to law, simply because it is unusual.”340
“Those who contend, that the King’s Bench has a universal jurisdiction,” he added, “are
right—but they forget that this jurisdiction is universal only for lawful purposes . . . but
not universal for imposing the novel punishment of banishment for a misdemeanor,
which is unusual—therefore contrary to the Bill of Rights—therefore contrary to
law.”341 “[T]he Executive,” Phillips continued, “it is bound by the Bill of Rights, in
executing the judgments of the Courts, to conform to immemorial usage, and to inflict
no punishment in a cruel or unusual manner; and consequently to inflict imprisonment
in the common gaol, except in cases in which the law has specially conferred a discre-
tionary power on the Judges, and these have thought it necessary and proper to
exercise that discretion.”342
Among Englishmen, there was a great reverence for the English common law,
one rooted in tradition—what Sir Matthew Hale (1609–1676), a Lord Chief Justice
of the Court of King’s Bench, called the unwritten laws which had “acquired their
339 See MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 1 (2d ed.
1716); see also id. at 1–2 (“[A]lthough . . . all the Laws of this Kingdom have some Monuments
or Memorials thereof in Writing, yet all of them have not their Original in Writing; for some of
those Laws have obtain’d their Force by immemorial Usage or Custom, and such Laws are
properly call’d Leges non Scriptæ, or unwritten Laws or Customs.”); id. at 22 (distinguishing
“Statutes or Acts of Parliament, which in their original Formation are reduced into Writing,
and are so preserv’d in their Original Form,” from “Lex non Scripta,” under which were listed
“General Customs,” “the Common Law,” and “even those more particular Laws and Customs
applicable to certain Courts and Persons”); id. at 23 (referring to Leges non Scriptae as “those
Parts of the Law” as those “grown into Use” and as having “acquired their binding Power and
the Force of Laws by a long and immemorial Usage, and by the strength of Custom and Re-
ception in this Kingdom”).
340 RICHARD PHILLIPS, ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF JURIES AND ON THE CRIMINAL
LAWS OF ENGLAND 299 (1st ed. 1811).
341 Id. at 299–300. See also id. (showing an unpaginated index entry which reads: “Banish-
ment for misdemeanours an unusual punishment”).
342 Id. at 302. Phillips, the ex-sheriff, added:
I know that many persons of the highest influence in the British Gov-
ernment are solicitous for some change in our code of punishments, and
that even our heads of the law are no sticklers for many of the present
practices. The enormous expence of transportations to Botany Bay, the
cruel and crying injustice of sending persons to the Antipodes for terms
short of life, the want of moral reform in the hulks, and the barbarity as
well as inutility of hanging for so great a variety of offences, are faults
of our penal code felt and deplored by many Statesmen; and I am not
without hopes that a radical change will be one of the glorious achieve-
ments of this enlightened age.
Id. at 302–03.
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binding Power and the Force of Laws by a long and immemorial Usage, and by the
strength of Custom and Reception in this Kingdom.”343 That the English prohibition
against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments344 was part of that
centuries-old legal tradition—one dating all the way back to Magna Carta (1215)
and intended as a legal constraint on disproportionate penalties, arbitrary power, and
otherwise boundless judicial discretion—is clear.345
Arbitrariness and abuses of power—in particular, judicial abuses of discre-
tion—were thus seen as clear violations of the English Bill of Rights.346 For exam-
ple, in a preface, one originally written in 1730 and reprinted in A Complete Collec-
tion of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and
Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783 (1816), the Irish legal
writer Sollom Emlyn (1697–1754)347 observed:
343 HALE, supra note 339, at 23. See also 1 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY MAGAZINE 574
(2d ed. 1827) (“[C]orporal punishments in the army clearly rested on immemorial usage and
custom, and bearing in mind that various punishments known to the common law of the land
rested on precisely the same basis, that the former might for that reason be considered and
denominated as the common law punishments of the army.”).
344 Sometimes the prohibition was expressed as one against “unusual and cruel punish-
ments.” E.g., WILLIAM SULLIVAN, SEA LIFE; OR, WHAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE DONE, AND
WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE BY SHIP-OWNERS, SHIP-MASTERS, MATES AND SEAMEN 75 (1837)
(“Unusual and cruel punishments are forbidden; nor could any law of congress make them
lawful.”); A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH-TREASON,
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS: FROM THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE II, at xi (3d
ed. 1742) (referring to “the Illegality of unusual and cruel Punishments”); THE PROCEEDINGS
AND SPEECHES, AT THE MEETING THE SEVENTEENTH NOVEMBER, 1795, AT ST. ANDREW’S
HALL, NORWICH, TO PETITION PARLIAMENT AGAINST LORD GRENVILLE’S AND MR. PITT’S
TREASON AND SEDITION BILLS 13 (1795) (“The 10th clause of the Bill of Rights declares, that
unusual and cruel punishments shall not be inflicted . . . .”); 30 A COMPLETE COLLECTION
OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDE-
MEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 1342 (Thomas Jones Howell
ed., 1822) (“He quoted the declaration of the Bill of Rights against excessive bail, and unusual
and cruel punishments . . . .”); 38 THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES FROM THE YEAR 1803 TO
THE PRESENT TIME 1128 (1818) (“[T]hough the bill declared against all unusual and cruel
punishments . . . no provisions were made to carry these declarations into effect.”).
345 E.g., 1 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
YEAR 1783, at xxxv (Thomas Jones Howell ed., 1816).
346 See THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES 13 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1992).
347 Mr. Emlyn’s Preface to the Second Edition of the State Trials, 1 A COMPLETE COL-
LECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO PRESENT TIME, at xxii, xxv (1809) [hereinafter
Mr. Emlyn’s Preface] (reprinting “Mr. Emlyn’s Preface to the Second Edition of the State
Trials, in Six Volumes Folio: Printed in the Year 1730”); FRANCIS HARGRAVE, A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH-TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES
AND MISDEMEANOURS, at xi–xii (4th ed. 1776) (reprinting the preface to the second edition).
Sollom Emlyn (1697–1754) was an Irish legal writer who became a member of Lincoln’s Inn,
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As to smaller Crimes and Misdemeanors, they are differenced with
such a variety of extenuating or aggravating circumstances, that the
law has not, nor indeed could affix to each a certain and determi-
nate Penalty, this is left to the discretion and prudence of the Judge,
who may punish it either with Fine or Imprisonment, Pillory or
Whipping, as he shall think the nature of the crime deserves . . . .348
“[B]ut though he be intrusted with so great power,” Emlyn emphasized, “yet he is
not at liberty to do as he lists, and inflict what arbitrary punishments he pleases; due
regard is to be had to quality and degree, to the estate and circumstances of the of-
fender, and to the greatness or smallness of the offence . . . .”349 A principle of
proportionality, one traced back to King John at Runnymede but that got renewed
attention in the Enlightenment in the writings of Montesquieu, Beccaria, and others,
was thus built into the common-law tradition.350
Another important principle of early English law in the context of the imposition
of fines was known as salvo contenemento suo, which translates as “saving his
contenement,” or livelihood.351 Explaining that a fine “which would be a mere trifle
was the compiler of the six-volume second edition of STATE TRIALS, and contributed “a lengthy
preface critically surveying the condition of English law at the time.” 25 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA: A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES, LITERATURE AND GENERAL INFORMATION
806 (11th ed. 1911). See also LOUIS HYMAN, THE JEWS OF IRELAND: FROM EARLIEST TIMES
TO THE YEAR 1910, at 16 (1972); BASIL MONTAGU, THE OPINIONS OF DIFFERENT AUTHORS
UPON THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH, at ix (1812); Emlyn, Sollom (DNBoo), WIKISOURCE, https://
en.wikisource.org/wiki/Emlyn,_Sollom_(DNB00) [http://perma.cc/C5PK-QQQP]; THE NEW
OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1123 (Peter Cane & Joanne Conaghan eds., 2008).
348 Mr. Emlyn’s Preface, supra note 347, at xxxv.
349 Id.
350 MAGNA CARTA AND ITS MODERN LEGACY 148 (Robert Hazell & James Melton eds.,
2015). The concept of proportionality was one that was argued over or put to use by Anglo-
American lawmakers as they grappled with the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishments.”
BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 46, at 37–39; Imperial Parliament—
House of Lords—May 18, CALEDONIAN MERCURY (Edinburgh, Scotland), May 22, 1809, at 2
(“Counsel were then called to the bar, in the case of Messrs White and Hart, proprietor and
printer of the Independent Whig. . . . Lord Stanhope rose and expressed his regret that the Coun-
sel had on either side indulged in personalities. He would decline voting upon the question
before the House, but he would suggest some comparative inquiry into the nature of offences
and punishments, for without that it would be impossible to ascertain whether in this case the
bill of rights had been violated by the infliction of a cruel and unusual punishment.”).
351 McLean, supra note 308, at 835. See also HERBERT BROOM & GEORGE DENMAN, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW VIEWED IN RELATION TO COMMON LAW, AND EXEMPLIFIED BY CASES
399–401 (2d ed. 1885) (citations omitted):
The king, by virtue of his prerogative, was entitled to all fines and
amercements and penalties, either wholly or in part, and, to prevent the
undue exercise of this perogrative, various statutory restrictions were
imposed. Thus, the fourteenth chapter of Henry III.’s Magna Carta de-
clares that “a freeman shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the
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to one man, may be the utter ruin and undoing of another,” Emlyn, in his preface,
further observed that “[f]ines ought to be moderate and within bounds.”352 A judge,
he wrote, must not abuse power. A judge, he explained, who uses
[d]iscretionary power to gratify a private revenge, or the rage of
a party, by inflicting indefinite and perpetual Imprisonment, exces-
sive and exorbitant Fines, unusual and cruel Punishments, is
equally guilty of perverting justice and acting against law, as he,
who in a case, where the law has ascertained the penalty, will-
fully and knowingly varies from it.353
manner of the fault—and for a great fault after the greatness thereof—
saving to him his ‘contenement,’ and a merchant likewise—saving to
him his merchandize.” We must understand this word “contenement”
to signify that which is necessary for the support and maintenance of
a man in his state or condition of life. And, thus, this well-known chapter
of Magna Carta forbids the setting upon any man of an amercement
heavier than his circumstances or estate would bear—saving, as Lord
Coke says, in his commentary on this passage, to the soldier his armour,
to the scholar his books, and to the villein the cart or wainage with which
his ignoble service was performed. . . .
Magna Carta, as remarked by Lord Coke, “extends to amercements,
and not to fines imposed by any Court of Justice.” Within the spirit and
equity, however, of this enactment, fines imposed judicially must cer-
tainly be brought; such fines ought to be moderate and “within bounds”,
for “where a court has a power of setting fines, that must be understood
of setting reasonable fines”: an excessive fine “is against law, and shall
not bind, for excessus in re quâlibet jure reprobatur communi”. And
accordingly the counsel for Mr. Hampden, who was convicted of a mis-
demeanor anno 36 Car. II., urges upon the court in mitigation of punish-
ment, that his client was possessed but of a moderate estate, and that
according to Magna Carta, “there should be a salvo contenemento in all
fines.” So in O’Connell v. Reg., Lord Campbell refers to Magna Carta
as providing that “no fine shall be imposed beyond what the party is
able to pay.”
On many occasions which the reader of history will call to mind—
especially during the seventeenth century—were ruinous fines inflicted
in violation of law, as well by the Star Chamber as by the Superior Courts;
and hence the declaration in the Bill of Rights that “excessive fines ought
not to be imposed,” grounded on the averment that such had been the
practice in the reign of King James II., who in this and other ways, “by the
assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges, and ministers employed
by him, did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the laws and liberties of
this kingdom.
352 1 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783,
at xxxv (Thomas Jones Howell ed., 1816).
353 Id.
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“If no measures were to be observed in these discretionary Punishments,” he wrote,
“a man who is guilty of a Misdemeanor might be in a worse condition than if he had
committed a capital crime; he might be exposed to an indefinite and perpetual
Imprisonment, a punishment not at all favoured by law, as being worse than death
itself . . . .”354 He added:
Nor does an extravagant Fine, which is beyond the power of the of-
fender ever to pay or raise, differ much from it; for if his Imprison-
ment depend upon a condition, which will never be in his power
to perform, it is the same as if it were absolute and unconditional;
if the offender be not able to pay such a Fine as his offence
deserves, he must then submit to a corporal punishment in lieu
of it, according to the old Rule, Qui non habet in crumena, luat
in cute.355
That now-obscure Latin maxim, one put to use when corporal punishments were still
being utilized, translates as “[h]e who has nothing in his purse must pay the penalty
with his body.”356
In other words, the English Bill of Rights’ prohibition on excessive fines, like its
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, operated in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries as a constraint on arbitrary and unreasonable penalties.357 “It is true,”
Emlyn proclaimed in his preface, “that Clause of Magna Charta which requires the sav-
ing every man’s contenement (viz. his means of livelihood), extends only to Amercia-
ments, which are ascertained by a Jury, and not to Fines, which are imposed by the
Court . . . .”358 An amercement was understood to be “[a] pecuniary penalty imposed
354 Id.
355 1 FRANCIS HARGRAVE, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS
FOR HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS, at xi–xii (5th ed. 1793).
356 See JAMES A. BALLENTINE, A LAW DICTIONARY OF WORDS, TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND
PHRASES WHICH ARE PECULIAR TO THE LAW AND OF THOSE WHICH HAVE A PECULIAR
MEANING IN THE LAW 410 (1916); ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY AND
GLOSSARY: CONTAINING FULL DEFINITIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL TERMS OF THE COMMON AND
CIVIL LAW, TOGETHER WITH TRANSLATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE VARIOUS TECHNICAL
PHRASES IN DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, OCCURRING IN THE ANCIENT AND MODERN REPORTS, AND
STANDARD TREATISES; EMBRACING ALSO ALL THE PRINCIPAL COMMON AND CIVIL LAW
MAXIMS 854 (1850) (defining “Qui non habet in crumena, luat in corpore” as “He who has not
[the means of satisfaction] in his purse, must pay in his body. If a man cannot pay his fine, he
must go to prison”).
357 THOMAS JONES HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS
FOR HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS 424 (1816).
358 Id. at 420. Amercements were a common criminal sanction in medieval England. See
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 270–71 (1989); see also Massey, supra note 57, at 1259–64
(discussing the difference between fines and amercements).
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upon an offender by a judicial tribunal.”359 As one eighteenth-century law dictionary de-
fined it: “AMERCEMENT is, to be at the king’s mercy with regard to the quantum of
a fine imposed.”360 “By magna charta,” it explained, “no man shall have a larger
amercement imposed upon him than his circumstances or personal estate will bear, sav-
ing to the landowner his land, to the trader his merchandize, and to the husbandman his
team and instruments of husbandry . . . .”361 “[T]he ancient practice,” it was noted, was
“to inquire by a jury, when a fine was imposed,” how much an offender “was able
to pay by the year, saving the maintenance of himself, his wife, and children.”362 It
was acknowledged:
And since the disuse of such inquest, it is never usual to assess a
larger fine than a man is able to pay, without touching the imple-
ments of his livelihood, but to inflict corporal punishment, or a
stated imprisonment, which is better than an excessive fine, for that
amounts to imprisonment for life, and by the bill of rights it is par-
ticularly declared, that excessive fines ought not to be imposed.363
But “where a court has a power of setting Fines,” Emlyn made clear in his preface,
“that must be understood of setting reasonable Fines: ‘an excessive Fine,’ says lord
Coke, ‘is against law,’ and so it is declared to be by the Act ‘for declaring the Rights
and Liberties of the Subject.’”364 “The same Statute,” Emyln stressed, “declares the Ille-
gality of unusual and cruel Punishments.”365 Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634), a jurist
known for his four-volume Institutes of the Lawes of England, had himself written in
a common-law decision even before the English Bill of Rights came into force that if
a fine appears “to be excessive, it is against Law, and shall not binde . . . as excessive
distress is forbidden by the Common Law.”366 In Richard Godfrey’s Case (1615),
“the reasonableness of the Fine shall be judged by the Justices,” he wrote, adding
that “[e]xcessive Amercement is against Law” and “[a]n excessive Fine at the Will of
359 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION:
WITH REFERENCES TO THE CIVIL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF FOREIGN LAW 155 (1886). See also
id. (“As distinguished from a fine, at the old law an amercement was for a lesser offence,
might be imposed by a court not of record, and was for an uncertain amount . . . .”).
360 1 RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, NEW LAW DICTIONARY: INTENDED FOR GENERAL USE
AS WELL AS FOR GENTLEMEN OF THE PROFESSION 30 (1792).
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Id.
364 Mr. Emlyn’s Preface, supra note 347, at xxxv.
365 Id.
366 EDWARD COKE, THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, LATE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF
ENGLAND 838 (1738).
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the Lord, shall be said oppression of the people.”367 “[T]he Lord cannot demand, or
exact excessive and unreasonable Fines,” Coke tellingly wrote in another case.368
II. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND EARLY AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
A. The Enlightenment in America
The American Revolution and eighteenth-century European and American
penal-reform efforts were products of the Enlightenment.369 American colonists felt
grossly abused and oppressed by George III and the British Parliament.370 Following
Parliament’s Stamp Act (1765),371 Tea Act (1773),372 and the five so-called “Intoler-
able Acts,”373 which included the Boston Port Act (1774) that imposed a blockade,374
American colonists protested and ultimately rebelled, leading to the Boston Tea
Party (1773),375 the onset of the hard-fought Revolutionary War (1775–1783),376 and
the Declaration of Independence (1776).377 The motto of the colonists, “No taxation
without representation,”378 was itself emblematic of what the colonists saw as a
contest between tyranny and liberty, and over the ideas of freedom and equality.379
In addition to seeking economic liberty, early Americans sought to reform—indeed,
to transform—the law, including the criminal law, by jettisoning monarchical rule
and the English “Bloody Code.”380 Having read and studied a host of Enlightenment
367 Id. at 838–39.
368 Id. at 839; Godfrey’s Case, 11 CO. REP. 42a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1199 (1861). The right to free-
dom from excessive fines has deep historical roots and has long been recognized as a funda-
mental right. Brief Amici Curiae of Eighth Amendment Scholars in Support of Neither Party,
Timbs v. State of Indiana, No. 17-1091 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2019) (submitted Sept. 10, 2018).
369 See BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 46; John D. Bessler, The
American Enlightenment: Eliminating Capital Punishment in the United States, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: A HAZARD TO A SUSTAINABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM? 93–101 (Lill
Scherdin ed., 2014).
370 See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 1776 (2005).
371 THE STAMP ACT OF 1765 (Jonathan Mercantini ed., 2018).
372 PAUL S. BOYER ET AL., THE ENDURING VISION: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
110 (6th ed. 2010).
373 TOM HEAD & DAVID WOLCOTT, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 32–33 (2010).
374 NANCY RUBIN STUART, THE MUSE OF THE REVOLUTION: THE SECRET PEN OF MERCY
OTIS WARREN AND THE FOUNDING OF A NATION 60–61 (2008).
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378 JOHN ANTAL, 7 LEADERSHIP LESSONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE FOUNDING
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writers, and having personally experienced British oppression, Americans sought
structural checks and limitations on power and they sought both procedural pro-
tections and substantive safeguards to protect their rights and liberties.381
In early state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution, America’s founders, looking
to Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws for guidance, put in place a system of checks
and balances.382 They divided power between the federal government and the states, and
they divided power in each of those jurisdictional spheres between the three branches
of government—the executive, the legislative, and the courts.383 Forthrightly rejecting
England’s “Bloody Code”—the set of British laws that at one time made more than
two hundred crimes punishable by death—early American political leaders not only
381 Id. at 429–36. The Revolutionary War was seen as arising out of the same spirit which
produced England’s Glorious Revolution against the Stuart dynasty, with the Glorious Revo-
lution producing the English Declaration of Rights. London, July 5, VA. GAZETTE, Oct. 6,
1775, at 1 (“If the Americans who lately fought in their own defence, in the defence of their
chartered liberties, in defence of their undoubted properties, in defence of their wives and
their little ones, nay more, in defence of the constitutions; if those men were rebels, then every
man who joined in the glorious revolution, every man who drew his sword in this kingdom
to oppose an arbitrary Stuart, was an arrant rebel.”). See also To the People of Great Britain,
PUB. ADVERTISER (London), Jan. 24, 1775, at 1 (“Every late Act against our Brethren in Amer-
ica has been a wanton, cruel, iniquitous Exertion of unjustifiable Measures, contrary to every
Thing granted by the Constitution, and the glorious Revolution.”).
382 See Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu’s Theory of Government and the Framing of
the American Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1990).
383 Separation of Powers—An Overview, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state
-legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx [http://perma.cc/A5S7-Q7VE]. Some
political leaders, such as Virginia’s governor, Edmund Randolph, felt that no constitutional
protection against cruel and unusual punishments—or against excessive bail and fines—was
needed. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS
928 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]. As Gov-
ernor Randolph observed in mid-June 1788:
As to the exclusion of excessive bail and fines, and cruel and unusual
punishments, this would follow of itself, without a bill of rights. Obser-
vations have been made about watchfulness over those in power which
deserve our attention. There must be a combination; we must presume
corruption in the House of Representatives, Senate, and President,
before we can suppose that excessive fines can be imposed or cruel
punishments inflicted. Their number is the highest security. Numbers
are the highest security in our own Constitution, which has attracted so
many eulogiums from the gentlemen. Here we have launched into a sea
of suspicions. How shall we check power? By their numbers. Before
these cruel punishments can be inflicted, laws must be passed, and judges
must judge contrary to justice. This would excite universal discontent
and detestation of the members of the government. They might involve
their friends in the calamities resulting from it, and could be removed
from office. I never desire a greater security than this, which I believe
to be absolutely sufficient.
Id.
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adopted constitutions that prohibited excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and
unusual punishments, but they also passed statutes restricting the use of the death
penalty and corporal punishments.384 Both Montesquieu and one of his most prominent
disciples, the Italian penal reformer Cesare Beccaria, had articulated the idea that only
proportionate and necessary punishments should be imposed, with Montesquieu and
Beccaria concluding that any punishment that goes beyond necessity is “tyrannical.”385
Early American lawyers, such as James Madison’s close friend, William Bradford
Jr., embraced the necessity-for-punishment maxim.386 A Pennsylvania jurist, Bradford
wrote An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death Is Necessary in Pennsylvania
(1793), invoking both Montesquieu’s and Beccaria’s ideas, with Bradford becoming
the second Attorney General of the United States.387 In June of 1789, before William
Bradford penned that influential essay, Madison himself proposed adding to the U.S.
Constitution the prohibitions against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and
unusual punishments.388 Madison’s proposal, echoed by a House Committee of Eleven
Report from July 1789, was taken up by the U.S. House of Representatives in August
1789, and “was agreed to by a considerable majority.”389 The U.S. Senate concurred
with the House’s resolution that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”390 From 1787 to 1790,
delegates from various state conventions (e.g., in New York, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia) also sought prohibitions against excessive
bail, excessive fines, and against either “cruel and unusual punishments” or “cruel
or unusual punishments.”391
Many Americans felt strongly that such protections were needed not just at the
state level, but at the national level, too. As “Brutus” wrote in the New York Journal on
November 1, 1787: “For the security of liberty it has been declared, ‘that excessive
384 See Bruce P. Smith, The History of Wrongful Execution, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1185,
1198–99 (2005).
385 See John D. Bessler, The Italian Enlightenment and the American Revolution: Cesare
Beccaria’s Forgotten Influence on American Law, 37 MITCHELL-HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y
& PRAC. 1, 83–84 (2016). Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments had a profound
influence on America’s founders and throughout the world. BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERI-
CAN LAW, supra note 46; JOHN D. BESSLER, THE CELEBRATED MARQUIS: AN ITALIAN NOBLE
AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (2018); BESSLER, supra note 49; John D. Bessler,
Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty and the Abolition
Movement, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 195 (2009); John D. Bessler, The Economist and the
Enlightenment: How Cesare Beccaria Changed Western Civilization, 42 EUR. J. L. & ECON.
275 (2016).
386 See William Bradford, An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death is Necessary in
Pennsylvania, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 122 (1968).
387 See id.
388 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 383, at 913.
389 Id. at 914.
390 Id. at 915.
391 Id. at 921.
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bail should not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishments inflicted . . . .”392 “These provisions,” Brutus argued, “are as necessary
under the general government as under that of the individual states; for the power
of the former is as complete to the purpose of requiring bail, imposing fines, inflict-
ing punishments . . . in certain cases, as the other.”393 On November 7, 1787, in
Philadelphia’s Independent Gazetteer, one “Philadelphiensis” wrote of the lack of
protections in the original Constitution as drafted in Philadelphia:
To such lengths have these bold conspirators carried their scheme
of despotism, that your most sacred rights and privileges are sur-
rendered at discretion. When government thinks proper, under
the pretense of writing a libel, &c. it may imprison, inflict the
most cruel and unusual punishment, seize property, carry on prose-
cutions, &c. and the unfortunate citizen has no magna charta, no
bill of rights, to protect him; nay, the prosecution may be carried
on in such a manner that even a jury will not be allowed him.394
In the United States, the English Bill of Rights was still well known, and much
lauded for the legal protections it articulated, in the era of America’s founding
generation.395 Indeed, when George Mason, of Fairfax County, drafted the Virginia
Declaration of Rights (1776), he relied upon the English Bill of Rights in articulat-
ing the rights of Americans.396 Thus, Section 9 of Virginia’s Declaration—exactly
tracking Article 10 of the English Bill of Rights—reads: “That excessive bail ought
not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”397 American political scientist Joseph Melusky and U.S. Magistrate Judge
Keith Alan Pesto recently wrote that “[t]he Stuart Kings, Judge Jeffreys, the Bloody
Assizes, and Titus Oates remained in public memory through the eighteenth cen-
tury.”398 “To many Americans in 1776,” Melusky and Pesto explain, “the reason for
independence from England was their perception that the abuses of the Stuart kings
were being replicated by King George’s ministers.”399 “As a result,” they emphasized,
American revolutionaries, fully aware of that history, “imitated the English Bill of
Rights’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment as cheap insurance against
would-be Jeffreys.”400 In the late eighteenth century, just as Titus Oates, the perjurer,
392 Id. at 929.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Rumann, supra note 226, at 669–73.
396 Id. at 673–74. See also Granucci, supra note 18, at 840.
397 VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776).
398 JOSEPH A. MELUSKY & KEITH ALAN PESTO, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 24 (2011).
399 Id.
400 Id.
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was still portrayed as a notorious figure,401 so too was George Jeffreys for his ju-
dicial abuses.402
The early American constitutions and declarations of rights borrowed from the
text of the English Bill of Rights but were informed by the Enlightenment—not by
the same set of unique circumstances that drove the Glorious Revolution.403 After
the Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted by Virginia’s constitutional conven-
tion on June 12, 1776,404 other states quickly followed suit in the post–Declaration
of Independence period, albeit with variations in wording, some rather minor, from
section 10 of the English Bill of Rights.405 On August 14, 1776, for example, the
State of Maryland chose to address cruel acts and excessive punishments in two
separate clauses.406 Clause 14 read: “That sanguinary laws ought to be avoided, so
far as is consistent with the safety of the State; and no law, to inflict cruel and un-
usual pains and penalties, ought to be made in any case, or at any time hereafter.”407
Clause 22 provided: “That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted, by the courts of law.”408
On September 11, 1776, Delaware also adopted the following provision, more
closely tracking, though not exactly, the English version: “That excessive bail ought
not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments
401 4 J. GRANGER, A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM EGBERT THE GREAT TO
THE REVOLUTION 348 (3d ed. 1779) (“The notorius Titus Oates was, soon after the accession
of James, convicted of perjury, upon the evidence of above sixty reputable witnesses, of
whom nine were protestants.”).
402 AN EXTINCT PEERAGE OF ENGLAND; CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF ALL THOSE NOBLE
FAMILIES WHOSE TITLES ARE EXTINCT FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS TO THE PRESENT
TIME 219 (1769) (containing an entry pertaining to “George Jeffries” which notes that “his
character is too well known to need any recital”); THE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY; OR, COM-
PLETE HISTORICAL LIBRARY 409 (1780) (containing an entry written by “A SOCIETY OF
GENTLEMEN” for “JEFFREYS, or JEFFERIES (George)” which notes that “[h]e was one of the
greatest advisers and promotors of all the oppressive and arbitrary measures carried on in
th[e] reign” of James II, and that “his sanguinary and inhuman proceedings against the duke
of Monmouth’s unfortunate adherents in the West, will ever render his name infamous”); 6
A NEW AND GENERAL BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY; CONTAINING AN HISTORICAL, CRITICAL,
AND IMPARTIAL ACCOUNT OF THE LIVES AND WRITINGS OF THE MOST EMINENT PERSONS IN
EVERY NATION IN THE WORLD 339 (1795) (noting that, in James II’s reign, Jeffreys was “was
one of the greatest advisers and promotors of all the oppressive and arbitrary measures of that
unhappy tyrannical reign: and his sanguinary and inhuman proceedings against Monmouth’s
miserable adherents in the West will ever render his name infamous”).
403 See Foundations of American Government, US HIST., http://www.ushistory.org/gov
/2.asp [http://perma.cc/F5FK-S98E].
404 VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (June 12, 1776).
405 See Jeremy Rabkin, Constitutional Firepower: New Light on the Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 232–35 (1995).
406 MARYLAND CONST. cl. 14 (1776).
407 Id.
408 Id. cl. 22.
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inflicted.”409 Additional states adopted similar variations on the theme, with Pennsylva-
nia’s 1776 constitution forbidding “[e]xcessive bail,” providing that “all fines shall be
moderate,” and stating that the penal laws “shall be reformed by the legislature of
this state, as soon as may be, and punishments made in some cases less sanguinary,
and in general more proportionate to the crimes.”410 By 1790, the year before the
ratification of the U.S. Bill of Rights, nine states had constitutional provisions barring
“cruel and unusual,” “cruel or unusual,” or “cruel” punishments.411
The prohibitions against “cruel and unusual” or “cruel or unusual” punishments
in the early American revolutionary constitutions412 was explained, in part, by James
Iredell, a future U.S. Supreme Court Justice, in 1788.413 Iredell was appointed to the
U.S. Supreme Court by President George Washington, and he served in that position
from 1790 until his death in 1799.414 But before that appointment, Iredell, as the Attor-
ney General of North Carolina from 1779 to 1782, offered an explanation for why
such prohibitions ended up in early American constitutions in his answers to George
Mason’s objections to the lack of a federal bill of rights in the originally proposed
U.S. Constitution.415 Mason had begun his objections: “There is no declaration of
rights, and the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and con-
stitutions of the several States, the declarations of rights, in the separate States, are
no security.”416 In 1788, Iredell opposed the inclusion of a prohibition against cruel
409 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 178.
410 Id. at 179.
411 Id. at 177–81.
412 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 383, at 922–25 (excerpting provisions
from the Delaware Declaration of Rights (1776), the Maryland Declaration of Rights (1776),
and the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776)); ROLAND ADICKES, THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION AND CITIZENS’ RIGHTS: THE INTERPRETATION AND MIS-INTERPRETATION OF THE
AMERICAN CONTRACT FOR GOVERNANCE 132–33 (2001).
413 Such prohibitions became a standard feature of American constitutions. E.g., STUART
BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 231–32 (2002) (“By 1791, when
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified, the phrase cruel and
unusual punishments was already a stock verbal formula. It originally appeared in the English
Bill of Rights of 1689, which declared that ‘excessive bail ought not to be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’ That sentence was copied
into Virginia’s Declaration of Rights of 1776, and versions of it were included in several
more state constitutions in the next few years. . . . By the time the Constitution was up for
ratification, the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments was such a standard element
in documents of the sort that its absence was a common source of complaint among the Con-
stitution’s opponents. There was accordingly almost no debate over the constitutional amendment
that became number eight.”).
414 George Washington and the Supreme Court, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON,
https://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/the-first-president/george-washington-and
-the-supreme-court [http://perma.cc/K8NK-N2NH].
415 James Iredell, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography
/James-Iredell [http://perma.cc/JVG2-BLKV].
416 James Iredell, Marcus, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution,
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and unusual punishments in the U.S. Constitution—a document debated one hun-
dred years after the Glorious Revolution.417 He did so—albeit unsuccessfully, as
others rightfully insisted on the Eighth Amendment’s written protections—because
of his belief that Congress should have the legislative prerogative to decide upon the
punishments for those crimes in the subject matter areas over which the Constitution
gave Congress jurisdiction to legislate (e.g., “counterfeiting the securities and current
coin of the United States,” “piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and of-
fences against the law of nations,” and “treason against the United States”).418
In discussing the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments in early
American state constitutions, James Iredell looked to English history even as he
recognized that Americans were making history.419 “It may be observed, in the first
place,” he wrote, “that a declaration against ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ formed
part of an article in the Bill of Rights at the revolution in England in 1688.”420 “The
prerogative of the Crown having been grossly abused in some preceding reigns,”
Iredell stressed, “it was thought proper to notice every grievance they had endured,
and those declarations went to an abuse of power in the Crown only, but were never
intended to limit the authority of Parliament.”421 “Many of these articles of the Bill
of Rights in England, without a due attention to the difference of the cases,” Iredell
continued, “were eagerly adopted when our constitutions were formed, the minds
of men then being so warmed with their exertions in the cause of liberty as to lean
too much perhaps towards a jealousy of power to repose a proper confidence in their
own government.”422 With Iredell asserting that Congress should have “a just right
to authority” to delineate crimes and punishments, he pondered the issue of “whether
it is practicable and proper to prescribe limits to its exercise, for fear that they should
inflict punishments unusual and severe.”423
For Iredell, the prohibitions in state constitutions against cruel and unusual punish-
ments were too ambiguous or nebulous to warrant inclusion in the U.S. Constitu-
tion.424 “From these articles in the State constitutions,” Iredell explained, “many
things were attempted to be transplanted into our new Constitution, which would
either have been nugatory or improper.”425 “This is one of them,” Iredell offered of
the proscription.426 “The expressions ‘unusual and severe’ or ‘cruel and unusual,’”
THE FOUNDERS CONST., http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch14s36.html
[http://perma.cc/HD6R-83BM].
417 Id.
418 Id.
419 See id.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Id.
424 Id.
425 Id.
426 Id.
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Iredell emphasized, “surely would have been too vague to have been of any conse-
quence, since they admit of no clear and precise signification.”427 “If to guard against
punishments being too severe,” Iredell observed of the Constitutional Convention
in Philadelphia,
the Convention had enumerated a vast variety of cruel punish-
ments, and prohibited the use of any of them, let the number have
been ever so great, an inexhaustible fund must have been unmen-
tioned, and if our government had been disposed to be cruel their
invention would only have been put to a little more trouble.428
“If to avoid this difficulty,” he added:
they had determined, not negatively what punishments should
not be exercised, but positively what punishments should, this
must have led them into a labyrinth of detail which in the origi-
nal constitution of a government would have appeared perfectly
ridiculous, and not left a room for such changes, according to
circumstances, as must be in the power of every Legislature that
is rationally formed.429
“[W]hen we enter into particulars,” Iredell concluded, “we must be convinced that
the proposition of such a restriction would have led to nothing useful, or to some-
thing dangerous, and therefore that its omission is not chargeable as a fault in the
new Constitution.”430 “Let us also remember,” Iredell assured his audience:
[T]hat as those who are to make those laws must themselves be
subject to them, their own interest and feelings will dictate to
them not to make them unnecessarily severe; and that in the case
of treason, which usually in every country exposes men most to
the avarice and rapacity of government, care is taken that the
innocent family of the offender shall not suffer for the treason of
their relation.431
427 Id.
428 Id.
429 Id.
430 Id.
431 2 GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL, ONE OF THE
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 207 (1858); PAMPHLETS
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE
PEOPLE 1787–1788, at 360 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888); THE FEDERALIST AND OTHER CON-
TEMPORARY PAPERS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 908 (E. H. Scott ed.,
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Notably, Iredell later seems to have had a change in heart—or, at the very least,
felt compelled to acknowledge the significance and legal import of the U.S. Con-
stitution’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.432 In April 1795, Iredell, then an
Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, delivered a grand jury charge in New
York City that was later published at the grand jury’s request.433 In that grand jury
charge, he described the series of protections laid out in the U.S. Constitution for
criminal suspects and criminal defendants.434 After reciting a whole host of
protections—from the right to grand juries and to trial by jury, to the protection
against double jeopardy and freedom from self-incrimination, to due process and the
rights to a speedy trial and assistance of counsel—Iredell emphasized that “[b]esides
the provisions in the constitution I have already noticed, there are other provisions
in it calculated to secure still farther the invaluable possession of personal liberty, so
that it may not be unjustly sacrificed to any arbitrary measures.”435 Among the rights
Iredell then listed, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”436 “The above contain all the restrictions
in the constitution I proposed to enumerate,” Iredell added, emphasizing: “Subject to
these, the following authority in regard to the criminal law is vested in the legisla-
ture of the United States.”437
B. Early American Legal Commentary
Enlightenment thinkers and America’s founders recognized that power had to be
checked by power, and a great many of those thinkers and lawmakers believed that
certain punishments were preferable to severe ones.438 In his Commentaries on the Con-
stitution of the United States (1833), Joseph Story, the influential American jurist
and Harvard professor who served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845,439
specifically emphasized the importance of the separation-of-powers principle to
1894); James Iredell, Marcus, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution,
supra note 416.
432 See United States, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 17, 1795, at 2.
433 See id.
434 See id.
435 Id.
436 Id.
437 Id. Since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the U.S. Supreme Court
has articulated and exercised the power of judicial review to strike down legislative enact-
ments that run afoul of the U.S. Constitution. Because the protections against excessive bail,
excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments were included in the U.S. Bill of Rights,
any governmental actions that violate those protections are unconstitutional.
438 See BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 46.
439 R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC 64, 238 (2004).
2019] A CENTURY IN THE MAKING 1055
American legal systems.440 As Story wrote, “In the establishment of a free govern-
ment, the division of the three great powers of government, the executive, the
legislative, and the judicial, among different functionaries, has been a favorite policy
with patriots and statesmen.”441 Noting that it had become “a maxim of vital impor-
tance that these powers should for ever be kept separate and distinct,” Story empha-
sized that it was Montesquieu—the French thinker—who “seems to have been the
first, who, with a truly philosophical eye, surveyed the political truth involved in this
maxim, in its full extent, and gave to it a paramount importance and value.”442 As
Story emphasized: “No remark is better founded in human experience, than that of
Montesquieu, that ‘there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers.’”443 In his three-volume Commentaries, Story cited
both Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws and Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments.444
For example, Story had this to say about the French jurist: “Montesquieu has remarked,
that the Christian religion is a stranger to mere despotic power. The mildness so fre-
quently recommended in the gospel is incompatible with the despotic rage, with which
a prince punishes his subjects, and exercises himself in cruelty.”445 In On Crimes and
Punishments, Beccaria, the law-trained criminal-law theorist from Milan, argued for
the abolition of torture and capital punishment and sought proportionate punish-
ments, writing of a scale of crimes and a corresponding scale of punishments.446
Ultimately, the U.S. Bill of Rights, like the English Bill of Rights before it,447
included the prohibitions against excessive bail and fines and barred cruel and
unusual punishments.448 Although those proscriptions were rarely litigated in the
early days of the American Republic,449 they were seen as important constitutional
440 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH
A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES,
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 2–3 (Hilliard, Gray, and Co., 1833).
441 Id.
442 Id. at 3.
443 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH
A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES,
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 426 (1833).
444 See, e.g., 1 STORY, supra note 440, at 455 n.1.
445 3 STORY, supra note 443, at 725.
446 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1764).
447 Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights, LEEDS MERCURY (Leeds, England), Jan. 21, 1809,
at 3 (quoting Lord Chatham as saying that “Magna Charta, the Petition Rights and the Bill of
Rights, form that code which, I call the Bible of the English Constitution”). See also THE
STAR OF FREEDOM (Leeds, England), June 24, 1848, at 3 (describing “excessive bail” as “a gross
violation of the Constitution, and a crime against the subject expressly forbidden by both Magna
Charta and the Bill of Rights”).
448 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
449 E.g., BANNER, supra note 413, at 232:
Neither the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments
clause nor its state constitutional analogues were used much in the
century that followed. The lack of much early litigation on the subject,
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guarantees—and it has long been held that those proscriptions restrict the actions of
all three branches of government.450 Whereas the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, in
a provision modeled on the Massachusetts Constitution, barred “cruel or unusual
punishments,”451 further providing that “[a]ll fines shall be moderate” and that “[a]ll
combined with the virtual absence of recorded debate over the Eighth
Amendment and its antecedents, has left little evidence of exactly what
Americans of the late eighteenth century understood by the concept of
cruel and unusual punishment. The phrase appears to have been used
in three distinct but related senses.
By prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments, some may have be-
lieved themselves to be holding government to the principle of pro-
portionality, the idea that the harshest sentences had to be reserved for the
worst crimes. . . . That the punishment should fit the crime was a truism
of Enlightenment penology, repeated by Beccaria, Montesquieu, and vir-
tually all eighteenth-century writers on the subject. The original appear-
ance of the cruel and unusual punishments clause in the English Bill of
Rights had been a response to judicial overreaching in the political trials
of the 1670s and 1680s, during which several defendants had received
sentences widely perceived to be disproportionate to their crimes. . . .
A second meaning was more common. Some understood cruel and
unusual to refer to punishment unauthorized by law and therefore outside
the authority of a court to impose. Such had also been a standard com-
plaint about the harsh sentences imposed after the English political trials
of the 1670s and 1680s—that the penalties had been not just dispropor-
tionate but illegal. . . . The future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell
seems to have had this definition in mind in 1788, when he referred to
the cruel and unusual punishments clause and related provisions of the
English Bill of Rights as limitations that “went to an abuse of power in the
Crown only, but were never intended to limit the authority of Parliament.”
The third meaning of cruel and unusual in circulation in the late
eighteenth century referred only to methods of punishment. . . . Abraham
Holmes worried at the Massachusetts ratifying convention that in the
unamended Constitution Congress was “nowhere restrained from
inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishment . . . racks and
gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline.
At the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry complained that without
a ban on cruel and unusual punishments Congress might “introduce the
practice of France, Spain, and Germany—of torturing, to extort a con-
fession of the crime.”
See also BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 162–98 (discussing debate over
the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments and early American judicial decisions inter-
preting that concept); THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 383, at 927–28 (quoting
comments of “Mr. HOLMES,” “Mr. HENRY,” and “Mr. GEORGE NICHOLAS”).
450 Separation of Powers—An Overview, supra note 383. See also Granucci, supra note
18, at 840–42.
451 1 CLASSICS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT: ORIGINS
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persons shall be bailable, unless for capital offences, where the proof shall be evident
or the presumption great,”452 the U.S. Constitution banned “cruel and unusual
punishments” and more generically prohibited “excessive” bail or fines.453 Unlike
Virginia’s Declaration of Rights (1776), the Eighth Amendment used the “shall not”
language instead of the more hortatory “ought not” phraseology.454 At the First Con-
gress, during the debates on the U.S. Bill of Rights, only two mentions were made
about the text that became the Eighth Amendment.455 William Loughton Smith, of
South Carolina, “objected to the words ‘nor cruel and unusual punishments;’ the
import of them being too indefinite.”456 And Samuel Livermore, of New Hampshire,
offered this perspective:
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which
account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no mean-
ing in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms
excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What is understood by
excessive fines? It lies with the court to determine. No cruel and
unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary
to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps
having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented
from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a
more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from
the commission of it could be invented, it would be very prudent
in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security
that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making
necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.457
In spite of these two expressed concerns, the Eighth Amendment “was agreed to by
a considerable majority” of legislators in the First Congress.458
C. Early Views of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment
In the generations that came after America’s founding generation, everyone (but
especially lawyers and judges) had their own take on the import of the Eighth
Amendment’s words. For example, Justice Story later offered a short explanation
THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 365–66 (Scott J. Hammond, Kevin R. Hardwick & Howard L.
Lubert eds., 2007).
452 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 118.
453 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
454 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 178, 193.
455 Id. at 186.
456 Id. See also THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 383, at 926–27 (quoting
comments made by “Mr. Livermore”).
457 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 186.
458 Id.
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for why, in his judgment, the Eighth Amendment was ultimately added to the U.S.
Constitution. In two sections of his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States (1833), Story gave this history and context, explaining, at a time before the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, how the Eighth
Amendment only served to restrain the federal government:
The next amendment is: “Excessive bail shall not be required; nor
excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted.” This is an exact transcript of a clause in the bill of rights,
framed at the revolution of 1688. The provision would seem to be
wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possi-
ble, that any department of such a government should authorize,
or justify such atrocious conduct. It was, however, adopted, as an
admonition to all departments of the national government,459 to
warn them against such violent proceedings, as had taken place
in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the Stuarts. In those
times, a demand of excessive bail was often made against persons,
who were odious to the court, and its favourites; and on failing to
procure it, they were committed to prison. Enormous fines and
amercements were also sometimes imposed, and cruel and vin-
dictive punishments inflicted. Upon this subject Mr. Justice
Blackstone has wisely remarked, that sanguinary laws are a bad
symptom of the distemper of any state, or at least of its weak
459 Other public officials around that time also saw the Eighth Amendment’s language as
an admonition and a call to action. Gov. Gabriel Moore, Governor’s Message (Tuscaloosa,
Ala., Nov. 16, 1830), THE DEMOCRAT (Huntsville, Ala.), Nov. 25, 1830, at 2:
In connexion with other means calculated to advance the pros-
perity and general welfare of the community, I have thought it my duty
to bring to your notice our criminal code, and submit to the wisdom of
the Legislature, whether the great objects of punishment will not be
better attained by the establishment of a Penitentiary system.
I find our attention has been most clearly pointed to this interesting
topic by the 19th Sec. of the 6th Art. under the head of general provisions
in our constitution. “It shall be the duty of the General Assembly as soon
as circumstances will permit, to form a penal code founded on principles
of reformation and not of vindictive justice.” Again, in Sec[.] 16, Art.
1, declaration of rights—“excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.” In the like liberal
spirit, the federal compact points emphatically to the protection of the
personal rights of the citizen, as one of its prominent objects:—thus we
find it forbidding the passage of bills of attainder, the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, the exaction of unreasonable fines, and the inflic-
tion of cruel and unusual punishments. These, gentlemen, we should re-
ceive as powerful admonitions to us, and great incentives in this work
of humanity.
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constitution. The laws of the Roman kings, and the twelve tables
of the Decemviri, were full of cruel punishments; the Porcian
law, which exempted all citizens from sentence of death, silently
abrogated them all. In this period the republic flourished. Under
the emperors severe laws were revived, and then the empire fell.
It has been held in the state courts, (and the point does not seem
ever to have arisen in the courts of the United States,) that this
clause does not apply to punishments inflicted in a state court for
a crime against such state; but that the prohibition is addressed
solely to the national government, and operates, as a restriction
upon its powers.460
How legal commentators viewed the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions were,
necessarily, shaped by their own times—and by their own understanding of history,
of constitutional language, and of the meaning of their individual words. For ex-
ample, in A Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of the Jurisdiction of the Courts
in the United States (1824), Peter Du Ponceau—the provost of the Law Academy
of Philadelphia—distinguished the American prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments from the earlier one contained in the English Bill of Rights.461 In his
dissertation, Du Ponceau wrote of “certain harsh punishments which our modern
manners reprove, but which still stain the page of the common law; as for instance the
punishment of petty treason in men by drawing and quartering, and in women by burn-
ing.”462 He then wrote this about the difference between American and English law:
But the 10th amendment of our Constitution has sufficiently pro-
vided that ‘no cruel and unusual punishment shall be inflicted,’
which word ‘unusual’ evidently refers to the United States, and
the time when the Constitution was made, and therefore is not to
be confounded with the same clause in the English bill of rights,
which referring to another period and to another country, may
have been differently construed.463
460 3 STORY, supra note 443, at 750–51.
461 PETER S. DU PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDIC-
TION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, BEING A VALEDICTORY ADDRESS DELIVERED
TO THE STUDENTS OF THE LAW ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA, AT THE CLOSE OF THE ACA-
DEMIC YEAR, ON THE 22ND OF APRIL, 1824, at 95–97 (1824) (published in Philadelphia by
Abraham Small and dedicated “To the Honourable William Tilghman, LL.D., Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Patron of the Law Aca-
demy of Philadelphia”).
462 Id. at 95.
463 Id.
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Du Ponceau then emphasized that peine forte et dure (pressing to death) and
burning in the hand in cases of manslaughter had been abolished, with “milder
substitutes provided by our national statutes.”464 As Du Ponceau wrote, reflecting
his view of what he perceived as the progressive nature of that time:
[C]orruption of blood, trial by battle, all other modes of trial, but
trial by jury in criminal cases are also abolished; in short the com-
mon law as modified by our Constitution, by our laws, manners
and usages, is as wholesome and as harmless a system, in crimi-
nal as well as in civil cases, as any that can be devised.465
As Du Ponceau’s Dissertation then continued:
As to offences not capital, cruel and unusual punishments being
forbidden by our Constitution, there remains none but fine, im-
prisonment and, perhaps, whipping and the pillory. I hope I shall
hear nothing of the ducking stool and other obsolete remains of the
customs of barbarous ages. The pillory and whipping, I know, are
out of use in most of the States, imprisonment at hard labour hav-
ing been substituted in lieu of them. Yet Congress have thought
proper to retain the latter punishment in their penal code, and we
have seen it inflicted not long since in our city on an offender
against the laws of the United States. It is in the power of the na-
tional Legislature to alter or amend the law in this respect, as they
shall think proper; but until they do so, I see nothing inhuman in
the moderate infliction of either of these penalties, nor any
reason why we should reject the common law on their account.
It may be said, perhaps, that there is too much left to the
discretion of the Judges as to the quantum, and even the nature
of the punishment and sometimes also as to deciding what is or
what is not an indictable act. As to the quantum of punishment,
I know no system of laws in which some discretion at least is not
left to the Court according to the greater or lesser magnitude of
the offence. It is impossible to avoid this inconvenience by any
legislation. The same thing may be said of the authority to choose
between two or three mild punishments; there may be cases in
which imprisonment would be death to the party, and when a
fine may be inflicted upon him with greater effect; others when
the reverse may be the case.466
464 Id. at 95–96.
465 Id. at 96.
466 Id. at 96–97. The pillory and the whipping post were once usual punishments in colonial
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The American prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments applies not
just to judicial discretion but to restraining the conduct of all three branches of gov-
ernment: legislative, executive, and judicial.467 Through the Eighth Amendment’s his-
tory, however, there have been fierce disputes about what precisely the Eighth
Amendment prohibits.468 For example, in his treatise on the constraints on the legisla-
tive branch, Thomas Cooley, a justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan,469 included
a section on “Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishments.”470 In it, he wrote
that “the question what fine shall be imposed is one addressed to the discretion of the
court” but that “it is a discretion to be judicially exercised; and there may be cases
in which a punishment . . . is nevertheless so clearly excessive as to be erroneous in
law.”471 As Cooley wrote:
and early America. PETER C. HOLLORAN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF NEW ENGLAND 496 (2d
ed. 2017) (“Boston last used the pillory in 1803.”); HOWARD O. SPROGLE, THE PHILADELPHIA
POLICE, PAST AND PRESENT 56 (1887). In America’s founding era, various civic leaders and law-
makers sought not only the abolition of capital punishment but the abolition of corporal punish-
ments. See BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 191; see also BOB NAVARRO, THE
FIRST EXECUTIVES: LIVES AND EVENTS IN THE SHADOW OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 143–44
(2000) (noting that John Hancock’s “final action as Governor was a plea to the General Court
of Massachusetts against capital punishment, branding and the public whipping post”).
467 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 294. See also JOHN C. KLOTTER &
JACQUELINE R. KANOVITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 531 (6th ed. 1991) (“[T]he Eighth Amend-
ment restrains the legislature from imposing cruel forms of punishment.”). Because of the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments also now applies against state governments and state officials, and
not just against the federal government and its officials.
468 See, e.g., O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 330–32 (1892) (finding the Eighth Amend-
ment inapplicable to a state-law punishment in which a defendant had been found guilty of 307
offences of selling intoxicating liquors in violation of Vermont law, and sentenced to be fined
and to be imprisoned at hard labor for 19,914 days in the event the fine was not paid); id. at 337,
339–40 (Field, J., dissenting) (labeling the punishment at issue “unusual and cruel” while noting
that such a designation “is usually applied” to punishments “which inflict torture, such as the
rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with
acute pain and suffering. Such punishments were at one time inflicted in England, but they were
rendered impossible by the Declaration of Rights, adopted by Parliament on the successful term-
ination of the revolution of 1688, and subsequently confirmed in the Bill of Rights. It was there
declared that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted. . . . The inhibition is directed, not only against punishments of the
character mentioned, but against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are
greatly disproportioned to the offences charged. The whole inhibition is against that which is
excessive either in the bail required, or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted”); see also MELVIN
I. UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE COURT’S HISTORY AND THE
NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 388–400 (2015) (discussing the Eighth Amendment
views of Justice William Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall on capital punishment).
469 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1878).
470 Id. at 406–08.
471 Id. at 406.
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A fine should have some reference to the party’s ability to pay
it. By Magna Charta a freeman was not to be amerced for a
small fault, but according to the degree of the fault, and for a
great crime in proportion to the heinousness of it, saving to him
his contenement; and after the same manner a merchant, saving
to him his merchandise. . . . The merciful spirit of these provi-
sions addresses itself to the criminal courts of the American
States through the provisions of their constitutions.472
In his section on cruel and unusual punishments, Cooley further wrote: “It is
certainly difficult to determine precisely what is meant by cruel and unusual punish-
ments. Probably any punishment declared by statute for an offence which was punish-
able in the same way at the common law, could not be regarded as cruel or unusual
in the constitutional sense.”473 “And probably any new statutory offence,” he added,
“may be punished to the extent and in the mode permitted by the common law for of-
fences of similar nature.”474 “But those degrading punishments which in any State
had become obsolete before its existing constitution was adopted,” Cooley opined, “we
think may well be held forbidden by it as cruel and unusual.”475 As Cooley editorialized,
We may well doubt the right to establish the whipping-post and
the pillory in States where they were never recognized as instru-
ments of punishment, or in States whose constitutions, revised
since public opinion had banished them, have forbidden cruel
and unusual punishments. In such States, the public sentiment
must be regarded as having condemned them as ‘cruel,’ and any
punishment which, if ever employed at all, has become alto-
gether obsolete, must certainly be looked upon as ‘unusual.’476
CONCLUSION
A lot has transpired since the late seventeenth century, when the Glorious Revolu-
tion deposed King James II and elevated William and Mary to the throne. In time,
the anti-Catholic fervor that drove the Glorious Revolution477 gave way to American
472 Id. at 406–07 (citation omitted).
473 Id. at 407–08.
474 Id. at 408.
475 Id.
476 Id.
477 E.g., HUTTON WEBSTER, EARLY EUROPEAN HISTORY: MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN
TIMES 720–71 (1917) (“In settling the crown on William and Mary, Parliament took care to
safeguard its own authority and the Protestant religion. It enacted the Bill of Rights, which
has a place by the side of Magna Carta and the Petition of Right among the great documents
of English constitutional history. This act decreed that the sovereign must henceforth be a
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legal protections (e.g., the U.S. Constitution’s First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments,
as well as various civil rights acts) that guarantee religious freedom, non-discrimina-
tion, due process, and equal protection of the law.478 The language of the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment, closely resembles that of Section 10 of the English Bill of Rights.479
While slavery and the transatlantic slave trade existed in the days of the Glorious
Revolution and through the American Revolution, slavery—a practice which many
of America’s founders tolerated or embraced—is now expressly outlawed by in-
ternational law and there is a jus cogens (peremptory) norm prohibiting it.480
The prohibitions set forth in the English Bill of Rights against excessive bail,
excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments came about as a result of a peculiar
set of circumstances. But each generation—from participants in the Glorious Revolu-
tion, to America’s Founding Fathers, to nineteenth-century legal commentators, to
modern-day jurists—has, naturally, put its own indelible stamp upon those historic
Anglo-American prohibitions against “excessive bail,” “excessive fines,” and “cruel
and unusual punishments.” What is clear from an examination of the historical
record is that this process will continue into the future. It is, in fact, inevitable that
how one generation views the prohibitions against “excessive” bail and fines or
“cruel and unusual punishments” will not inhibit a later generation from reading
those proscriptions in a different way in an ever-changing world.481 If the Eighth
member of the Anglican Church. . . . It also declared . . . that excessive bail ought not to be
required, or excessive fines imposed, or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
478 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); id. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). See also TODD S. PURDUM,
AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: TWO PRESIDENTS, TWO PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2014).
479 1–3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICA 249 (David Schultz & John R.
Vile eds., 2005) (noting that “[t]he text of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishments is borrowed almost verbatim from Section 10 of the English Bill of Rights (1689)”).
480 THOMAS WEATHERALL, JUS COGENS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL CONTRACT
209–13 (2015).
481 For example, while the Eighth Amendment was understood in America’s founding era
to prohibit torture, I have argued that capital punishment, which was not seen as a form of
torture in the eighteenth century, should now be classified under the rubric of torture. JOHN
D. BESSLER, THE DEATH PENALTY AS TORTURE: FROM THE DARK AGES TO ABOLITION (2017).
See also JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA (1997)
(discussing the history of capital punishment in early America); John D. Bessler, Capital Punish-
ment Law and Practices: History, Trends, and Developments, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT
WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE
ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds.,
3d ed. 2014) (same); John D. Bessler, The American Death Penalty: A Short (But Long) History,
in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Robert M. Bohm & Gavin Lee eds.,
2018) (same); John D. Bessler, Taking Psychological Torture Seriously: The Torturous Nature
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Amendment were read in a static manner482—something already rejected decades
ago by the U.S. Supreme Court—the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions, originally
targeted at the most extreme and grotesque of Stuart excesses,483 would be rendered
moot or meaningless.
History is revealing, but history—as history itself shows—does not necessarily dic-
tate the law’s future. The Enlightenment inspired new forms of government and greater
protection of human rights,484 and the American Revolution forged the United States
of America and forever changed Americans’ relationship with England and the English
common law.485 American revolutionaries486 and various American lawmakers rejected
of Credible Death Threats and the Collateral Consequences for Capital Punishment, 11 NE.
U. L. REV. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Bessler, Taking Psychological Torture Seriously] (discussing
death threats, including state-sanctioned ones); John D. Bessler, Torture and Trauma: Why the
Death Penalty Is Wrong and Should Be Strictly Prohibited by American and International
Law, 58 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2019).
482 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“The words of the [Eighth] Amendment
are not precise, and that their scope is not static.”).
483 JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 237 (9th ed. 2015) (“The
proscription of cruel and unusual punishments has been attributed to reaction to barbaric,
torturous punishments imposed by the Stuarts, and to illegal punishments (such as defrocking)
imposed by the King’s Bench.”).
484 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 30
(1967) (“[T]he major figures of the European Enlightenment and many of the lesser, con-
tributed substantially to the thought of the Americans”; “the colonists cited with enthusiasm
the theorists of universal reason, so too did they associate themselves, with offhand familiarity,
with the tradition of the English common law.”).
485 See, e.g., HARRY POTTER, LAW, LIBERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 2 (2015) (“The origins of the English common law are to be found in Anglo-
Saxon times and on these island shores. While Germanic and Nordic practices have influ-
enced its creation, it owes relatively little to Roman or continental exemplars.”); EMPIRE AND
NATION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 98 (Eliga H. Gould & Peter
S. Onuf eds., 2005) (“The idea that the English common law was born out of immemorial custom
was deeply ingrained in the English consciousness, and the common law’s ability to endure
across the ages was a source of great pride for Englishmen. Habitual usage was, to the Eng-
lish mind, the most perfect litmus test of a regulation. If a practice could hold up to years of use
without rejection by the governed, it carried great legal authority among the English. Americans
shared English pride in their common legal tradition, and they too emphasized the importance
of custom, particularly in solidifying and giving strength to a constitution and law seemingly
without beginning. The idea of an ancient, unwritten law was so much a part of Anglo-American
culture that it was difficult, if not impossible, for many to imagine living without it. In his address
to the incoming law students at the College of Pennsylvania in 1824, Philadelphia lawyer and
law lecturer Peter DuPonceau called the common law ‘a metaphysical being’ grown out of
feudal customs that had gradually ‘become incorporated and in a manner identified not only with
the national jurisprudence, but, under the name of Constitution,’ with America’s government.”).
486 E.g., PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 132 (rev. ed.
1998) (“From 1763 to 1775 American lawyers ransacked common law to find evidence against
parliamentary impositions. The major obstacle they faced was that Parliament was not only
a maker of statutes but the highest common-law court in the land. Undeterred, like every good
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certain English customs,487 with American constitutional law itself changing sub-
stantially over the ensuing centuries.488 The Fourteenth Amendment, most notably,
made the Eighth Amendment applicable against the states, and added the Equal
Protection Clause to the Constitution—which itself must be understood to have
transformed the Eighth Amendment’s meaning and calculus because of the equality
principle it embodies.489
There is no reason to believe that the law will not continue to evolve in the
decades and years to come, with the U.S. Supreme Court’s “evolving standards of
decency” test actually compelling that result.490 In fact, history makes clear that the
law is constantly in motion, with archaic punishments such as ducking, the pillory,
and the whipping post no longer with us.491 The Eighth Amendment sets forth
general prohibitions framed with general language, and each generation is bound
to interpret, and to reinterpret, those prohibitions in their own time.492 Indeed, the
counselor in the service of a client, the American revolutionary lawyers sought to distinguish
their case from earlier colonial claims rejected by Parliament and the crown. If common law was
what English authorities said it was, a coil in the cord that bound the subordinate colonies to a
dominant metropolitan center of power, the lawyers would fashion an American common
law that was part of the longer cord but still gave Americans freedom to protest parliamen-
tary impositions.”).
487 E.g., HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
OR THE SCIENCE OF CASE LAW 432 (1912) (“In several of the states, at an early day, statutes
were enacted prohibiting the citation of decisions of the English courts except such as were
rendered before the separation from the mother country. Thus, in Kentucky, it was enacted
in 1807 that ‘reports and books containing adjudged cases in the kingdom of Great Britain,
which decisions have taken place since the 4th July, 1776, shall not be read nor considered as
authority in any of the courts of this commonwealth.’”); WILLIAM H. LOYD, THE EARLY COURTS
OF PENNSYLVANIA 150 (1986) (“[A]n act was passed March 19, 1810, which provided that
it should not be lawful to read or quote in any court of this commonwealth, any British precedent
or adjudication which had been given or made subsequent to the fourth of July, 1776, except
those relating to maritime law or the law of nations.”); PATRICIA EARNEST SUTER & RUSSELL
& CORINNE EARNEST, THE HANGING OF SUSANNA COX: THE TRUE STORY OF PENNSYLVANIA’S
MOST NOTORIOUS INFANTICIDE AND THE LEGEND THAT’S KEPT IT ALIVE 37 (2010) (“As an
extreme reaction to the overthrow of British rule, Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Kentucky passed laws prohibiting the citation of English legal decisions and precedents.”).
488 The law is constantly evolving, as it always will be. E.g., LAURENCE CLAUS, LAW’S EVO-
LUTION AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (2012); see also JANE MALLOR, ET AL., BUSINESS
LAW: THE ETHICAL, GLOBAL, AND E-COMMERCE ENVIRONMENT 60 (16th ed. 2016) (“American
constitutional law has evolved rather than being static. Many of these changes result from
the way one public decision maker—the nine-member U.S. Supreme Court—has interpreted
the Constitution over time.”).
489 Bessler, The Inequality of America’s Death Penalty, supra note 15, at 542.
490 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
491 See id. The “evolving standards of decency” test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1958 ensures the evolution of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See also HOLLORAN, supra
note 466.
492 See DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 127.
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concepts of “excessive” bail and fines and “cruel and unusual punishments” depend
upon the views of those interpreting those concepts, as well as on the time and
context of the particular issues that come before the courts.493
The law is a product of those who write and apply and interpret it. The English-
men in the time of William and Mary decried the hefty bail amounts and fines im-
posed upon fellow noblemen and the draconian punishments that had been imposed
upon the likes of men such as Titus Oates.494 While members of England’s Parlia-
ment continued to decry the kind of cruel and excessive punishments inflicted by the
Stuarts long after the passage of the English Bill of Rights,495 America’s founders
493 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We consider
whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment bars a city
from prosecuting people criminally for sleeping outside on public property when those people
have no home or other shelter to go to. We conclude that it does.”).
494 See supra notes 217–26 and accompanying text.
495 E.g., 19 THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES FROM THE YEAR 1803 TO THE PRESENT TIME:
FORMING A CONTINUATION OF THE WORK ENTITLED ‘THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF
ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803,’ at 602–03 (T.C. Hansard ed., 1811):
To look at the practices of modern times under this pretended libel law,
one would almost think we had relapsed it to the odious times of the
Stuarts. This was the very rock upon which they split. It was owing to
these very practices, and that Martyr to obstinacy, Charles the 1st, lost his
head, that James the 2d, was expelled the throne, and the family finally
banished the land. This was effected by those infamous Star Chamber pro-
ceedings which the King’s Bench seems now willing to adopt, as well as
those cruel sentences and punishments equally abhorrent to the nature of
English law, and equally detestable, whether inflicted by one court or
another. For what was it that was complained of in the Star Chamber, but
Ex Officio prosecutions and cruel and unjustifiable punishments; and
amongst all the cruelties exercised by that infamous court? The practice
most complained against the modern practice of sending to distant gaols
and close custody. “When,” says some one in Rushworth, speaking of the
cruelties of the Star Chamber, “when nothing would satisfy the rancor
of some churchmen but whipped backs, gagged mouths, and slit noses,
and above all the transporting men to distant prisons, and keeping them
in solitary confinement; when wives and children and friends were, by or-
ders from that court, prevented from entering those prisons where their
husbands and fathers lay in misery, then began the English nation to lay
to heart the slavish condition they were brought unto. Should this court be
longer suffered to exercise its tyrannical power?” and it is high time
when the same system is reintroduced, when cruel and unusual punish-
ments, and, above all, distant gaols and solitary confinement are again re-
sorted to, that we should lay to heart, in like manner, the slavish condition
likely to be brought upon ourselves, if no restraint should be put upon
the powers and practices now claimed and exercised by the Attorney Gen-
eral against the liberty of the press. In order, therefore, to commence
some cheque upon these arbitrary, cruel, and unconstitutional proceedings,
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worried about acts of civil-law-style torture, just as those who lived in later times
(e.g., in the first quarter of the nineteenth century) worried about the inhumanity of
corporal punishments such as the pillory, whipping and ducking—barbaric practices
used on offenders and slaves or that, in the case of ducking, was once considered to
be the usual punishment to be inflicted upon “scolds.”496 While anti-slavery crusad-
ers in America’s slavery era discussed how the “cruel and unusual punishments”
language might be perverted by slaveholders to institutionalize the whipping of
slaves,497 those supportive of slavery or other barbaric practices in antebellum America
made use of the “cruel and unusual punishments” language but simultaneously saw
the whipping of slaves as an acceptable practice.498
Although the Eighth Amendment’s protections have been part of America’s
national conversation for multiple centuries, it was in the 1950s and 1960s that the
modern Eighth Amendment really came into its own. It was in 1958 that the U.S.
Supreme Court crafted its now famous “evolving standards of decency” test,499 and
it was in 1962 that the Court first applied the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments against the states.500 In 1968, in a particularly
notable lower-court decision from the 1960s, Harry Blackmun, then a judge on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, held in Jackson v. Bishop501 that the
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” outlawed the use of the strap
in Arkansas prisons.502 After citing language from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion
in Trop v. Dulles about “the dignity of man” grounding that Eighth Amendment
prohibition,503 Blackmun wrote for the Eighth Circuit:
I shall give my decided support to the motion for inquiry brought forward
by the noble lord.
496 See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
497 See, e.g., WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE:
ITS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRA-
TIVE FACTS 165 (1853) (“[I]t is only an ‘unusual’ punishment that is forbidden! The masters and
overseers have only to repeat their excessive punishments so frequently that they become
‘usual,’ and the statute does not apply to them! In this view it holds out an inducement to
render the most cruel inflictions usual.”).
498 Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners,
and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 94 N.C. L. REV. 817, 837, 844–45 (2016).
499 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
500 SUSAN LOW BLOCH & VICKI C. JACKSON, FEDERALISM: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 113 n.147 (2013) (“The view that the states were not bound by
the Eighth Amendment was not clearly repudiated until Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
667 (1962); see also State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947)
(assuming, arguendo, that the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” applied to
the states).”).
501 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
502 TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACKMUN: THE OUTSIDER JUSTICE 101 (2008).
503 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
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[W]e have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the use
of the strap in the penitentiaries of Arkansas is punishment which,
in this last third of the 20th century, runs afoul of the Eighth
Amendment; that the strap’s use, irrespective of any precautionary
conditions which may be imposed, offends contemporary con-
cepts of decency and humanity dignity and precepts of civiliza-
tion which we profess to possess.504
The origins of the English Bill of Rights and its prohibitions against excessive bail,
excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments are rooted in the abuses of the
Stuart monarchs. But for the Eighth Amendment’s very American proscriptions against
excessive governmental actions and cruel and unusual punishments to maintain their
currency, a thoughtful understanding of the Eighth Amendment’s protections cannot
be focused on the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries. Those centuries, which gave rise
to the English Bill of Rights and then to revolutionary constitutions and the Eighth
Amendment, are long past, and twenty-first century Americans and state and federal
judges have new challenges and circumstances that they must confront. The Stuarts are
not the only ones who were capable of abuses of power, and the Eighth Amendment
must be interpreted and understood as nothing less than an Enlightenment-inspired
bulwark against tyrannous and cruel and arbitrary and unnecessary governmental
behavior—whether that behavior comes in the form of excessive bail determina-
tions, excessive fines, or punishments that are found to be cruel and unusual by
modern-day judges.
The Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court are now engaged in a fierce debate over the
Eighth Amendment’s proper interpretation. In its recent decision in Bucklew v.
Precythe,505 the Supreme Court rejected a death row inmate’s as-applied challenge to
the State of Missouri’s lethal injection protocol.506 In doing so, a bare majority of the
Supreme Court purported to “examine the original and historical understanding of the
Eighth Amendment.”507 The majority opinion, written by Justice Neil Gorsuch, failed
to even allude to the Court’s long-standing “evolving standards of decency” test.508
504 Jackson, 404 F.2d at 579–80. The fact that non-lethal corporal punishments have been
declared unconstitutional makes the continued use of lethal punishments a particular enigma.
See, e.g., John D. Bessler, The Anomaly of Executions: The Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause in the 21st Century, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. 297 (2013); John D. Bessler, Tinkering
Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1913 (2012).
505 No. 17-8151 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2019).
506 Id. at 4, 8, 14–15, 17–18. The death row inmate, Russell Bucklew, suffers from a rare
medical condition known as cavernous hemangioma, which causes tumors to grow in the head,
neck and throat. Id. at 5.
507 Id. at 8. See also id. at 16 (“Mr. Bucklew’s argument fails for another independent
reason: It is inconsistent with the original and historical understanding of the Eighth Amend-
ment on which Baze and Glossip rest.”).
508 Garrett Epps, Unusual Cruelty at the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2019),
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Instead, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion concluded that the Constitution permits capital
punishment,509 that it is for “the people and their representatives” to decide whether to
authorize it,510 and that “the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a prisoner a painless
death.”511 “Under our Constitution,” Gorsuch wrote, “the question of capital punishment
belongs to the people and their representatives, not the courts, to resolve.”512
In his opinion, Justice Gorsuch discussed English law and invoked the eighteenth-
century writings of Sir William Blackstone.513 That opinion, however, neglected to
mention that Blackstone himself greatly admired the writings of Enlightenment
thinker Cesare Beccaria,514 a pioneering advocate of the death penalty’s abolition.515
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/bucklew-v-precythe-supreme-court-turns
-cruelty/586471 [https://perma.cc/7XGU-LPTW]. The “evolving standards of decency” test,
laid down in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), has been used to strike down the death penalty
for various classes of offenders. E.g., STEPHANIE A. JIRARD, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:
A COURTROOM APPROACH 379 (2019) (citing cases and noting, “Societal standards on death
as a just punishment for certain crimes has informed the U.S. Supreme Court’s evolving stan-
dards of decency standard”). Instead, Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion focused on the fact that
“death was ‘the standard penalty for all serious crimes’ at the time of the founding.” Bucklew,
No. 17-8151, at 8.
509 Bucklew, No. 17-8151, at 8 (“The Constitution allows capital punishment.”).
510 Id. at 9 (“The same Constitution that permits States to authorize capital punishment
also allows them to outlaw it.”); id. (“[T]he judiciary bears no license to end a debate reserved
for the people and their representatives.”).
511 Id. at 12.
512 Id. at 29.
513 Id. at 9 (“At the time of the framing, English law still formally tolerated certain punish-
ments even though they had largely fallen into disuse—punishments in which ‘terror, pain, or
disgrace [were] superadded’ to the penalty of death. These included such ‘[d]isgusting’ practices
as dragging the prisoner to the place of execution, disemboweling, quartering, public dissection,
and burning alive, all of which Blackstone observed ‘savor[ed] of torture or cruelty.’”) (quoting
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 370 (1769)). In his majority
opinion, Justice Gorsuch wrote that the barbaric methods of execution Blackstone listed in
his Commentaries “readily qualified as ‘cruel and unusual,’ as a reader at the time of the Eighth
Amendment’s adoption would have understood those words.” Bucklew, No. 17-8151, at 9.
514 Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments argued for proportionality between crimes
and punishments and for the death penalty’s abolition. In his Commentaries on the Laws of
England, William Blackstone called Beccaria “an ingenious writer, who seems to have well
studied the springs of human action, that crimes are more effectually prevented by the cer-
tainty, than by the severity, of punishment.” BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at
48. See also DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES SHOWING HOW BLACKSTONE, EMPLOYING EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY IDEAS OF SCIENCE, RELIGION, HISTORY, AESTHETICS, AND PHILOSOPHY, MADE OF THE
LAW AT ONCE A CONSERVATIVE AND A MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE 150 (1996) (“The theory of crimi-
nal law suggested by Montesquieu, and developed by Beccaria, was wholeheartedly adopted
by Blackstone. And, although Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishments did not appear
until 1764, Blackstone referred to it several times and made extensive use of the ideas in it.”).
515 Marcello Maestro, A Pioneer for the Abolition of Capital Punishment: Cesare Beccaria,
34 J. HIST. IDEAS 463 (1973).
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Gorsuch, while referring to “the Constitution’s original understanding,”516 wrote in
Bucklew of the Supreme Court’s only recently imposed requirement for a death row
inmate’s assertion of a legal challenge to a particular method of execution: “To
determine whether the State is cruelly superadding pain, our precedents and history
require asking whether the State had some other feasible and readily available
method to carry out its lawful sentence that would have significantly reduced a
substantial risk of pain.”517 That requirement, which imposes on a death row inmate
the obligation to prove an alternative method of execution by which an inmate can
be executed,518 was first mentioned in the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Baze
v. Rees,519 then adopted by five members of the Court in Glossip v. Gross.520
The Bucklew decision upheld Missouri’s use of lethal injection in spite of the
death row inmate’s assertion—only begrudgingly made after the trial court insisted
that the inmate identify an alternative method of execution by which he could be put
to death—that execution by nitrogen gas would be less painful.521 The Court, Justice
516 Bucklew, No. 17-8151, at 10.
517 Id. at 17. See also id. at 12 (“[W]hat unites the punishments the Eighth Amendment
was understood to forbid, and distinguishes them from those it was understood to allow, is
that the former were long disused (unusual) forms of punishment that intensified the sentence
of death with a (cruel) “‘superadd[ition]’” of “‘terror, pain, or disgrace.’”) (citations omitted);
id. at 13:
[W]here (as here) the question in dispute is whether the State’s chosen
method of execution cruelly superadds pain to the death sentence, a
prisoner must show a feasible and readily implemented alternative method
of execution that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe
pain and that the State has refused to adopt without a legitimate peno-
logical reason.
518 ALESSANDRA MIGNOLLI, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
A STUDY ON UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES 151 (2018) (noting that, in Glossip v. Gross, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the use of midazolam in an execution protocol
and “controversially held” that the petitioners had to themselves “identify an alternative and
less painful method of execution”).
519 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008) (opinion of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Kennedy
concluding that a State’s refusal to alter its lethal injection protocol could violate the Eighth
Amendment only if an inmate first identified a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative pro-
cedure that would “significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain”).
520 While Baze upheld the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol, Glossip
upheld the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol. In Baze, the Supreme
Court’s plurality opinion explained that the petitioners in the case failed to establish that
Kentucky’s protocol created a “substantial risk of serious harm” or “an ‘objectively intolerable
risk of harm’” to death row inmates compared to “known and available alternative[ ]” methods
of execution. Baze, 553 U.S. at 61. In Glossip, the Court held that the district court did not
err in finding that Oklahoma’s protocol presented no “substantial risk of severe pain” and that
“the prisoners failed to identify a known and available alternative method of execution that
entails a lesser risk of pain.” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015).
521 Bucklew, No. 17-8151, at 20:
Through much of this case and despite many opportunities, Mr. Bucklew
2019] A CENTURY IN THE MAKING 1071
Gorsuch emphasized, faulting the inmate for failing to satisfy the requirements of the
Court’s newly created test (one imposed in 2015),522 “has yet to hold that a State’s
method of execution qualifies as cruel and unusual.”523 Beginning with its 2015
decision in Glossip v. Gross,524 the Supreme Court has required that whenever a
method of execution is challenged, the inmate must simultaneously propose another
readily available alternative method of execution that would “significantly” reduce
a “substantial risk of pain.”525 Gorsuch, writing for the Court in Bucklew and
discussing the sordid history of hanging,526 noted that “traditionally accepted methods
of execution” are not necessarily unconstitutional.527 His opinion—as well as Justice
Brett Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion—referenced the possibility of the firing squad
as an alternative method of execution.528
refused to identify any alternative method of execution, choosing instead
to stand on his argument that Baze and Glossip’s legal standard doesn’t
govern as-applied challenges like his (even after the Eighth Circuit
rejected that argument). Only when the district court warned that his con-
tinued refusal to abide this Court’s precedents would result in imme-
diate dismissal did Mr. Bucklew finally point to nitrogen hypoxia.
522 Id. at 21 (“[W]e conclude Mr. Bucklew has failed for two independent reasons to
present a triable question on the viability of nitrogen hypoxia as an alternative to the State’s
lethal injection protocol.”); id. (“the inmate’s proposal must be sufficiently detailed” to permit
a finding that the alternative method of executions could be carried out “‘relatively easily and
reasonably quickly’”; “Mr. Bucklew’s bare-bones proposal falls well short of that standard.”);
id. at 23 (“Even if a prisoner can carry his burden of showing a readily available alternative,
he must still show that it would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. A minor
reduction in risk is insufficient; the difference must be clear and considerable.”).
523 Id. at 12.
524 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
525 Id. at 2737.
526 Bucklew, No. 17-8151, at 11 (“At the time of the [Eighth] Amendment’s adoption, the
predominant method of execution in this country was hanging. While hanging was considered
more humane than some of the punishments of the Old World, it was no guarantee of a quick
and painless death.”) (citation omitted). As Justice Gorsuch wrote in graphic terms of hanging
as a method of execution:
The force of the drop could break the neck and sever the spinal cord,
making death almost instantaneous. But that was hardly assured given
the techniques that prevailed at the time. More often it seems the prisoner
would die from loss of blood flow to the brain, which could produce un-
consciousness usually within seconds, or suffocation, which could take
several minutes.
Id.
527 Id. at 13–14 (“Nor do Baze and Glossip suggest that traditionally accepted methods of
executions—such as hanging, the firing squad, electrocution, and lethal injection—are neces-
sarily rendered unconstitutional as soon as an arguably more humane method like lethal injection
becomes available.”).
528 Id. at 10 (“Consistent with the Constitution’s original understanding, this Court in
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), permitted an execution by firing squad while observing
that the Eighth Amendment forbade the gruesome methods of execution described by Blackstone
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The majority opinion in Bucklew drew sharply worded dissents. Justice Stephen
Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, wrote that the evidence
presented by Bucklew “established at this stage of the proceedings529 that executing
Bucklew by lethal injection risks subjecting him to constitutionally impermissible
suffering.”530 “Bucklew,” Justice Breyer emphasized of Bucklew’s rare medical con-
dition, “cites evidence that executing him by lethal injection will cause the tumors
that grow in his throat to rupture during his execution, causing him to sputter, choke,
and suffocate on his own blood for up to several minutes before he dies.”531 As Breyer
then lamented of Bucklew and the majority opinion’s approach: “The majority holds
that the State may execute him anyway. In my view, that holding violates the clear
command of the Eighth Amendment.”532 “I cannot reconcile the majority’s decision
with a constitutional Amendment that forbids all ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’”
Breyer observed.533
In a separate dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor was especially critical of the Su-
preme Court’s newly created requirement that death row inmates challenging a
method of execution must identify an alternative method in order to make out a
viable claim.534 “As I have maintained ever since the Court started down this
wayward path in Glossip v. Gross,” Justice Sotomayor wrote, “there is no sound
basis in the Constitution for requiring condemned inmates to identify an available
‘and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty.’”); id. at 11 (“It’s instructive, too, to
contrast the modes of execution the Eighth Amendment was understood to forbid with those
it was understood to permit. At the time of the Amendment’s adoption, the predominant method
of execution in this country was hanging.”); id. at 2 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“I do not here
prejudge the question whether the firing squad, or any other alternative method of execution,
would be a feasible and readily implemented alternative for every State.”).
529 In Bucklew, the U.S. Supreme Court was reviewing a summary judgment ruling. Id.
at 6–7, 14.
530 Id. at 1 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2 (“Bucklew has easily established a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether an execution by lethal injection would subject him to im-
permissible suffering.”); id. at 5 (concluding that executing Bucklew in a manner that would
cause him to “suffocate on his blood” would “exceed ‘the limits of civilized standards’”).
531 Id. at 1.
532 Id. at 1–2.
533 Id. at 14–15. As Justice Breyer wrote in his dissent: “We have repeatedly held that the
Eighth Amendment is not a static prohibition that proscribes the same things that it proscribed
in the 18th century. Rather, it forbids punishments that would be considered cruel and un-
usual today.” Id. at 15. See also id. at 15–16 (citation omitted):
The Constitution prohibits gruesome punishments even though they
may have been common at the time of the founding. Few would dispute,
for example, the unconstitutionality of “a new law providing public lash-
ing, or branding of the right hand, as punishment . . . [e]ven if it could be
demonstrated unequivocally that these were not cruel and unusual
measures in 1791.
534 Id. at 1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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means for their own executions.”535 “If a death sentence or the manner in which it
is carried out violates the Constitution,” Sotomayor stressed, “that stain can never
come out.”536 In fact, forcing a death row inmate to identify an alternative method
of execution turns America’s adversarial system on its head.537 Unlike the vigorous
advocacy of John Adams on behalf of his clients at the Boston Massacre trial,538 a
modern-day lawyer—forced to comply with Glossip’s Kafkaesque requirements—
must, in order to try to save the life of a death row client, make a detailed proposal
for how that same client can be readily executed.539
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Bucklew was, not surprisingly, sharply
criticized in the wake of its issuance.540 The ruling, one commentator wrote for Slate,
“signals the end of an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence governed by ‘civilized
standards’—and the beginning of a new, brutal era in American capital punishment.”541
Although it is too early to tell what will transpire in the months and years to come,
what is at stake is nothing less than a decades-old legal standard542 and the future
535 Id.
536 Id. at 5.
537 Introduction, in STEPHEN BREYER, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 14 (John D. Bessler
ed., 2016).
538 As John Adams said in open court in representing his clients at the Boston Massacre
trial in 1770:
“I am for the prisoners at the bar, and shall apologize for it only in the
words of the Marquis Beccaria: “If by supporting the rights of mankind,
and of invincible truth, I shall contribute to save from the agonies of
death one unfortunate victim of tyranny, or ignorance, equally fatal, his
blessings and tears of transport shall be sufficient consolation to me for
the contempt of all mankind.”
BESSLER, supra note 385, at 207.
539 E.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., DEADLY JUSTICE: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF
THE DEATH PENALTY 213 (2018) (“Most defense attorneys are loath to suggest to the govern-
ment how best to kill their clients; they only object to those methods that are proposed.”).
540 Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court’s Conservatives Just Legalized Torture, SLATE
(Apr. 1, 2019, 1:14 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/04/supreme-court-neil-gor
such-eighth-amendment-death-penalty-torture.html [https://perma.cc/4DMW-THMD].
541 Id.
542 The “evolving standards of decency” test has been in use since 1958 and has been in-
voked countless times by American courts. Jonathan Simon, The Legal Civilizing Process:
Dignity and the Protection of Human Rights in Advanced Bureaucratic Democracies, in
PUNISHING THE OTHER: THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF IMMORALITY REVISITED 37 (Anna
Eriksson ed., 2016) (“Trop v. Dulles (1958), decided four years into [Earl] Warren’s
transformative Chief Justiceship, represented the most significant early effort to discern the
implications of the new focus on human dignity for the state’s power to punish.”). See also
Ruth Hargrove & Roberta Thyfault, The Impact of, and Resistance to, the Use of Foreign
Law on Juvenile Punishment in the United States, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 41 (Kyriaki Topidi & Lauren Fielder eds., 2016):
Since 1958, when the Court decided Trop v. Dulles, the Court has held
1074 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:989
development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.543 When, for example, in Atkins
v. Virginia,544 the Supreme Court outlawed the execution of persons with intellectual
disabilities, it applied the “evolving standards of decency” test.545 In invoking that test,
and thus rejecting an originalist view of the Eighth Amendment, the Court in Atkins
explicitly ruled: “A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the stan-
dards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the ‘Bloody Assizes’
or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.”546
In future Eighth Amendment cases, the U.S. Supreme Court would be wise to
remember the historical context in which the U.S. Constitution’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause was adopted. Whereas the Glorious Revolution led to the adop-
tion of the English Bill of Rights, American revolutionaries were products of the
Enlightenment and avid readers of Montesquieu, Beccaria, and other leading intellectu-
als of the age.547 Whereas the Enlightenment—a period of history focused on progress,
rationality, and advances in science and legal and penal thought—was decidedly
forward-looking,548 the interpretive theory of originalism looks backward,549 harkening
that a punishment is cruel and unusual if society’s “evolving standards
of decency” say it is. The “evolving standards of decency” test sees the
Eighth Amendment as “progressive,” recognizing that contemporary
society may reject a punishment that was accepted when the Framers
wrote the Bill of Rights.
543 Stern, supra note 540 (speculating that the Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision in Bucklew
v. Precythe did “much more than condemn” an inmate to “a harrowing demise”; “[i]t also
quietly overrules, or at least erodes, more than 60 years of precedents, including several written
by Justice Anthony Kennedy”).
544 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
545 Id. at 321.
546 Id. at 311.
547 See generally BESSLER, supra note 49 (discussing the influence of Montesquieu and
Beccaria on America’s founders); see also BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note
46, at 75–271 (discussing the influence of Enlightenment thinkers on America’s founders).
548 STEVEN PINKER, ENLIGHTENMENT NOW: THE CASE FOR REASON, SCIENCE, HUMANISM,
AND PROGRESS 8 (2019):
The Enlightenment is conventionally placed in the last two-thirds of the
18th century, though it flowed out of the Scientific Revolution and the
Age of Reason in the 17th century and spilled into the heyday of clas-
sical liberalism of the first half of the 19th. Provoked by challenges to
conventional wisdom from science and exploration, mindful of the blood-
shed of recent wars of religion, and abetted by the easy movement of ideas
and people, the thinkers of the Enlightenment sought a new understanding
of the human condition.
549 PATRICK J. CHARLES, HISTORICISM, ORIGINALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE USE
AND ABUSE OF THE PAST IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2014) (noting that “originalism
invokes history . . . to define the contours of the Constitution” and that “[s]ome view originalism
as the use of historical sources to discern the meaning or intentions of the Constitution” while
“[o]thers perceive the task of originalism to be more complex” and “less about history and
more about defining legal meaning at a particular point in time”); compare DAVID A. STRAUSS,
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back to a time (i.e., the eighteenth century) when slavery and archaic and gruesome
corporal punishments were still in use.550 Unlike in the Enlightenment, when the
central question posed was whether a punishment was necessary or absolutely
necessary,551 the Bucklew ruling would allow the use of punishments that are not
only unnecessary, but cruel and unusual.552
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bucklew not only threatens the development of
modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, but it cuts against the prevailing trend
worldwide against the death penalty’s use553 and toward a recognition of death sen-
tences and executions as acts of physical and psychological torture.554 Indeed, in es-
sentially ruling out the notion of a future U.S. Supreme Court decision outlawing
capital punishment,555 the majority opinion in Bucklew took a far different approach
than that taken by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in 1995,556 the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court in 2015,557 and other judges who have examined the death
penalty’s characteristics and constitutionality.558 The “evolving standards of de-
cency” test invites the Supreme Court to periodically revisit the constitutionality of
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 17 (2010) (“Originalism is inconsistent with principles that are
at the core of American constitutional law”).
550 See, e.g., MARTHA L. FINCH, DISSENTING BODIES: CORPOREALITIES IN EARLY NEW
ENGLAND 125 (2010) (“Historians of early America are familiar with the corporal punishments,
like whippings, colonial courts imposed on criminals”); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 594 (2d ed. 1985):
Corporal punishment (whipping and flogging) survived in a few states—
in Delaware for example—as a kind of abominable relic. Elsewhere, even
in the South, its legitimacy was slowly sapped. Though whipping was still
legal in South Carolina up to the Civil War, a “cloud of disapproval”
made public whipping of whites a rare event. By 1900, except for con-
victs, whipping was almost extinct in the South—at least as a legitimate
punishment; it was common, however, for prisoners, especially on the
chain gang.
551 See generally BESSLER, supra note 49 (tracing the history of Montesquieu’s maxim—later
publicized by Beccaria—that any punishment that goes beyond necessity is “tyrannical”).
552 See generally BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7; FACING THE DEATH
PENALTY: ESSAYS ON A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (Michael L. Radelet ed., 1989).
553 JOSEPH A. MELUSKY & KEITH A. PESTO, THE DEATH PENALTY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK
266–68 (2017) (discussing U.N. resolutions calling for a moratorium on the death penalty).
554 See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES: BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERI-
CA’S DEATH PENALTY (2014) (discussing and analyzing botched executions in the United
States); Bessler, Taking Psychological Torture Seriously, supra note 481, at 1–97 (discussing
the torturous and coercive nature of threats of death).
555 Bucklew v. Precythe at 29–30, No. 17-8151 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2019).
556 State v Makwanyane and Another [1995] ZACC 3, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6)
BCLR 665 (CC), 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC).
557 State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2015) (outlawing Connecticut’s death penalty).
558 Barry, supra note 4, at 521 (gathering the opinions of judges who have advocated for
the death penalty’s abolition over the past half-century).
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punishments, but Bucklew—on its face—seems intended to foreclose that, at least for
capital punishment.559
Whereas South Africa’s highest court invoked the concepts of cruelty and human
dignity in declaring capital punishment unconstitutional,560 and whereas Connecticut’s
highest court invoked Beccaria’s memory and civilized standards in doing the same,561
the U.S. Supreme Court—in Bucklew—narrowly focused on whether a death row
inmate would suffer excruciating physical pain at the moment of his execution.562
For the Eighth Amendment to be read in a principled manner, though, the punish-
ment of death—a far more severe punishment than already abandoned or barred
non-lethal corporal punishments—must be declared unconstitutional.563 While the
English Bill of Rights set the stage for the adoption of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth
Amendment, the law is not static—and it never has been. And punishments once meted
out with regularity in seventeenth-century England or eighteenth-century America
are now known to bear the clear indicia—and the immutable characteristics—of
torture.564 Just as the English Bill of Rights, in 1689, barred punishments seen as
559 In his dissent in Glossip, Justice Breyer—joined by Justice Ginsburg—had specifically
called for a “full briefing” on “whether the death penalty violates the Constitution.” Glossip
v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
560 LILIAN CHENWI, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN AFRICA: A
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 128 (2007):
The Constitutional Court of South Africa, in S v Makwanyane, had to
decide whether the death penalty was cruel, inhuman and degrading
within the meaning of section 11(2) of the Interim Constitution Act 200
of 1993. Ten of the 11 judges considered the death penalty as cruel, in-
human and degrading punishment.
561 Kevin Barry, The Death Penalty & the Dignity Clauses, 102 IOWA L. REV. 383, 388
(2017) (“[J]ust eight weeks after Glossip, the Connecticut Supreme Court handed down a
sweeping decision in State v. Santiago, which ruled Connecticut’s 400-year-old death penalty
cruel and unusual in violation of the state’s constitution.”).
562 In ignoring the concept of psychological torture, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bucklew
completely disregarded the modern definition of torture, which includes both physical or
mental torture. DAVID LUBAN, TORTURE, POWER, AND LAW 153 (2014).
563 E.g., John D. Bessler, Beccaria in America: How the Italian Enlightenment Shaped
American Law, in AN DEN WURZELN DES MODERNEN STRAFRECHTS: DIE JURISTISCHE
AUFKLÄRUNG CESARE BECCARIAS UND DIE STRAFGEWALT 119 (Lorenzo Picotti ed. 2017):
Ironically, non-lethal corporal punishments such as ear cropping, the
pillory and whipping—the latter closely associated with slavery—have
already, for decades, been abandoned in the U.S. penal system. Indeed,
non-lethal bodily punishments have long been considered unconstitu-
tional in U.S. courts. Back in 1968, Harry Blackmun—then a judge on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit—ruled that the infliction
of lashes violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and
unusual punishments.”
564 Bessler, Taking Psychological Torture Seriously, supra note 481, at 1–97 (discussing
torture and the torturous characteristics of the death penalty).
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inconsistent with the standards of that day and age, the U.S. Supreme Court—which
has the duty to interpret the Constitution565—must not shirk its obligation, or abdi-
cate its duty, to declare any punishment unconstitutional that, in the twenty-first
century, runs afoul of the “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibition.566
565 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”).
566 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 312:
If the Justices find executions both “cruel” and “unusual,” and they
should, that should be the end of the story—period. Any punishment that
is “cruel and unusual” is unconstitutional, and the fact that some Southern
prosecutors and members of the general public still vocally support or
want to use that punishment does not make that punishment any less so.
